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ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY, A.D. 1439-1449

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THE QUESTION OF PEACE:

ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY, A.D. 1439-1449

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THE QUESTION OF PEACE:

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written on diplomacy during the earlier portions of the Hundred Years War.[1] Yet, except for a recent work on the Congress of Arras (1435),[2] little has been written on diplomacy during the latter segments of the war. Diplomacy in the crucial years following Arras has only been discussed

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[1]Eugène Déprez, Les préliminaries de la guerre de cent ans: La papauté, la France et l'Angleterre, 1328-1342 (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1902); Henry S. Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War, 1326-1347 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1929); Lucas, John III, duke of Brabant, and the French Alliance, 1345-1347 (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1927); Helen Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace under Benedict XII, 1334-1342 (Philadelphia: privately printed, 1933); Pierre Chaplais (ed.), "Some Documents regarding the Fulfillment and Interpretation of the Treaty of Bretigny, 1361-1369," Camden Miscellany ("Camden Third Series," no. 80; London: Royal Historical Society, 1952); Edouard Perroy (ed.), "The Anglo-French Negotiations at Bruges, 1374-1377," Camden Miscellany.

[2]Joycelyne Gledhill Dickinson, The Congress of Arras, 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1955). Although this work describes the more significant political developments at Arras, it places greater stress on the methods of diplomacy in this age.

in the general histories of the period[3] in spite of the fact that the occurrences in the final portions of a great conflict are often the most decisive in determining its outcome.

The Hundred Years War did not end with the successes of the Maid of Orléans. France remained divided and its eventual unification under the "king of Bourges" would not be achieved for almost a quarter of a century. From 1439 to 1449 diplomacy between the courts of the two claimants to the crown of France, Henry VI and Charles VII, was quite considerable. It dealt with the establishment and maintenance of peace, and the resolving of their differences concerning their claims to the French crown and various lands in France. This work is a study of that diplomacy during those critical and decisive years.

The Hundred Years War was really a series of wars beginning in 1338. The primary issue of the wars was the desire of the English kings to maintain and increase the size of their holdings in France, as opposed to the goal of the French kings to unify the nation under their crown. The conflict was complicated by the claims of various English rulers to the crown of France, and by the demands of the French monarchs that the kings of England do homage for their lands in France.

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[3]Although quite old the most detailed general histories in English or French remain: James H. Ramsay, Lancaster and York, A Century of English History, A.D. 1399-1485 (2 vols.; Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1892); G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, Histoire de Charles VII (6 vols.; Paris: Libraire de la Société bibliographique, 1881-91).

The first war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 by Edward III and the Dauphin Charles (the able future Charles V). By this treaty, Charles agreed to pay a ransom of three million ecus d'or for the captured French king, Jean II (1350-64). Edward III surrendered his claim to the French crown in return for Valois recognition of his full sovereignty (i.e., without homage) over almost one-third of France. The English-held lands thus recognized were generally in southwestern France between the Loire and the Pyrenees, except for Calais and certain other small holdings along the north coast. Charles V (1364-80) promoted the organization of a non-feudal army to compete with the more modern English army, but this program was largely interrupted by his early death. Yet, during his brief reign, English holdings were reduced to Calais and a narrow strip of coast in Guienne. The deaths of Charles V and Edward III (d. 1377) were followed by internal troubles in both countries and a lull in the war.

The reign of Charles VI (1380-1422) was one of misgovernment and strife in which the gains made by Charles V were lost. Periods of insanity made him unable to rule and the various princes of the blood competed for control of the government. The powerful dukes of Burgundy used the financial and military resources of the throne to increase their influence in the Low Countries. This was resented by the other blood princes led by Louis, duke of Orléans. Louis was assassinated in 1407 by henchmen of John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy (1409-19).

After three years of considerable intrigue, civil war broke out between factions led by the duke of Burgundy, and by Bernard VII, count of Armagnac and father-in-law of Charles, the new duke of Orléans. The ambitious Henry V of England (1413-22) could not let the opportunity pass to declare himself king of France and renew the war in 1415. English connections with the dukes of Burgundy had generally been close because of the commercial ties existing between England and Flanders. Yet Henry and John were wary of each other. Each wished to use the other for his own objective, the crown of France. Some of the adherents of John fell at Agincourt in 1415, but this crushing French defeat at the hands of the English was primarily an Armagnac defeat. Charles of Orléans was taken prisoner by the English and remained in England for most of the rest of his life. In a secret pact made in May of 1417, John recognized Henry and his descendents as heirs to the French throne and promised to do homage. The Burgundians took Paris from the Armagnacs in 1418. The Anglo-Burgundian pact had not been exposed and it appeared that, in the face of an English threat, the rival French parties might unite. Talks between John and the dauphin (the future Charles VII) opened in July. Tempers flared and John held that the dauphin could not agree to any settlement without the approval of his father, the king. Assassination had been feared by each side from the start and on July 16 John the Fearless was struck in the head with an axe. Adherence to a

pro-English policy against the Armagnacs was no longer in doubt.[4]

John was succeeded by his son Philip the Good (1419-67) who, duty bound to avenge the murder of his father, became a public ally of Henry V. The Lancastrian king was approached by both French groups and was thus able to increase his demands. In the face of English aggressions, the Armagnacs also attempted unsuccessfully to resolve their differences with the Burgundians. The Burgundians had recently gained control of the mad Charles VI, and on May 21, 1420, the remarkable Treaty of Troyes was signed. Charles VI agreed to allow Henry V to

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[4]Detailed works on the complex relations among the Valois, Lancastrians, and Burgundians, as described in this and following paragraphs, include: Richard A. Newhall, The English Conquest of Normandy (1416-1424): A Study in Fifteenth Century Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924); Newhall, "Henry V's policy of conciliation in Normandy, 1417-1422," Anniversary Essays in Mediaeval History by Students of Charles Homer Haskins; Presented on His Completion of Forty Years of Teaching, ed. Charles H. Taylor (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), pp. 205-30; Ernest F. Jacob, Henry V and the Invasion of France (London: English Universities Press, 1947); Jacob, "The Collapse of France, 1419-1420," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XXVI (1942), pp. 307-26; Jacques d'Avout, La querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons: Histoire d'une crise d'autorité (Dijon: Gallimard, 1943); Pierre Champion and Pierre de Thoisy, Bourgogne, France-Angleterre au traité de Troyes (Paris: Editions Balzac, 1943); Charles Samaran, La maison d'Armagnac au XV^e siècle et les dernières luttes de la féodalité dans le Midi de la France (Mémoires et documents publiés par Société de l'Ecole des chartes, no. 7; Paris: A. Picard et fils, 1907); Leonard V. D. Owen, The Connection between England and Burgundy during the First Half of the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937); Albert Mirot, "Charles VII et ses conseillers assassins présumés de Jean Sans Peur," Annales de Bourgogne, XIV (1942), pp. 287-321; Joseph Calmette, The Golden Age of Burgundy: The Magnificent Dukes and Their Courts, trans. Doreen Wightman (New York: Norton, 1963).

marry his daughter Catherine and declared him his son. The dauphin was disinherited by his parents in terms that intimated he was a bastard. Henry was to be regent during the life of the mad king and would succeed him on his death as the king of France, thus violating the tradition of inheritance through the male line. The dauphin held his own during a period of confused struggles, being aided by increased national feeling in France, of which the mission of Joan of Arc a decade later may be called the culmination. The English prospered in France while Henry V lived, but he died before he could obtain the crown of France. Henry V died on August 31, 1422. A regency was set up to govern for his successor, the infant Henry VI, and also for Charles VI. Philip the Good refused an offer by John, duke of Bedford and brother of the late Henry, to accept the regency.[5] Thus Bedford became regent of France. Following the death of Charles VI on October 21, almost two months after the death of Henry V, the infant Henry VI, already king of England, was proclaimed king of France.

The Burgundian duke rarely gave strong support to the English military in France. Philip directed his energies towards increasing his holdings in the Empire, especially in the Netherlands. This involved him in a conflict with Humphrey, duke of Gloucester and uncle of Henry VI, who married Jacqueline

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[5]On Bedford see: Ethel Carleton Williams, My Lord of Bedford, 1389-1435: Being a Life of John of Lancaster, First Duke of Bedford, Brother of Henry V, and Regent of France ([London]: Longmans, c.1963).

of Bavaria in 1422 against the wishes of Bedford. Philip gained control of her lands (Hainault, Holland, Zeeland, Friesland) by 1428, but his relations with Gloucester, who was also the regent in England (under the Council) of Henry VI, suffered greatly. Bedford tried to avoid the Burgundian conflict with his brother by diplomatic means. He had married Anne of Burgundy, a sister of Philip, in 1423. In 1430 the English were able to maneuver Philip into a marriage with Isabella of Portugal, a descendant of John of Gaunt, the first Lancastrian.[6] However, Anne of Burgundy died in 1432 and the relationship between Philip and Bedford became extremely weak. Throughout this period the wily Charles VII attempted to attract Philip away from his English alliance. Late in 1431 a general truce was signed between Burgundy and France largely due to the efforts of Nicolò Albergati, cardinal priest of S. Croce, a papal legate. The English had refused to negotiate without first consulting with Philip, but the Burgundian duke had no qualms about making a unilateral truce. Talks continued between the Burgundians and representatives of Charles VII on ways to resolve their differences. One of the more important mediators was René of Anjou, who was destined to be the father-in-law of Henry VI. The main barriers to a reconciliation were the matter of guilt in the murder of John the Fearless, and the problem of Philip's agreements and oaths to Henry VI.

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[6]She was a granddaughter of John of Gaunt by Blanche of Lancaster and the daughter of John I of Portugal by Philippa

At Nevers early in 1435, Philip proposed that a great congress under the mediation of the pope be called to resolve the conflict between Henry VI and Charles VII. The Congress of Arras, which opened in August, was in theory a great international conference called to re-establish peace in the west. However, it appears to have been primarily designed to allow Philip to break his hollow alliance with Henry VI and resolve his differences with Charles VII. The duke and duchess of Burgundy and all of the great lords of France were there. The English delegation was headed by Henry Beaufort, the wealthy cardinal of Winchester and grand-uncle of Henry VI. Cardinal Albergati represented Pope Eugenius IV. Representatives from the Council of Basel were also present. Talks between the Lancastrian and Valois delegates never attained any level of compromise or even cordiality. Anglo-Burgundian relations were also frigid from the beginning of the conference when Philip refused to head the English delegation. Several offers were made by the delegates of both monarchs; none of them compromised significantly on the major issues at the conference. The main issue appears to have been the question of who possessed the crown of France. Cardinal Albergati suggested that Henry should be content with one crown and the English countered that some dukes had more than one duchy, an obvious comparison with Philip. The English held that Henry's right

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of Lancaster. She was thus a niece of Henry IV and a first cousin of Henry V.

to the crown was a topic too sacred to be discussed by mortals, for he held it from God alone. Curiously, the claim of descent from Edward III was used more strongly than the claim of support from the Treaty of Troyes. The French not only claimed the crown for Charles VII but asserted that Henry should do homage to Charles for any French lands ceded him. The English realized that a final settlement could not be reached short of compromising Henry's claim to the throne. The English offers suggested that there be a truce declared for a certain length of time, a marriage alliance between Henry and a daughter of Charles VII, and the return of Charles of Orléans for a specified ransom. The offers varied on the length of the truce, the amount of the dowry and ransom, and also on the lands that would be held by each claimant. Henry's subjects held that they could not compromise on Henry's claim to the French throne and that a truce would allow this matter to be resolved after he became of age. The French refused to make any concessions on their demand that Henry give up his claim to the throne and to any lands he occupied or claimed. Any lands ceded to him in return could only be held after he had done homage for them. All of the French offers, except the first, offered to cede lands to Henry with homage due. The final offer of the French was that the renunciation of the crown by Henry, and French sovereignty over the ceded lands, including Normandy and much of Guienne, be postponed for seven years, i.e., until the king reached his majority of twenty-one years. This was the only

French offer which also included a proposal of a marriage alliance before the demands relating to the crown and homage had been met, although the English had been suggesting such a marriage alliance throughout the negotiations. This final offer was refused by the English, who soon left for home. At Philip's insistence, the offer was repeated with minor concessions and sent directly to England. The English were given until January 1, 1436, to accept it. The two monarchs were probably too balanced in strength in 1435 for either to make any concessions without first striving for a greater military advantage.[7]

A general peace treaty between the Valois and Lancastrians was unattainable, as was expected at least by Philip II and Charles VII. Cardinal Albergati absolved Philip of his oaths to Henry VI and the duke signed a treaty with Charles VII. The Treaty of Arras was signed on September 20. Bedford, who had lain ill at Rouen during the negotiations, died on September 14. Thus, Henry VI lost his highly able regent of France. The final French offer to England, noted above, was repeated, after the English had departed and a separate Franco-Burgundian treaty was signed, apparently as a device. Philip assumed the offer would be unacceptable to the ministers of Henry VI and thereby make it appear they had precipitated the break with him. Thus the duke would appear not as a perjuror so much as one who fervently desired peace. He assured the English that

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[7]Dickinson, passim.

he held no ill feeling towards them and wished to remain at peace. His embassy was rebuffed and the English tried to foment troubles for him in the Low Countries through Jacqueline of Bavaria and those in Holland and Zeeland related commercially to the English. The opposition to any compromise with Philip was apparently led by Gloucester, who organized forces in 1436 to defend Calais against him.[8]

Under the terms of the Treaty of Arras, Charles VII denied that he had any part in the murder of Jean the Fearless in 1419 but promised to make atonement. Various lands generally northeast of Paris were handed to Philip and he was exempted during the life of Charles VII from doing homage for

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[8] Ibid. On English activities in the Low Countries see: Edward Scott and L. Gilliodts van Severen, Le Cotton Manuscrit Galba B. I, transcrit sur l'original par M. Edward Scott et annoté par M. L. Gilliodts van Severen ("Collection des chroniques belges inédites"; Bruxelles: Hayez, Imprimeur de l'Academie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1896), pp. 425-35; Enguerrand de Monstrelet, The Chronicles of Enguerrand de Monstrelet; containing an Account of the Cruel Civil Wars between the Houses of Orleans and Burgundy; of the Possession of Paris and Normandy by the English; their Expulsion thence; and of other Memorable Events that Happened in the Kingdom of France, as well as in other countries . . . Beginning at the year MCCCC, where that of Sir John Froissart finishes, and ending at the year MCCCCLXVII. [sic, Monstrelet died in 1444], and continued by others to the year MDXVI., trans. Thomas Johnes (4 vols.; Hafod: J. Henderson, 1809), III, pp. 156-57; Thomas Rymer (ed.), Foedera, Conventiones, Literae, et Cujuscunque Generis Acta Publica, inter Reges Angliae, et Alios quosvis Imperatores, Reges, Pontifices, Principes, vel Communitates, ab Ineunte Saeculo Duodecimo, viz. ab Anno 1101, ad nostra usque Tempora, Habita aut Tractata; Ex Autographis, infra Secretiores Archivorum Regiorum Thesaurarias, per multa Saecula reconditis, fideliter Exscripta (2d. ed., 20 vols.; Londini: Per J. Tonson, 1704-35), X, p. 686.

his French fiefs.[9] The treaty was highly favorable to both the interests and honor of Philip. Though perhaps expensive and humiliating to Charles VII, it added greatly to his power. The strongest French prince of the blood was no longer allied with the English.

Events of the year 1435 had greatly damaged English interests in France. Abandoned by his powerful ally Philip, and without the leadership of Bedford, Henry VI had seen his power on the continent decline. In 1436 even Normandy was in a state of confusion with Fécamp and Harfleur temporarily lost and Arques burned.[10] Moreover, Charles VII regained Paris in April of 1436. Later in the same year, however, Calais was successfully defended against Philip and the English ravaged Flanders. Yet English relations with Scotland deteriorated with the expiration of the truce with the Scots in May. King James I unsuccessfully attacked England while Calais was being besieged. Moreover, his murder by discontented nobles led to a renewal of the truce in 1438.[11] The French avoided a direct confrontation

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[9]Dickinson, pp. 160-98. For an annotated copy of the Treaty of Arras see: Eugène Cosneau (ed.), Les grands traités de la guerre de cent ans (Paris: A. Picard, 1889), pp. 116-51.

[10]Great Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Memorials of the Reign of King Henry VI: Official Correspondence of Thomas Bekynton, Secretary to King Henry VI., and Bishop of Bath and Wells, ed. George Williams (2 vols.; "Rolls Series," no. 56), I, pp. 289-93.

[11]Great Britain, Privy Council, Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England (6 vols., Record Commissioners), IV, pp. 308-15. Hereafter referred to as PPC.

with English troops, but continued to harass them. Guienne was invaded and Bordeaux besieged in 1438. The English were fighting a defensive war. Cardinal Beaufort, who had gained great influence in the Council, realized that England would have to compromise her continental ambitions or face further setbacks, but English opinion was not unanimous. In particular, Humphrey of Gloucester still hoped to achieve the goals of his late brother, Henry V.[12]

Charles VII was not opposed to coming to terms with the English if favorable terms could be reached. The Île de France had been cleared of the English in 1436, and in 1437 Montereau, one of the last English posts on the Seine, was seized. However, these French successes were counterbalanced by English

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[12]Humphrey was not very active politically following his military engagement against the Burgundians in 1436 (Kenneth H. Vickers, Humphrey Duke of Gloucester [London: Archibald Constable and Co., 1907], pp. 255ff.). However, in a protest to Henry VI in 1440, he denounced the peace motives of Beaufort since he was "the chief merchant of wolles in youre lande, that ye be therby gretly defrauded," i.e., that Beaufort's desire for the resumption of the wool trade between Flanders and Calais would take precedence over other national interests. The protest began: "The declaracione of Humfrey, sonne, brother and oncle of Kynges, duc of Gloucestre, of Holand, Zeland and Brabant, erle of Penbroke [sic], of Henaude and of Flaundres, grete chanbrelain of England. . . ." indicating he still claimed title to the Burgundian lands granted him by Henry VI in 1436. This may also have influenced his opposition to peace at least slightly. For the letter of protest see: PRO, Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry the Sixth, King of England, ed. Joseph Stevenson (2 vols. in 3; "Rolls Series," no. 22), II, p. 443. (This work is referred to hereafter as Stevenson). For the 1436 grant to Humphrey see Rymer, X, p. 652. On Beaufort see L. B. Radford, Henry Beaufort (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 1908).

ones. England by the end of 1436 restored order in Normandy. In 1438 the French campaign in Guienne had been repelled. Thus, apart from the capture of Paris, Valois military achievements were insignificant. In 1437, Charles was also threatened by a plot of French nobles led by Charles, duke of Bourbon, Jean, duke of Alençon, King René of Anjou, titular king of Sicily and Jerusalem, and Jean V, duke of Brittany. They had resented the king's favors towards Arthur, earl of Richmond, a brother of Jean of Brittany, and Charles of Anjou, count of Maine and brother of King René.[13] France was also weakened by devastating plagues in 1437, Paris being especially hard hit.[14] Thus, although Charles VII remained at an advantage over Henry VI, events following the capture of Paris were disappointing to him. The plot of 1437 had militarily weakened France. If terms were favorable, Charles was not opposed to a temporary peace that would allow him to strengthen his position.

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[13]This plot came alive again in 1440 when it was more threatening since it included others. The 1440 plot, known as the "Praguerie," will be discussed in chapter three. Arthur of Brittany, constable of France, was also known as the "comte de Richemont" because of his claim to the English earldom of Richmond. He was a prisoner in England from the battle of Agincourt to 1420. He adhered to the English cause until 1424 when he returned to the French side again. His claim was not recognized by the English. Part of his childhood was spent in the household of Philip's grandfather and part of it in that of the duke of Berry, who also had charge of the future Charles VII and the future duke of Bourbon (see Eugène Cosneau, Le Connétable de Richemont [Paris: A. Picard, 1886], p. 8 et passim).

[14]Monstrelet, III, p. 244; Jean Chartier, Chronique de Charles VII, roi de France, ed. Vallet de Viriville (3 vols.; Paris: Chez P. Jannet, Libraire, 1858), I, pp. 245-46.

Philip of Burgundy, detested by the English since Arras, still held hope for a treaty with Henry VI. In 1437 and 1438, following an English blockade, the Flemish had revolted and Flemish and Dutch pressure continued for a resumption of commercial relations with England. Although Philip and Henry had forbidden trade, numerous English, Flemish, and Dutch merchants gained letters of safe-conduct from Henry to continue the trade.[15] Perroy has suggested that Philip may also have been fearful of an Anglo-French agreement at his expense if he did not take the initiative.[16] England signed a commercial treaty with the Grand Master of the Teutonic knights and certain Hanseatic cities in March, 1436.[17] Commercial rivalry between the Low Countries and some members of the Hanse caused their relations to deteriorate rapidly. War broke out in May, 1438, lasting until 1442. Thus, a resumption of relations with England had become steadily more urgent. Philip desired

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[15]PRO, Calendar of French Rolls in The 48th Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records (1887), pp. 314ff. Trade between England and the Low Countries, especially Flanders and Holland, consisted not only of cloth and wool, but also of fish, salt, cereals, ale and beer, vegetables and fruits, cheese and butter, cows and barrels of salt beef, coal, madder, tiles, hides and skins, and numerous other items, both raw and manufactured (Nelly Johanna Martina Kerling, Commercial Relations of Holland and Zeeland with England from the Late 13th Century to the Close of the Middle Ages [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954], chap. 3).

[16]Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years War (London: Eyre and Spottieswood, 1951), pp. 308-309.

[17]For a copy of the treaty see Rymer, X, p. 666. Hanseatic cities in the treaty included Lübeck, Danzig, and Hamburg.

either a general peace between England and France or, at least, a commercial treaty with England.

Philip showed his desire for normal commercial intercourse with England as early as 1437.[18] Safe-conducts were granted in March of 1438 to Sir Hugues de Lannoy, seigneur de Santes and governor of Holland and Zeeland, Henry Utenhove, and others to come to England for the purpose of bringing about closer relations.[19] Lannoy and his delegation were invited to appear before the King's Council on May 11.[20] There exist no details of their embassy, though subsequent events indicate they probably arranged for the meeting of Cardinal Beaufort and Duchess Isabella near Calais in January of 1439. Utenhove and at least part of the delegation remained in England until September.[21] Isabella, a half-niece of Beaufort and a cousin once removed of Henry VI, had a more cordial relationship with the Lancastrians than did her husband Philip, who was still considered a traitor. This probably explains why she rather than Philip undertook the cause of peace and trade with England.[22]

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[18] PRO, Lists and Indexes, XLIX, p. 181.

[19] Cal. Fr. Rolls, pp. 322, 325.

[20] PPC, V, p. 95.

[21] Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 325. On Nov. 21 safe-conduct was also granted to Sampson de la Laing who had brought letters from Isabella (Rymer, X, p. 716).

[22] According to The Brut or the Chronicles of England, ed. Friedrich W. D. Brie (Early English Text Society, nos. 131 and

On November 23, 1438, Henry VI appointed John Kemp, archbishop of York, Cardinal Beaufort, and others to treat with Flanders, Holland, Zeeland and Friesland for "Intercursus Mercandisarum & Communicationes mutuae."[23] Charles VII, at the invitation of Isabella, sent his secretary, Robert Mallière, and Regnault Girard, seigneur de Bazoges and master of the household, to take part in the deliberations

> sur la paix finale dentre les deux rois et royaulmes de France et dAngleterre et du duc de Bourguoigne, et aussi pour la delivrance des prisonniers, especialement du duc dOrlyens....[24]

In January, 1439, Cardinal Beaufort and Isabella met at a place previously agreed on between Calais and Gravelines.

136; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1906), pp. 505-506:

> "And for the Duke, was the Duchesse, having ful power of hir lorde as Regent & lady of his landis, wher was taken, by trewes of both parties, An Abstinance of Werre for A certeyn tyme in the name of the Duchesse, & nat of the Duke, because he had gone from his othe & legeance that he had made to King Henry; therefor King Henre neuer wold write, ne Apoynt, ne haue to do with him after, but al in the Duchesse name."

[23]Rymer, X, pp. 713-35. Others appointed by Henry VI included Nicholas Byllesdon, dean of Salisbury, Sir Thomas Rempston, lieutenant of Calais, and John Raynwell, master of the Staple. There is no evidence that all of these actually attended. Those accompanying Isabella to Calais included Louis van Caloen, Roland van Caloen, and Pierre Mathys (Galba B. I, p. 440n.).

[24]PRO, Recueil de croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant Bretaigne, a present nomme Engleterre par Jehan de Wavrin, seigneur du Forestel, ed. W. Hardy et al. (5 vols.; "Rolls Series," no. 39), IV, p. 252. See also Monstrelet, III, p. 253; Beaucourt, III, p. 103; Rymer, X, p. 718. Mallière was secretary to Charles VII from 1426 to 1441 and had been an ambassador at Arras in 1435 (Dickinson, p. 9).

Little detail is available on the conference. Wavrin provides more information than the other chroniclers.[25] The parties led by Beaufort and the duchess pitched tents for their meetings "chascun deulz noblement et grandement adcompaignies de notables personnes, ecclesiastiques que seculiers...."[26]

According to the chroniclers, numerous proposals were offered, but the only matters agreed upon were to inform the two kings of the various proposals relating to peace and to meet later and discuss these more fully. It was also determined that the duke of Orléans should be brought to the later meeting. The location was to be either Calais or Cherbourg, but this choice, as well as the time of the planned conference, was to be negotiated through the correspondence of the two kings with Isabella.[27] However, an additional event not noted by the chroniclers was that a truce for two months was concluded between Cardinal Beaufort and the duchess of Burgundy on February 8.[28] This truce, which may have been agreed upon after the departure of the French ambassadors, provided for a cessation of hostilities between England and the Burgundian lands in various critical areas including Calais. It required

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[25]The slightly briefer account of Monstrelet appears to be based on Wavrin.

[26]Wavrin, IV, p. 251.

[27]Wavrin, IV, pp. 251-53; Monstrelet, III, p. 253.

[28]PRO, Exchequer, Treasury of Receipt (Dipl. Doc.), 30/448. A second copy (Exch. 30/1072) is dated February 11.

safe-conducts for subjects of one ruler when entering the lands of the other, and provided for conservators to make compensation for any infractions. It was apparently decided that a commercial agreement between England and the Low Countries would have to await the next meeting and follow an attempt to bring about peace between England and France.

CHAPTER II

THE CONFERENCE OF CALAIS (1439)

The first great conference between Valois and Lancastrian embassies since the Congress of Arras in 1435 was planned for the year 1439. In January the conference had been agreed upon, and plans were made for it during the ensuing months. On March 4, 1439, Henry VI informed the "Puissant Princesse nostre Treschier & Tresame [très aimée] Cousine la Duchesse de Burgoyne" that he preferred the marches of Calais for the planned conference but would agree to Cherbourg if Charles VII ("nostre adversaire de France") so preferred. He also agreed to bring Charles of Orléans to Calais or Cherbourg. As was true of some other statements by Henry concerning the conference, he prefaced his remarks by reiterating his desire for peace

> par toutes bons Moiens honorables & raisonables, en aient Pitie & Compassion des enormes Maulx & innumerables Iniquitez, perpetrees, & Commis a la destruction du Poeple Christien de touts Estas, a l'occasion des Guerres quy sy loignement ont durs [durée], que lamentable chose est de le cognoistre & reacompter, & Principalment, pur reverence de Dieu, & a fyn de eviter l'effusion de Sang humain, aians Agreeable, Ferme, & Estable, &, de nostre part, Voulans, tant come en Nous est, effectuelment

accomplir ce que a este avise en ceste Partie, ...[1]

On March 26 a Flemish embassy departed for England to negotiate a commercial treaty and allow the important trade between Flanders and the Staple merchants of Calais to be resumed. This delegation was absent for about two months and probably helped make plans for the pending conference.[2] In May, Henry VI granted safe-conducts for the Burgundian and Valois delegations coming to the planned conference which Isabella had decided to locate in the marches of Calais.[3]

The members of the French delegation to Calais were listed in their commission issued by Charles VII on April 7.[4]

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[1]Rymer, X, pp. 718-19.

[2]Galba B. I, pp. 440-41n. Members of the embassy were Pierre Mathys, Sampson de la Laing, Henri Utenhove, Wautier van der Mandere, and Jean Rosincrans.

[3]The safe-conduct for five hundred members of the Valois delegation, including the archbishop of Reims, the dukes of Bourbon, Auvergne, and Alençon, the counts of Maine, Vendôme, Eu, and Dunois, dated May 8, is in Rymer, X, pp. 720-22. A safe-conduct for representatives from Flanders, Artois, and Picardy, also granted some time in May, is found in Galba B. I, pp. 440-44. All those listed in the safe-conducts did not necessarily attend the conference. These delegations were not of unusual size. Each ambassador had a large retinue, depending on his station. See Dickinson, pp. 103-108, for size of delegations at Arras.

[4]PPC, V, pp. 346-49; Urban Plancher, "Preuves," Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne, avec des notes, des dissertations et les preuves justificatives, composée sur les auteurs, les titres originaux, les cartulaires des églises cathédrales & collégiales, des abbäies, des monastères, & autres anciens monuments; et enrichie de vignettes, de cartes géographiques, de divers plans, de plusieurs figures, de portiques, tombeaux et sceaux tant des ducs que des grandes

The duke of Burgundy and Louis of Bourbon, first count of Vendôme, were the titular heads of the embassy, though neither is known to have played a very active role on behalf of Charles. The count of Vendôme, a cousin of Charles VII, had been at Arras in 1435, but was largely inactive at that time also.[5] It was customary at such conferences for the great nobles to remain aloof from detailed discussions. Dickinson has suggested this was probably because of their rank and also the wish to avoid embarrassing questions of precedence.[6] The interests of the duke of Burgundy, not always identical with those of Charles VII, were represented by his duchess and a separate delegation as noted below. The leading French ecclesiastic in the delegation was Regnault de Chartres, archbishop and duke of Reims and chancellor of France. Regnault, an experienced diplomat, had been the French spokesman at Arras, and was to assume again this role at Calais. This position was customarily reserved for the senior ecclesiastic in medieval times. However as chancellor of France he also was considered an important figure in Charles's Council. He had served Charles VII as dauphin and had crowned him in 1429. His experience as a diplomat is shown by the fact he had been a

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maisons, &c., par un religieux bénédictin de l'abbäie de S. Bénigne de Dijon et de la Congrégation de S. Maur (4 vols.; Dijon: impr. de A. de Fay, 1739, 1781), IV, pp. clxiv-clxv.

[5]Dickinson, p. 7.

[6]Ibid., p. 4. Though true here and at Arras, this was not always the practice. Cf. the Conference of Tours in 1444 (see below, pp. 117-24).

part of every significant embassy dealing with England or Burgundy since the first treaty of Arras in 1414 and including the conferences held by Cardinal Albergati with England in 1432. A second important ecclesiastic was Jean Tudert, formerly dean of Notre Dame of Paris and bishop-elect of Châlons sur Marne. Tudert had long been active in diplomacy and was the subject of Charles VII who had knelt before Philip at Arras and apologized for the murder of John the Fearless.[7] The only other ranking ecclesiastic noted in the commission was Jean de Harcourt, archbishop of Narbonne and son of Jean VI, count of Harcourt. His brother Christofle, seigneur d'Havrech, had been at Arras and other earlier diplomatic conferences.[8]

Other members of the French delegation were Jean, bastard of Orléans and count of Dunois (half-brother of the captured duke of Orléans), Adam de Cambrai, first president of the Parlement of Paris, Jacques de Chastellion, seigneur de Dampierre, Regnaud Girard, seigneur de Bazoges and master of the household, Robert Mallière, maître des comptes, and André du Beuff, secretary.[9]

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[7]Beaucourt, II, pp. 442-47; Dickinson, pp. 5-8 et passim; Calmette, p. 151.

[8]Dickinson, pp. xiv, 7-8.

[9]Cambrai and Mallière had been at Arras in 1435. Cambrai had been the first president of the Parlement of Paris after its reconstruction in 1436, and a member since 1412 (Dickinson, pp. 8-9). Girard and Mallière, members of the King's Council, had been the French ambassadors to the January, 1439, meeting with Cardinal Beaufort and the duchess of Burgundy.

Philip of Burgundy's delegation included only one leading ecclesiastic, Jean de Chevrot, bishop of Tournai and leader of the ducal Council.[10] He had also been at Arras. Among others present at Calais who had also been at Arras were Nicholas Rolin, the chancellor of Burgundy, Hugues de Lannoy, seigneur de Santes and governor of Holland and Zeeland, and Jacques de Crèvecoeur, seigneur de Crèvecoeur. Pierre Mathys led a group representing the major Flemish towns. In addition the delegation included Pierre Boutin (Bourdin), Philip de Namptere (Nanterre), "et pluiseurs autres sages et notables personnes" including representatives of various towns and states.[11] The duchess of Burgundy was attended by her niece, Anne, daughter of the duke of Cleves and wife of the prince of Vienne.[12]

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[10]Calmette, pp. 160, 167-68; Wavrin, IV, pp. 263-64; Monstrelet, III, p. 284.

[11]Wavrin, IV, pp. 263-64; Monstrelet, III, p. 283 (same account as Wavrin); Galba B. I, pp. 440-44. See Dickinson for a list of those with Philip at Arras (p. 152). According to Dickinson, Lannoy and Chevrot had been members of the Anglophile party at Arras (pp. 63-64). Hall stated in his chronicle that the "Lorde of Croy" (probably Sir Jean de Croy, bailiff of Hainault) and the bishop of Arras were at Calais with Philip but they are not listed by other sources (Edward Hall, Hall's Chronicle Containing the History of England during the Reign of Henry the Fourth and the Succeeding Monarchs to the end of the Reign of Henry the Eighth, in which are Particularly Described the Manners and Customs of those Periods [London: Printed for J. Johnson, 1809], p. 184).

[12]PPC, V, p. 342. See Rymer, X, p. 734, for permission from Henry, dated June 30, for her to pass into Navarre to her husband. Vienne (Viana) is in Navarre. Her husband was the future Charles IV, king of Navarre. She was apparently married by proxy and needed Henry's permission to pass through his lands in France in order to go on her honeymoon.

On May 23, Henry VI issued a commission naming and granting powers to the English delegation going to the marches of Calais to treat with the ambassadors of "Karolo de Valoys nobis adversante."[13] John Kemp, archbishop of York, headed the delegation and, as senior ecclesiastic, was its chief spokesman. His experience, as well as his rank, was comparable to that of the archbishop of Reims. He had been on numerous diplomatic missions under Henry V between 1415 and 1419, and had been the leading spokesman of the English delegation at Arras in 1435. A Frenchman, Pierre Cauchon, bishop of Lisieux, was, as at Arras, spokesman in Kemp's absence. Two other ranking ecclesiastics were Thomas Brouns, bishop of Norwich, and Thomas Rodburn (Redbourne), bishop of St. David's.[14] John Mowbray, third duke of Norfolk, was the ranking secular member of the delegation. Humphrey, earl (later duke) of Buckingham, Hereford, Stafford, Northampton, and Perche, John de Vere, earl of Oxford, Henry, lord Bourchier, Gilles de Duremont, twenty-fourth abbot of Fécamp, Walter, first baron Hungerford, and

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[13]This commission (PPC, V, pp. xlvii-l) was unacceptable to the French and was replaced in July by one also dated May 23. The latter is the one in Rymer (X, pp. 728-32) and Beckington's protocol (PPC, V, pp. 349-52). See below, pp. 46-47.

[14]PPC, V, p. xlviii; Dickinson, pp. 40-41; Arnold Judd, The Life of Thomas Bekynton: Secretary to King Henry VI and Bishop of Bath and Wells, 1443-1465 (Chichester: Printed by Moore and Tillyer Limited, The Regnum Press, for the Marc Fitch Fund, 1961), p. 183. The bishops of Lisieux and St. David's had also been at Arras. Brouns had become bishop of Norwich in 1436, replacing William of Alnwick who had also been at Arras. The bishop of Lisieux is well known because of his role in the trial of Joan of Arc.

Nicholas Byllesdon, dean of Salisbury, were among the other persons of rank named to the delegation.[15] Other members of the delegation included Sir John Sutton, sixth baron Dudley, Sir John Popham, speaker-elect of the House of Commons, Robert Whitingham, treasurer of Calais, Sir John Stourton, Thomas Beckington, the king's secretary, Stephan Wilton, William Sprever, and Jean de Rinel (Reynell or Ryvel), the king's French secretary.[16]

Although the embassy to Arras in 1435 had had at least five ranking members from France, in addition to twelve or so Englishmen,[17] the embassy in 1439 had only three Frenchmen, Cauchon, Duremont, and Rinel, as compared to fifteen or so

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[15] PPC, V, p. xlviii. Gilles de Duremont was the first abbot elected under English influence and did homage to Bedford. He became bishop of Coutances in 1437 and consented to the verdict against Joan of Arc. He and Hungerford were also members of the English embassy at Arras. (Judd, p. 183; Dickinson, pp. 44-47).

[16] Popham, Sprever and Rinel were at Arras in 1435 (Dickinson, pp. 44-47). Beckington, Wilton, and Sprever were called "legum doctorum" in the commission. Sprever had been at Basel in 1434-35 and was familiar with the Anglo-French conflicts there. He compiled the "Codex Sprever" containing many valuable documents concerning Arras (Dickinson, p. 32). Rinel, a nephew by marriage of Pierre Cauchon, had been on numerous embassies before Arras (André Bossuat, "La littérature de propagande au XVe siécle: Le mémoire de Jean de Rinel, secrétaire du roi d'Angleterre, contre le duc de Bourgogne, 1435," Cahiers d'histoire [Lyon, 1956], pp. 131-46; J. Otway-Ruthven, The King's Secretary and the Signet Office in the XVth Century [Cambridge: At the University Press, 1939], pp. 91-93, 156; Dickinson, p. 47). William Erard ("sacrae Paginae Professoris"), though not mentioned in the original commission, was included in the later one replacing it. However, his attendance at Calais in 1439 has not been verified.

[17] Dickinson, p. 49.

Englishmen, reflecting perhaps the declining English fortunes on the continent.

Another commission, also granted on May 23, empowered the archbishop of York, the bishops of St. David's and Norwich, Byllesdon, Popham, Wilton, Sprever, and, perhaps significantly, the treasurer of Calais, Robert Whitingham, to treat with the duchess of Burgundy, and the ambassadors of Flanders, Brabant, Artois, and certain other Burgundian lands "pro Intercursu Mercandisarum" and other related matters.[18] Thus although peace with France might not come about, England and Burgundy hoped at least for some beneficial results from the conference.

Cardinal Henry Beaufort, bishop of Winchester and uncle of Henry VI, and his niece Isabella, duchess of Burgundy, assumed special roles at Calais. Not officially members of either the English or French delegations, they were to act as mediators between the embassies of the rival kings, assisted by Charles, duke of Orléans, a prisoner of the English since Agincourt, who was brought to Calais for this occasion.[19] Beaufort also held a separate commission from Henry VI, dated May 25, that empowered him alone to treat on the most important matters that might arise, in particular respecting Henry's

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[18]Rymer, X, pp. 730-31. On May 29 power was also granted to Sprever and two merchants, Robert Brampton and Nicholas Hysshom, to treat with Holland and Zeeland for a redress of injuries (Rymer, X, pp. 733-34).

[19]Rymer, X, pp. 719, 724; PPC, V, p. 335.

right and title to the crown and realm of France.[20]

In addition to the letters of commission noted above which gave the embassies authority to act on behalf of their sovereign, embassies to conferences such as that held at Calais also carried letters of instructions. The former, in the case of the English, would always be in Latin.[21] It gave

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[20]Rymer, X, pp. 732-33. Beaufort received a license on May 21 to take with him to Calais any quantity of money and plate (Rymer, X, p. 723). On May 23 he was empowered to grant letters of safe-conduct for those coming to Calais (Rymer, X, p. 730).

In 1430 the English had unsuccessfully suggested that he act as a papal mediator (PPC, IV, p. 12). However he was not acting as a papal representative here, but as a representative of Henry and an apparent counterpart to the duchess of Burgundy who would consult with the French ambassadors and then confer with him. Beaufort and Isabella then, as mediators, were fulfilling the role assumed at Arras by the more neutral mediators from the pope and the Council of Basel. English dissatisfaction with the church fathers at Arras probably explains why there was no mediation by the church in 1439 (PPC, V, p. 365; Dickinson, pp. 130 et passim). There was apparently no papal representative at Calais in 1439 though the pope sent a message to Henry VI during the previous winter applauding the decision to allow the duke of Orléans to take part in the peace talks (PRO, Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters, ed. W. H. Bliss et al. [15 vols., in progress], VIII, p. 222; Odericus Raynaldi et al. [eds.], Annales Ecclesiastici, Denuo et Accurate Excusi: Tomus Vigesimus Octavus, 1424-1453 [Parisiis: Ex Typis Consociationis Sancti Pauli, 1880], pp. 265-66 [Eugenii IV Annus 8, no. 14]. See Pap. Reg. for probable date of letter.). As will be noted below (pp. 51-53) the Council of Basel was rebuffed in an attempt to mediate at Calais.

[21]The French rarely used Latin at this time for such documents though they did use it at Arras, perhaps for the benefit of the papal and conciliar mediators. The English had refused to recognize the use of French at diplomatic conferences under Henry V, apparently because they found the language difficult (see Dickinson, pp. 113-17). Although the English might have found French more difficult than Latin, they had French members on their embassies at both Arras and Calais as well as a number of Englishmen who probably knew the language. Perhaps

the embassy authority, requested that this authority be accepted by the other party, named the members of the embassy, determined the quorum necessary to act in their behalf, and promised that items to which they would agree would be ratified by the king.[22] Letters of instructions were occasionally of such a nature as to be inspected by the other side but usually they were confidential. Thus, in the case of the English, they would be in English rather than Latin. The instructions of Charles VII to his embassy at Calais have not come to light, but the instructions of Henry VI to his delegation have survived. They detailed the various offers, concessions and arguments the embassy might put forward. They are therefore of great value in telling both what methods the English hoped

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the French delighted in the use of French at such conferences, rather than Latin, since Henry VI did claim to be the king of France. French documents at Calais were sometimes translated into Latin, probably for the benefit of the English (PPC, V, p. 370).

[22]These were sometimes called procurations ("procuratio") or letters of "full powers" ("potestas" or "pouvoir"), rather than commissions ("commissio"). Standard forms had developed by the thirteenth century making them easily recognizable. A third type of letters were the letters of credence ("lettres de creance" or "litterae credenciales"), which sometimes supplemented the letters of commission, as at Arras (Dickinson, p. 31), though apparently not in 1439. They usually replaced the commissions and were the only letters used for ambassadors delivering messages or undertaking other relatively simple missions. See G. Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration 1259-1339 (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940), passim; Ernest M. Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1917), I, pp. 105-108; Dickinson, pp. xvi-xxii; Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London: Constable, 1954), pp. 257ff.; Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955), pt. 1.

to use and also how far they were willing to go with their offers.[23]

According to the instructions, the ambassadors were ordered to demand first that the French allow Henry to enjoy "his Coronne and Reme of France" with "al thaire Appurtenances, as him oweth of Ryght to do." The ambassadors were to enforce this claim, "not in puttyng in Question ner in Disputes on the Kyng's Original Title," but

> by the Jugements of God that have be yoven, in many and diverse grete Batailles, had in and for his said Clayme and Right: And also by th' Appointment and Accorde made upon the same bitwix the Kyngs, of moost Noble Memoire, his Fadre [Henry V] and Aiel [Charles VI]. . . .[24]

If, as was anticipated, these claims were not acknowledged, the king was willing, since "he desirith the Peas," to purchase it by giving to his adversary and his heirs certain "Landes, Lordshippes, and Possessions beyonde the Ryvere of Lyre [Loire]," consisting mainly of the province of Languedoc, for twenty thousand pounds a year. The lands were to remain, however, owned by Henry "as in the Right of his said Coronne of France." If, as was expected, these initial proposals were refused, Cardinal Beaufort, "as a Prelat of the Chirche, and

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[23]Rymer, X, pp. 724-28; PPC, V, pp. 354-62. Their content, as well as the use of English, rather than Latin, indicates they were not meant to be read by the French.

[24]Rymer, X, p. 724. It is interesting to note that he used the English "father" for his English parent, but the French "aieul" for his French grandfather.

as a Mediatour and Sterer [Steerer] to the Peas," was to speak at length on the destruction and sorrow this war which had "endured this Hundred Yere and more" had caused. More men from each nation had been slain than now existed in both lands. One of the chief evils caused by the war was that

> the Christen Faith and Beleve, the whiche is now so gretly lassed and decressed as it is wele knowe, and the Remes and Cuntre, that had received it and were grounded in the same, now pervertid, might and shold not oonly have be defendid and kept, but the said Christen Feith and Beleve had, by lyklyhode of reson, be dilated thorgh the World.[25]

The war must terminate, according to the instructions, either by treaty or by the total destruction of one of the powers. Furthermore, Charles and Henry were also nearly related to each other "and ich of hem to al the grete Princes of bothe Lands," and the laws of God required each of them "to desire and wille the good of other." Another argument stressed was that

> the Princes of bothe Parties owe to considre that God made noght his People in the said Two Remes ner in other for the Princes, but He made the Princes for his Service and for the Whele and Behove of his People (that is to say) to Reule theim in Tranquillite (namly) by the mene of deue Ministracion of Justice: So that they, so Reuled, shal mowe [should or could] restfully and peasible serve hym. . . .[26]

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[25] Ibid., p. 724-25.

[26] Ibid. This view provides an interesting parallel to the ideas of Sir John Fortescue, chief justice of the Court of King's Bench from 1442 until 1461 (when Henry VI lost his throne), who compared the relationship of the crown to the people in England to that in Valois France.

Cardinal Beaufort was also to point out that France "be grete and populus, and have noght at al tymes be hooly under the Governance of oo sool kyng" but rather "as wele bifore Carlemeyn as after," had been divided among three or four kings. Moreover, whichever king should refuse to make concessions for the furtherance of peace would have to answer to God for the evils caused by the continuation of the war.[27]

Following this "Exhortacion" by Beaufort, the ambassadors were to make another offer to the no doubt deeply moved Valois embassy. They were to offer to cede all the lands "belonging to the Coronne of France, that is beyonde the Rivers of Leyrs," reserving only the duchy of Guienne, the county of Poitou and the other lands which the kings of England had possessed before "the Coronne of France descended or belonged unto hem."[28]

If refused, they should offer the above again, but enlarge it by reserving no more for Henry beyond the Loire than that which he currently possessed. They were also to emphasize and extol the large numbers of towns, bishoprics, and archbishoprics included in the offer. This offer, as the previous one, implied that the lands each would hold beyond the Loire would be held without doing homage to the other.[29]

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[27]Rymer, X, pp. 725-26. N. H. Nicolas, commenting on this assertion, observed that this truth appears "to have occurred to the English government for the first time when it was impracticable either to retain their conquests or to support the war (PPC, V, p. xxxix)."

[28]Rymer, X, p. 726.

[29]Ibid.

If this offer was also declined, the ambassadors were then ordered to propose that Henry retain the "Townes and Marches of Calais," and the "county, castle, and lordship of Guisnes,"[30] along with those parts of France which the English kings had possessed, "noght as kyngs of France, but in thaire own propre and Prive Right," to be held "immediately of God, and as Lord Soveraine of the same and of the Subgets thereof" and without subjection by him or his heirs "to any Erthy Man." The next article directed the embassy to resist but not totally reject a demand for the restoration of lands to Charles's adherents that had been lost due to the English conquest of Normandy and other areas.[31]

Title to the "Name and Coronne of France" and the accompanying question of homage had long been a major issue between the two kings. As important as the division of lands between the two and intertwined with it, this problem lent itself less easily to an amicable solution. Henry VI and Charles VII each claimed himself king of France and had refused to do homage to the other. Thus, if the conference was to be successful, this issue would have to be either temporarily or permanently resolved. Henry instructed his ambassadors that, after the question of lands had been resolved, if this was the only obstacle to an accord, they should state that since he had been

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[30]Not to be confused with the duchy of Guienne. Guisnes, more commonly called Guines, is just south of Calais.

[31]Ibid.

crowned in the capital city, a "grete partie of the Piers of France beyng present" and assenting thereto, its concession would "gretly touche and hurte his Worship." The instructions repeated an argument mentioned above within Beaufort's exhortation by noting

> that it were no Noveltee ner Inconvenient, that iche of hem callid him Kyng of France, for so hath be seen afore this that such have be Kyngs in France, of diverse Parties there of, that have called hemself ich of hem Kyng of France.[32]

Rather than allow the peace talks to "falle to Rupture," the ambassadors should then refer the Valois embassy to Cardinal Beaufort, "to whom the King hath opened and declared al his Entent in this Matiere." A commission, dated May 25, authorized Cardinal Beaufort to conclude an agreement with the French ambassadors relating to the "Jure & Titulo [Jus & Titulus] Juris ad Coronam & Regnum Franciae."[33] This commission does not make clear the exact content of the offer or offers he was instructed to make, but, on the basis of the instructions to the English embassy as just quoted and also the exhortation of Beaufort noted earlier, the general nature of his offer or offers may be surmised.

As long as Henry VI held lands in France over which he refused to relinquish sovereignty, he could not have recognized Charles VII as the sole possessor of French sovereignty. On the other hand, Charles VII could not be expected to deny his sovereignty over French lands he possessed. However, as

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[32] Ibid., p. 727.

[33] Ibid., pp. 732-33.

was done "as wele bifore Carlemeyn as after," France might have two kings, each sovereign over the lands he possessed and owing no homage to the other king. This conjecture of what Beaufort may have been prepared to offer, either immediately or, more likely, through a series of increasingly generous proposals, is supported by the fact that the last proposal concerning the division of lands was that Henry retain only those which the kings of England held or claimed, not as kings of France, but as the sovereign possessors thereof. It is impossible to surmise whether Henry VI was willing to cease using the title "King of France" or merely willing to acknowledge that Charles VII could also use it. Perhaps Beaufort was to propose that both kings use the title, and after some bargaining concede that Henry not use the title in return for full recognition of his sovereignty over his French possessions. However, regardless of whether the title "King of France" was to be used by either or both, it is reasonable to assume that the proposal planned for delivery by Beaufort would have suggested that each king be sovereign over his own lands within France, not recognizing the other as his lord.

The proposals the English were prepared to make were more generous than those made by them at Arras. Their final proposal in 1435 was the cession to France of all lands held by the French with a limited exchange of enclaves. However England at that time still held the Île de France including Paris, as well as other lands lost by 1439. Only a temporary

peace, if any, could have been hoped for at Arras since the English ambassadors, due to the minority of the English king, refused to compromise his rights to the crown of France or agree to any other final settlement.[34]

The English offers of land at Arras were also always accompanied by a proposed marriage alliance between Henry VI and a daughter of Charles VII. However, perhaps because Henry VI was old enough to speak for himself in 1439 and the English were rebuffed at Arras on this question, the instructions to the Calais embassy ordered that, if the French proposed such a marriage as a means of peace, the ambassadors were to reply:

> That it ne is noght thoght to the Kyng covenable to take to Wif the Doughter of any Prince withoute that he stonde in parfit Friendship with hym: And therefore of reson the Trete of the principal Matiere, that is to sey of the Peas, moost go bifore any such Matere of Mariage; considerynge that, withoute Accorde in the Principal, the Trete of Mariage shal be but voide.[35]

If the French should insist upon the marriage and allude to the English proposals at Arras, the ambassadors were to reply that the question "was so lightly laide by at Arras" that the king had not given them any instructions. They were also to point out that the king was not so far, however, that any

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[34]Dickinson, pp. 146-49. Henry assumed the government of the kingdom on November 13, 1437, about one month before his sixteenth birthday (Great Britain, Parliament, Rotuli Parliamentorum ut et Petitiones et Placita in Parliamento, ed. J. Strachey et al. [6 vols. and Index], V, pp. 438-39).

[35]Rymer, X, p. 727.

French proposal could not be sent to him. They were not to bind Henry, though they were authorized to negotiate on the size of a dowry. The ambassadors "shal aske for the Mariage Two Miliones, and from that descende, and finally abide upon a Milion of Scutes [crowns], Two of the Value of a Noble."[36]

If the French did not agree to a peace based upon any of the proposals outlined in the instructions and, instead, made other offers, the ambassadors were not to reject them. They were only to say that their instructions did not cover any such offers and they would have to "Reporte the said Offres to the kyng." If this happened, they were to persuade the duke of Orléans or the duchess of Burgundy to propose a

> Trete of a Trewe general [general truce] by See and by Land, to endure (if that other Partie wol condescend thereto) for Fifty, Forty, Thirty, or Twenty Yere, with Communicacion [Intercourse]; And rather than faile to condescende to a Trewes of Three, Four, Five, Six, Seven, or Eight Yere without Communicacion, and it may be so gotyn.[37]

For the surer keeping of such a truce they were to suggest the exchange of places claimed by both sides, i.e., Meaux, Criel, and St. Germaine en Laye, all held by the English, for Harfleur, Dieppe, and Mont St. Michel. If this was agreed upon, they were to attempt to make the release of the duke of Orléans contribute towards it by keeping or taking all six places as partial payment for his release. This would then apparently

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., pp. 727-28.

reduce the amount of ransom to be demanded from one hundred thousand marks to fifty thousand marks.[38]

The English then were prepared to make considerable concessions to the French in 1439 in order to attain peace. They were more sincere in their efforts for peace than they had been at Arras. In 1435, as noted, they refused to make any significant concessions. However in 1439 not only was Henry VI in his majority but the loss of Paris and other military setbacks all combined to increase the English zeal for a settlement. Their demands in 1439 were practical. They wished outright recognition by the French of their right to certain lands, mostly those long held by them, and were apparently willing to halt their pursuit of the shadowy French crown. If a solution did not come about, they could then assume a role roughly similar to that played by the French at Arras. They could at least partially undo the damage of Arras by improving their relations with the duke of Burgundy. There was, of course, domestic pressure on both Burgundy and England to mend their commercial ties, but England also probably recognized, as France had recognized in 1435, the value of further separating Burgundy from an old adversary.

The site of the peace conference held in the marches of Calais during the summer of 1439 was on the road between Calais and Gravelines. It was situated about seven miles east

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[38] Ibid. The instructions are not clear on the amount of the ransom.

of Calais, a little more than four west of Gravelines, and about one mile from the castle of Oye and the sea. The English embassy was to be housed at Calais, and the French at Gravelines. Although Isabella and most of the Burgundian embassy also were located at Gravelines, Philip remained at St. Omer, a few miles to the south.[39]

Cardinal Beaufort and most of the English delegation sailed from Dover to Calais on Friday, June 26, Beckington and Whitingham crossing the next day. On Sunday evening, June 28, members of the French delegation led by Louis of Bourbon, count

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[39] PPC, V, p. 341. Little would be known about this conference, which has been only briefly mentioned by the chroniclers, except for the protocol or journal of its proceedings written by Thomas Beckington, a member of the English delegation, or an assistant. The following account is based almost entirely on the protocol which was edited by Nicholas H. Nicolas and published in the PPC, V, pp. 334-407. It covers the period from July 26, when the ambassadors left Dover, to October 1, when they reported to the king at Kennington. Because his protocol provides an unusual amount of detail, more than is available for most other conferences in this period, this chapter will include items not directly essential for a knowledge of the decisions of the conference, but which will provide a better understanding of the procedures and problems of such conferences in the fifteenth century. There is no reason to suppose that other conferences, for which there is little record, varied greatly from this in their nature.

Beckington or an assistant also wrote a protocol of a diplomatic mission to the count of Armagnac in 1442 which will be discussed later. Early associated with Humphrey of Gloucester, he was his chancellor by 1422. He was employed in diplomatic missions in 1432-33 but he was not at Arras in 1435. He held various religious offices before becoming the king's secretary in 1437 or 1438. In 1443, following his mission to Armagnac, he became keeper of the privy seal and bishop of Bath and Wells. Like Humphrey he was known for his humanist interests. In addition to his two protocols he also collected some official correspondence that might otherwise have become lost (PRO, Official Correspondence of Bekynton. See Judd's life of Beckington, noted above, p. 25.).

of Vendôme, Regnault, archbishop and duke of Reims and chancellor of France, and Jean, bastard of Orléans and count of Dunois, accompanied by Jacques de Crèvecoeur, seigneur de Crèvecoeur, as the representative of the duke of Burgundy, journeyed to Newnam Bridge (Nywnā brigge), where they were met by John Kemp, archbishop of York, Humphrey, earl of Stafford, Thomas Brouns, bishop of Norwich, Henry, lord Bourchier, and Walter, first baron Hungerford, and conducted "honorifice usq [usque] ad villa Calesiae."[40]

The English ambassadors assembled at Cardinal Beaufort's residence on Monday morning at eight o'clock to decide how to answer questions concerning the planned proceedings that the French ambassadors might raise at a meeting scheduled later the same day. They decided to reply that, since Beaufort and the duchess of Burgundy were the promoters and mediators of the conference, various matters should be left to them. The French ambassadors were thus informed later in the day that such questions as the choosing of a day of "convencion," the number of persons allowed to attend, and whether they should be armed would be decided by the cardinal and the duchess. The French ambassadors then went to the Great Hall of the Staple where they met briefly with the duke of Orléans. At about ten o'clock the French party, except for the count of Vendôme, who fasted that day, went to the residence of the

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[40] PPC, V, pp. 335-36. The French words for Newnam Bridge and certain other place-names in this region are not known.

archbishop of York where they dined with Beaufort and the members of the English delegation. Following dinner they returned to the Great Hall and continued their talks with the duke of Orléans. They then supped with the earl of Stafford, being soon joined by the duke. Following the evening meal they returned to their residences.[41]

On the following morning, June 30, between seven and eight, the French delegates went to Cardinal Beaufort where, after conferring with him, they took a solemn oath before the altar in his oratory. When taking the oath the archbishop of Reims placed his right hand on his breast and the others placed their right hands in that of Cardinal Beaufort. They swore that they would not do or cause to be done any injury, neither would they in any way inconvenience the English ambassadors, the mediators or any of their followers, nor engage in any deception. They then departed for St. Omer.[42]

Sir John Popham and Stephen Wilton also went to St. Omer the same day to obtain similar oaths from the duke of Burgundy as well as to ascertain the wishes of the duchess concerning

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[41] PPC, V, pp. 336-37. According to the chronicler Hall (p. 192), "the duke of Orleaunce, gently receiued therle of Dumoys (his bastard brother) thankyng him hartely for his pain taken, in gouernyng his countrey durying the tyme of his captiuitie and absence." According to Wavrin (IV, pp. 289-90) and Monstrelet (III, pp. 302-303), this comment was made in 1440. They are probably in error since there is no other evidence of a conference in 1440 (see below, pp. 76-77).

[42] PPC, V, pp. 337-39. The oath is also in Plancher, IV, pp. clxv-clxvi.

the day of the first formal meeting, the number allowed to attend, and the question of bearing arms. Three days later, on July 3, Popham and Wilton returned with the oath of security taken by Philip, and the wishes of the duchess. Isabella proposed that the convention begin at nine in the morning on Monday, July 6, that a maximum of three hundred persons be allowed from each side to the site, and that they be armed only with swords and daggers. She also suggested that there be ten English scouts to explore the country for two miles towards Gravelines and Arde, and a similar number of French scouts to do likewise towards Calais and Guines. Each party could also have twenty attendants to serve refreshments. The English agreed to these proposals.[43]

Meanwhile on Wednesday and Thursday, July 1 and 2, pavilions or tents were erected at the meeting site. On Thursday, which was the feast of St. Swithin, the patron saint of Cardinal Beaufort's diocese of Winchester, Beaufort also gave a solemn entertainment to the members of the English embassy and others in Calais of high rank. Twenty clerics and others of the Council of the duke of Orléans visited him from Thursday until Sunday evening when they departed again from Calais.[44]

On Monday, July 6, following a 4:00 A.M. mass at Beaufort's chapel performed by Byllesdon, Beaufort and members of the English party totalling about 260 set out for the conference. Leaving a little after 6:00 A.M., they traveled the

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[43] PPC, V, pp. 339-40. [44] Ibid.

seven miles to the site within about two hours. Sir John Stourton, Lord Dudley and Whitingham remained in Calais for the defense of the town and the safe keeping of the duke of Orléans. Beckington noted that, according to Stourton and the duke's keeper, when Charles of Orléans learned he was not being taken to the conference he remarked "the others would do nothing but beat the wind."[45] Orléans had tried through the duke and duchess of Burgundy, as well as others, to be allowed to attend, and, according to the English scouts, many Flemings, Picards and others, had inquired with interest whether he might appear. Beckington commented in his protocol that there were too many symptoms of a planned attempt to rescue him.[46]

Beckington wrote a detailed description of the tents or pavilions erected for the conference. Beaufort's pavilion was built of timber and covered with new canvas. It was about one hundred feet in length and contained a hall lined with scarlet tapestry capable of entertaining three hundred people, a kitchen, pantry, wine cellar, two chambers and various other rooms.[47] Wavrin and Monstrelet also noted the extravagance of Beaufort.[48] The tents of the archbishop of York and the

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[45]". . . ceteri nichil aliud facerent nisi verberare ventum."

[46]Ibid., pp. 340-41. [47]Ibid., p. 341.

[48]Wavrin wrote: La estoient les Anglois venus en grant pompe et beubant, moult richement habillies et parez, especialement ledit cardinal de Wincestre y avoit fait tenir de sa part de moult riches et somptueulz estas et tendre de moult riches tentes et pavillions, bien parees et ordonnees de ce

The site of the conference held in the marches of Calais in 1439 as described by Thomas Beckington in his protocol (PPC, V, pp. 341-42).

bishops of Norwich and St. David's had been erected to the southwest of Beaufort's. On the south were the tents of the duke of Norfolk, the earls of Stafford and Oxford, and others. About "two bow-shots" east of the cardinal's tent was that of the duchess. It was of about the same size though, according to Beckington, built with rotten timber and covered with old canvas. However the inside was handsomely lined with cloth of Arras ("pannis de aras"). South of the duchess's tent were only two other small and old tents. Although Beckington did not say, these may have belonged to the archbishop of Reims and the count of Vendôme, since they were the ranking Frenchmen present. Between the two large tents of Beaufort and Isabella was a pavilion belonging to the duchess in which the conference was to be held. This very attractive pavilion ("notabilis quedã et pulcra papilio") included a seat covered with cloth and gold cushions for Beaufort, Isabella, and her niece Anne, princess of Navarre. There were also seats on each side for the two groups of ambassadors.[49]

At about ten o'clock Isabella, accompanied by her niece Anne and ten other ladies, all attired in much splendor with golden fabric, approached the conference pavilion. Here she

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quil leur failloit, tant de vaiselles dor et dargent comme dautres besongnes necessaires et duisables en tel cas (IV, p. 265). A similar description appears in Monstrelet (III, pp. 284-85). Beaufort had obtained a license from Henry VI on May 21 to take furniture and other expensive items to Calais (Rymer, X, p. 723).

[49] PPC, V, pp. 341-42.

met Beaufort and, after embracing and kissing each other, they entered the pavilion followed by the ambassadors. Beaufort sat in the center with Isabella on his right and Anne on his left. The ambassadors were placed on each side. John Kemp, archbishop of York, opened the proceedings with a Latin speech, in which he praised the endeavors of Beaufort and Isabella for peace, and urged the ambassadors to strive for peace by negotiating in good faith. He concluded by observing that, because of the importance of the conference, it would be necessary to show the authority of the ambassadors by exchanging their commissions. This was done and the parties separated until after dinner to inspect them.[50]

Isabella soon sent the bishop of Tournai and the seigneur de Crèvecoeur to inform Beaufort that the French ambassadors objected to the English commission and would be unable to proceed further. They held it contained a number of clauses that tended more to cause irritation than to promote peace. They chiefly objected to Charles VII being referred to as "Karolus de Valoys" rather than the more general "adversarius noster Franciae," and to the statement that he was required to surrender the crown and realm of France. Isabella observed that it would have been more discreet to have kept the latter in the instructions than to include it in the commission. They also objected that the commission did not grant sufficient

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[50] Ibid., pp. 342-43.

powers for concluding a peace agreement. The English then retaliated by objecting that the French commission was obscure and contradictory. Following dinner, since the English realized the French would not back down from their objections, it was finally agreed that each side would frame a new commission which would then be approved by the other party and sent to the respective king to be sealed. Meanwhile it was agreed to seek ways for peace and to meet again on Friday, July 10.[51] The bishop of Tournai acted as an intermediary during the week in drawing up new commissions for the embassies. At the meeting on Friday, the opposing delegations expressed approval of the commissions. The French commission, antedated April 7, empowered the delegation to proceed to the marches of Calais, to confer with the duke of Orléans and treat for his presence at the talks, to agree on a day and site for the conference, and to treat with the English for a final peace and for the release of the duke of Orléans.[52]

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[51] Ibid., pp. 343-44. This might be considered a friendly gesture by the French for they were not bound to do it. The English objections to the French commission appear to have been made in retaliation, for, if they had had any substance, Beckington would probably have recorded them. A party was not obligated to negotiate until it had accepted a satisfactory commission. The opposing party could demand to see the commission at any time during the negotiations and, if it was not forthcoming, could refuse to negotiate further. Cf. PRO, Conferences between the Ambassadors of France and England in: Narratives of the Expulsion of the English from Normandy, M.CCCC.XLIX.--M.CCCC.L. ("Rolls Series," no. 32), p. 495. Thus the French appear to have been more conciliatory on this issue at Calais than at other occasions.

[52] PPC, V, pp. 345-49. The amended French commission also

The English commission was also antedated to that of the original, May 23. It referred to Charles VII as "adversarius noster Franciae," authorized the ambassadors to agree on a time and place in the marches of Calais for the conference, and to treat for peace and the release of the imprisoned duke.[53]

Each embassy now having been fully recognized by the other, the archbishop of York addressed the group in Latin using as his text the words Christ spoke to Mary as found in the Revelations of St. Bridget:[54] "Si Franciae et Angliae Reges volunt habere pacē dabo eis perpetuā pacē." After proclaiming the advantages of peace, he then presented the demand, as directed in his instructions, that the king of England be permitted to enjoy his realm and crown of France in peace. He noted that the title truly belonged to Henry VI, this being made evident by the many victories obtained while contending for it. He referred to St. Bridget's words that when France

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appears in Plancher, IV, pp. clxiii-clxiv. The original is not available but probably varied only slightly from the amended copy.

[53]The original English commission to which the French objected has been printed from the French (now called Treaty) Rolls in the PPC, V, pp. xlvii-l. The amended version is in Beckington's protocol (PPC, V, pp. 349-52) and in Rymer, X, pp. 728-30.

[54]St. Bridget or Birgitta (1303?-1373) was a Swedish nun and mystic. Her Revelations are an account of supernatural impressions received during early childhood which Gregory XI and Urban VI pronounced to be inspired. She was canonized by Boniface IX in 1399. Popular with the Lancastrians, her work was also utilized at Arras (See Dickinson, p. 146).

was reduced "ad veram humilitatem" it would revert to its lawful heir. He cited the peace treaty confirmed at Troyes and concluded that if Charles would assent to it, provision would be made for him.[55] The archbishop of Reims replied in French that his king was sovereign in France and had also obtained many victories. Against the words of St. Bridget he quoted a prophecy of an obscure person called John the Hermit that France was afflicted with the English because of her sins but that eventually the French would expel them shamefully from the kingdom. He then concluded by saying that he was unable to conclude a general peace because of the king's illness and the absence of the dauphin.[56]

The archbishop of York responded that the prophecy of John the Hermit was less esteemed by the Church than the Revelations of St. Bridget. He then requested the French to open negotiations by submitting a proposal for peace. The French, however, insisted that the English make the first offer. The English archbishop then proposed the second article in his instructions, i.e., that Henry give certain lands south of the Loire, particularly the province of Languedoc, to his adversary for twenty thousand pounds a year. However, the title to the lands was to remain with Henry as king of France. The French objected vehemently to this proposal and replied that

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[55] PPC, V, p. 352.

[56] Ibid., p. 353. He may have been referring to a difficulty in getting the king's seal affixed to the amended commission.

they could proceed no further unless the renunciation of Henry's claim to the crown, kingdom, and arms of France, an agreement to do homage for French lands held, and the restoration of various lands to those dispossessed, formed the basis of the treaty. They conceded that Henry could retain only his lands in Guienne and that on the condition he did homage for them. The English replied that terms of that nature did not tend to promote peace. They then parted for dinner.[57]

After Beaufort had dined, he called in the archbishop of York and the other members of the English embassy and told them that there was little hope for agreement especially in view of the apparent unwillingness of the French to abandon their assertion that Henry should do homage for his French lands. Beckington exclaimed in his journal:

> O q$^{\bar{a}}$ possibile ẽet īvestigaret per Ducissā Burgundiae si pars adversa pacto quovis ꝑinduci posset aut auct^{a}em haberet ad ꝓmittend homagiū resortū et superioritatē t̃c^{a}.[58]

Beaufort had a long private conversation with the duchess concerning the possibilities of getting the French to relent in their demand, but returned and told the English ambassadors that there appeared to be little chance of this. He suggested they might be able to gain a truce, though not a treaty of peace. The English ambassadors then visited the duchess at her tent and partook of sweetmeats (spẽs) and wine. They

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., p. 354.

then returned to Calais, the next conference having been set for Monday.[59]

Plans were changed on Sunday so that Isabella and the French ambassadors might confer near Calais the next day with the duke of Orléans on the peace negotiations. Two tents were erected about two bow-shots from Calais for this purpose, one for the conference and the other for refreshments. The meeting was probably set near Calais by the English for security reasons. Here at Monday noon Beaufort and the English delegation met Isabella and the French, except for the archbishop of Reims "qui ludens pridie ad pilā pede lesus est" on Sunday. The captive duke held a long conference with Isabella and the French ambassadors. Beaufort was only occasionally present. The conference was recessed once for wine and sweetmeats in the other tent and soon resumed again. According to Beckington the duchess asked the duke "Domine nūquid vos vultis habere pacem," and he replied "Imo, etiam si moriar pro pace." After refreshments were served again Charles of Orléans and the English returned to Calais, and Isabella and the French to Gravelines.[60]

The duchess sent word to the English the next day that she had gone to St. Omer because her husband had become ill. She requested that because of this the next formal meeting be Thursday or Friday. The latter date was agreed on.[61]

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., pp. 363-64.

[61] Ibid., p. 364.

Meanwhile an audience was given by Beaufort and the English delegation on Wednesday, July 15, to the bishop of Vich (Viceñ), legate from the Council of Basel. The Catalonian bishop had arrived in Calais the previous Saturday to give his services as a mediator. He had been accompanied from Basel by the abbot of Virgilia in Provence, on behalf of France, and Nicholas Loysthere (Loscler), a canon of Rouen, for England. The bishop addressed the delegation concerning peace using as his text: "Ecce q^{a}m bonū et q^{a}m jocundū habitare fratres in unū." After dinner he again spoke to the ambassadors. This speech was delivered in the Great Hall of the Staple with the duke of Orléans present. His text was: "Estote fortes in bello ˜t pugnate cū serpeñ." Beckington noted he did not say the "old serpent."[62]

The archbishop of York answered the conciliar legate on the next morning. He thanked the bishop and the Church Council

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[62] Ibid., pp. 362, 364. Beckington was probably referring to the fact that in the Vulgate Bible (Apocalypse, 12. 9; 20. 2) Satan was referred to as the "serpens antiquum." Perhaps Beckington interpreted the bishop's text as being directed towards the young king, Henry VI, or possibly he was merely critical of the bishop's biblical scholarship.

The bishop of Viceñ noted by Beckington was probably Georgius de Ornós who was bishop of Vich from 1423 to 1445. According to Conrad Eubel (Hierarchia Catholica medii aeri sire Summorum pontificum, S. R. E. cardinalium, ecclesiarum antistitum Series e documentis tabularii praesartim Vaticani collecta digesta [3 vols.; Monasterii: Sumptibus et Typis Librariae Regensberigianae, 1848-1910], I, p. 558; II, p. 293), he was an adherent of the Council of Basel and of the antipope Felix V. He was also an apostolic protonotary and a doctor of law according to Eubel, indicating that he might have been well trained for such an embassy.

for their interest but clearly showed that the English were not pleased with their interference. He stated that Cardinal Beaufort and the duchess of Burgundy had already been selected as mediators, and his embassy had no orders allowing it to listen to others. He further exclaimed that if the Church Fathers had been less partial at the Congress of Arras there would be no need to treat for peace now. He concluded by exhorting the Council of Basel to act with greater moderation in its dealings with the pope if a schism was to be avoided. He thus implied that the Church Council should solve its own problems before attempting to mediate in disputes among others where its interference was resented.[63]

The bishop from Basel replied by eulogizing Henry VI and expressing the interest of the church in her sons. He then defended the actions of the Council and strongly attacked Pope Eugenius IV. The archbishop answered by attacking the Council and defending the innocence of the pope. He also repeated his remarks concerning the Congress of Arras. The conciliar legate then requested an audience for the next day with the two mediators and both delegations. He was told that the duchess of Burgundy would have to be consulted before any such meeting

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[63] PPC, V, pp. 364-65. The English had been strongly critical of the mediation of the legates from the pope and Council at the Congress of Arras. See Dickinson, pp. 130ff. Relations between Pope Eugenius IV and the Council of Basel were steadily worsening. The pope sent bulls throughout Europe in April, 1439, strongly attacking the council (Monstrelet, III, pp. 255-64).

could be set. Beckington gives no further mention of the legate from Basel except to note that he left Calais on July 24.[64]

The duchess of Burgundy returned to Gravelines late Thursday night. So many torches and cressets were lighted at her arrival that the English soldiers guarding the conference site thought it might be the signal for an insurrection. They immediately reported this to Beaufort at Calais. He sent Garter king-at-arms to Isabella to find the cause. Garter returned the next morning but meanwhile, Beckington wrote, an embargo was placed on shipping to England so that no rumors would reach England before the occurrence could be fully explained.[65]

Peace negotiations did not resume until Saturday, July 18, perhaps due to the unsettling nature of this occurrence. After conferring with the duchess on Saturday, Beaufort reported to the English ambassadors that Isabella believed that a treaty of peace was impossible, since the English refused to consent to their king holding his French lands in homage and the French demanded that Henry give up his claim to the French crown. She also believed that a truce would be quite difficult because restitution of possessions taken in the war would have to be made. She then suggested as an acceptable compromise that a peace of fifteen, twenty, or thirty years be negotiated. During this period Henry would refrain from using the title "King of France," and the French would not claim superiority over

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[64] PPC, V, pp. 365, 375. [65] Ibid., pp. 365-66.

him or demand homage for his French lands. Henry could resume the title and continue the war after giving one year's notice of his intentions. The English ambassadors showed interest in the plan when Beaufort discussed it with them. They requested that the proposal be put in writing. However the written proposition varied so much from the verbal that it could not be accepted. It provided that Henry renounce his claim to the French crown, surrender his French possessions except as left to him by agreement, restore the original owners in those lands remaining under him, and release the duke of Orléans without ransom. According to the written proposal upon expiration of the peace each party was to remain as before.[66]

The English delivered a written protest stating that in any proposal to be agreed upon they would not prejudice Henry's rights. If Henry should give up any part of his rights, it would be due only to his desire to stabilize the Christian faith, promote peace, and halt the shedding of Christian blood. When Beaufort asked the duke of Orléans the next day how he had understood the proposal of the duchess, the duke said he had understood the proposal as stated verbally by the cardinal and was surprised at the changes made in the written form.[67]

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[66] Ibid., pp. 366-69.

[67] Ibid., pp. 369-70. However, the duke's influence was probably shown in that part of the written proposal providing for his release without ransom. Beckington copied the written proposal and the English protest (Ibid., pp. 367-70). They are also with slight variation in Plancher, IV, pp. clxvi-clxvii.

However, on Monday, July 20, the English delegation decided that, in answer to the proposal of Isabella, they would ask their adversaries if they would be content with the lands south of the Loire, except for the duchy of Guienne, without reservation. If this offer proved futile they decided then to bring forth the last offer in their instructions. Beckington was directed to draw up this proposal in Latin. It was presented the next day and stated that Henry would be content to hold without homage the lands held by his ancestors before the crown of France passed to them. These lands were defined as including the town and marches of Calais, the castle and lordship of Guines, other possessions within the marches as specified in the Treaty of Brétigny, the duchy of Normandy with the homage of Brittany, Flanders, Anjou and Maine; the counties of Toulouse, Poitou, and Ponthieu; the duchy of Turenne; the duchy of Aquitaine (Guienne), including Gascony and the lands of the Basques; Montivilliers ("villa Mustrolii"), and the castles and lordships of Beaufort and Nogent.[68] The lands so claimed corresponded roughly to those held in the reign of Henry II. They had not all been held by the English at any one time since at least the wars of King John. However they were probably all listed merely to serve as a point of departure for negotiating. The English could not have seriously hoped to have gained outright by diplomacy more

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[68] PPC, V, pp. 370-72. Montivilliers is about three miles north of Harfleur.

lands than they had ever held at any one time during the century-old war.

The English agreed to a request from the duchess on Tuesday, July 21, to postpone the scheduled diplomatic session to the next day because of the cold rainy weather. Inclement weather still prevailed on Wednesday but the French and English delegates journeyed to the conference site, though, according to Beckington, many horses were injured. Before fully rejecting the proposal, first expressed verbally by the duchess and then placed in written form, the archbishop of York requested that the lands to be allowed Henry VI be specified. He also inquired whether the French would be satisfied with the lands south of the Loire and outside of Guienne as earlier offered. They answered that the earlier proposal had been formulated by the duchess, not by them. They further rejected the English suggestion concerning the lands south of the Loire, and suggested that within Normandy the English be content with only the two districts ("bailiagia") of Caen and Coutances. Nicholas Rolin, speaking for Isabella, stated that she had made her proposal in good faith, and asked the English ambassadors whether they were pleased with it. The English replied they could not answer such a question until more details were specified, especially the insertion of the lands offered. The duchess demanded to know more fully their objections and then burst into tears, whether from anger or sorrow, Beckington says he did not know. The English answered they could not

by their instructions conclude a peace such as that suggested by the duchess's proposals, but could only leave such a decision to the wisdom of their king. They promised, nevertheless, that if the lands offered were inserted in the proposal, they would forward it to Henry and would hope to know his pleasure within about three weeks. However, the English noted they were empowered to agree to a proposal recognizing as English lands, those lands that had belonged to the kings of England before they had gained title to the crown of France, i.e., before Edward III. The French then requested a list of the lands so considered by the English. The English asked for time to discuss this request and the meeting then adjourned.[69]

The next day, July 23, the archbishop of York was designated to draw up the list requested by the French. It was sent to the Valois embassy on Saturday, July 25. These lands were the same lands listed by Beckington on July 21, as noted above. The mediators and ambassadors assembled near Oye on Monday, July 27, for their next meeting. Isabella spent the entire day conferring alternately with Beaufort and the French ambassadors. The parties departed at four o'clock following wine and refreshments (spēs) at Beaufort's tent. It was decided to assemble near Calais for their next meeting so that the duke of Orléans might be consulted. Beaufort informed the English ambassadors, at a meeting the next day, what had transpired

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[69] Ibid., pp. 372-74.

between himself and the duchess. The French had broadened their previous proposal relating to Normandy by agreeing, under certain conditions, to cede all of Normandy except Mont St. Michel, which they wished to keep because they had originally derived from it "arma sua crucis albe." However they had refused to cede the homage of the duke of Brittany and the others noted above as attached to Normandy.[70]

Charles of Orléans met near Calais on July 29 with Isabella, Beaufort, and the English and French ambassadors. Lannoy and Rolin, representing the duke of Burgundy, also attended. It was decided that the proposal drawn up by Isabella and the duke of Orléans, as amended by subsequent negotiations, be placed in writing. The conference was adjourned until September 11. During the interval, the embassies were to obtain new commissions and instructions, and the English and French were apparently to refer the schedule of Isabella and Orléans to their respective kings. On July 30 the bishop of Tournai, Rolin, and Lannoy delivered the schedule to Beaufort. The Burgundian party and the English ambassadors then conferred

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[70] Ibid., pp. 375-77. Jean Fusiliers, an advisor to the duke of Orléans, notified the English on July 24 that the French ambassadors were about to depart and thereby break off the peace conference. The English sent a messenger to the duchess to confirm or deny this report. She replied on July 25 that she would certify the presence of the French at the next meeting. At Beaufort's request, Lannoy and Utenhove came to Calais on July 23 and conferred with him on the following day. It is not known whether they conferred about negotiations with the French, or the willingness of the duke of Burgundy to make a separate agreement with England if French negotiations collapsed.

with the duke of Orléans and agreed to insert a provision providing for a notice of one year before breaking the truce.[71]

The schedule proposed that Henry retain certain lands that had been held by the kings of England prior to their claim to the crown of France. These lands were defined as including the duchy of Normandy (except for Mont St. Michel), the marches of Calais, and those portions of Guienne then possessed by the English. The homage of the duke of Brittany would be due the Valois ruler. The lands to be held by Henry VI were to be held in homage to Charles VII. However, during a peace which would be declared for thirty, twenty, or fifteen years, the homage due would remain in abeyance, and Henry would merely abstain from styling himself "the King of France." The schedule further provided that Henry VI would restore all benefices and lands to people deprived of them as a consequence of the English conquests. Normandy was the only area to be held by Henry that would be affected by this provision, since the other areas had long been under English rule. Henry was also, according to the schedule, to release Charles of Orléans without ransom. When the peace to be declared had expired, conditions

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[71] Ibid., pp. 377-82. The schedule is also in Plancher, IV, clxvii-clxix, and a portion of it, dated July 24, is in: France, Ministre de l'Instruction Publique, Documents historiques inédits tirés des collections manuscrites de la Bibliothèque Royale, et des archives ou des bibliothèques des departements, ed. Jacques Joseph Champollion-Figeac (5 vols.; "Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France publies par ordre du Roi et par soins du Ministre de l'Instruction publique," 1841-74), II, pp. 185-88.

were to be the same as before the agreement had been made. However, if Henry would agree at any time to do homage to Charles VII for his lands in France, the Valois king would be bound to accept it, thus allowing a final and general peace to be established.[72]

The schedule did not recognize all the lands which the English had wished to retain. The major areas listed earlier by Beckington as belonging to the kings of England before they had inherited the crown of France, but not included in the schedule were, among others, the counties of Toulouse, Poitou, and Ponthieu, the duchy of Turenne, and various portions of Guienne, as well as the homage of Brittany, Flanders, Anjou, and Maine.[73]

The English ambassadors spent Saturday and Sunday, August 1 and 2, writing and comparing their various opinions of the schedule for the king's guidance. Safe-conducts for those returning to England were brought from St. Omer on Sunday. The messengers informed Beaufort that there had been many inquiries as to whether Beaufort and the duke of Orléans were to return or remain. Plans were then made for greater protection for both the duke and the town. On the morning of Wednesday, August 5, the duke of Norfolk and most of the other ambassadors departed for England. A total of twenty-two vessels were used to convey them across the channel.[74]

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[72] Ibid., V, pp. 378-82. [73] Ibid. [74] Ibid., pp. 382-83.

Beaufort remained on the continent. He and his retinue journeyed by water to the castle of Hammes near Guines on August 6. Beckington and the bishop of Norwich visited him there on August 13. After dinner, the cardinal and his two guests rode to the chapel and tomb of St. Gertrude, and performed devotions. They returned to the castle with some soil from the grave, which was said to have the miraculous power of driving away rats. After enjoying pears and wine at the castle, the bishop of Norwich and Beckington returned to Calais. The cardinal returned on August 21. Meanwhile, on August 19, a member of the household of John of Luxemburg brought word to Calais that Arthur of Brittany, count of Richemont and constable of France, had captured the town of Meaux after a siege of three weeks.[75] The English forces at Meaux remained fortified at the town's market-place. Later messages kept Beaufort and the others informed of the situation. Sir William Chamberlain, the English commander at Meaux, finally surrendered on September 15, under an agreement with Richemont for a safe withdrawal. Beaufort sent messages to England to keep the king informed on the situation at Meaux. Beaufort was also confronted with problems of less importance during these weeks. He was twice plagued with dysentary ("fluxus") according to Beckington. In addition he turned

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[75]Meaux is a few miles east of Paris on the Marne river. It was the last significant English stronghold east of Paris. Monstrelet (III, pp. 273-75) provides additional details of its siege and capitulation.

down a request of some Fleming herring-fishermen for safe-conducts because he was only authorized to grant safe-conducts for those coming to Calais or attending the conference. The violence of the sea also required him to make a contract for repairs along the coast at Calais.[76]

The archbishop of York and the other ambassadors who had been sent to England returned to Calais on September 9 with new instructions. Wilton read the instructions, dated August 30, to all the ambassadors at the cardinal's residence. The instructions rejected the terms of peace proposed by Isabella and Charles of Orléans as specified in the schedule which had been sent to England. Henry VI specifically rejected those provisions requiring him to abandon, at least temporarily, title to the French crown, to restore possessions, and to release without ransom Charles of Orléans, for these "matiers seme unto the kyng̃ right unr̃sonable." A separate article was appended to the instructions stating in greater detail the reasons for the king's rejection. It emphasized that if Henry VI even temporarily waived his claim to the French crown, it

> shold discolour̃ and put ī g̃te suspecioñ and doubte his title and claim, tho [to] the coroune and roy^{me} of France and all the werres and labours tha have be made and doo in and for the saide title.

It also noted the problems involved in changing the seal, coinage, and arms of the king. The reinstatement of those

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[76] PPC, V, pp. 383-88.

dispossessed to their former properties would strengthen his enemies, and weaken his hold on his lands in France if he should go to war again.[77]

However to show the king's sincere desire for peace, "to eschew shedyng̃ of Xp̃en blood and many othr̃ incōveveniente an orryble scisme," the ambassadors were authorized to propose, in addition to their previous offers, that:

> He wold be cōtent with̃ the hood [hool or whole] duchie ov Normandie, comprysyng therin the Mont Seint Michel and the hood [sic] duchie of Gwyenne with̃ hys towne of Caleys the castel of Guysnesse and the othr̃ fortesses wyth̃ al the marches of Caleys, to be boūded as they wer̃ bounded in the tr̃te of peas of Bretygny, to hold al Imediatly of God ~t I no wyse of eny erthly cr̃atr̃.

As a final offer, the ambassadors were also authorized to make concessions concerning the restitution of property. Henry would try to induce his subjects in Normandy to relinquish their possessions in order that he might restore them to their previous owners. If his subjects hesitated, he would compel them to accept compensation, and he would pay one-fourth of this compensation, the French paying the remainder. Charles of Orléans could also be released for a certain time, with sufficient hostages and bail, to promote peace. If peace was not concluded before a specified time, he was to return to captivity.[78]

The division of lands proposed in the instructions varied only slightly from that contained in the schedule sent

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[77] Ibid., pp. 388-95.

[78] Ibid., pp. 389-91.

to London. Mont St. Michel was the only area over which there was a conflict. If this had been the only remaining issue, it could probably have been resolved by further negotiation. However, it was not, for the questions of title and homage remained as unanswerable as before. Questions relating to compensation for property and the release of the duke of Orléans could probably also have been resolved, but the ambassadors realized that there was no way to avoid a rupture in the negotiations. Beaufort presumably had been empowered in May to negotiate to some extent on the questions of title and homage. However, the new instructions did not even allow this. The reasons why Henry VI took a more uncompromising stand on his claim to the French crown remain unclear. One factor may have been that Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, who had long been opposed to any such compromise, was able to exert some influence on the young king and his Council while Beaufort was away. Humphrey wrote a lengthy attack on Beaufort and his peace policies to the king early in 1440. He referred to the conference at Calais in 1439, and the schedule sent to England in August, accompanied by a letter from Beaufort, in "his own writing," urging its acceptance. Gloucester recounted the incident as follows:

> At whiche tyme, to myn understanding, hit was his [Beaufort's] single opinion and labour, that is to saye, that ye shulde leve youre right, title and youre honneur of youre coroune of Fraunce, of you being kyng of Fraunce, during certein yeeres ye shulde utterly absteyne you, and be content oonly in writing, "Rex Angliae," etc., to the

> grete note of infame that ever felle to you, my doubted [dreaded] lord, or to eny of youre noble progenitours sith the taking on hem first the saide title and right of youre saide royaume and coroune of France. To the whiche mater in youre saide presence, therafter that it had liked you to aske myn advis therupon, with other lords of youre bloode and counsaille, I answered and saide that I wolde never agre me therto, to dye therfore; and of the same disposicion I am yeet, and wol be whilest I lyve, in conservacion of youre honneur and of youre ooth made to youre saide coronne of Fraunce in tyme of youre coronacion there.[79]

If Beaufort had anticipated the decision of the king and his Council to reject the proposal so completely, he would probably have not remained at Calais. Gloucester's influence had been waning in recent years, but if one accepts the duke's own account of his role, he still apparently held enough influence in the Council, during Beaufort's absence, to thwart the cardinal's hopes for peace.

The English ambassadors at Calais agreed that, although a rupture appeared inevitable, Cardinal Beaufort, as one of the mediators, should still attempt to obtain an agreement with the French. The English proceeded to the conference site on September 11, after sending a herald to Gravelines to notify the French. However, the herald returned and reported that no one in Gravelines had seen the French ambassadors since July 30. Beaufort then learned that Charles VII had sent a letter to Isabella and Charles of Orléans in which he requested a brief deferment. The Valois king had stated that he could

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[79]Stevenson, II, p. 446.

not approve the proposal drawn up by Isabella and Orléans until he had gained the assent of the lords of the blood and his Council. He had summoned them to meet in Paris on September 25, rather than earlier, because the dauphin had been in Languedoc. However, Charles had concluded, he would send his decision as soon as possible.[80]

The action of Charles VII appeared to the English to be a subterfuge since, they asserted, the matters in the schedule had already been discussed at Arras. The English also believed that the siege of Meaux had cast doubt on the sincerity of Charles VII. Because of these reasons, and perhaps because the presence of the duke of Orléans in Calais may have been considered a danger, they decided that the conference should not continue. Nevertheless, Beaufort, Isabella, and Orléans should continue their efforts for peace. The lack of hesitation they showed in breaking off further talks was also probably motivated by their knowledge that, because of their new instructions, there was no longer any hope for an agreement anyway.[81]

On Saturday, September 12, Beaufort agreed with the decision of the English delegation, and also gave letters of safe-conduct to Isabella and her party of three hundred to come to Calais to confer with him and the duke of Orléans. Beaufort told the English ambassadors on Sunday that Isabella would

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[80] PPC, V, pp. 395-97.

[81] Ibid., pp. 396-97.

appear near Calais on Tuesday. It was agreed that Beaufort should endeavor to set another date for peace negotiations, if the kings would approve, and also to state to Isabella the reasons for Henry's refusal of the schedule. A written statement giving the reasons for Henry's decision, probably based on the annex to the instructions, was also prepared for her.[82]

On Tuesday, September 15, Cardinal Beaufort, Charles of Orléans, and the English ambassadors were met by Isabella, accompanied by about one hundred horsemen and the ten- or eleven-year-old son of the duke of Bourbon. Beaufort, Orléans, Isabella, Nicholas Rolin, and, apparently, Jean Tudert[83] spent the day in conference. According to Beaufort's account to the English on the following day, Isabella had urged the acceptance of the schedule, which he then assured her was impossible. He next refused her suggestion that there be a brief deferment of negotiations, as requested by Charles VII, by accusing the Valois ruler of fraud for causing the delay in order to gain the advice of his lords, since greater concessions had been offered at Arras than were now being proposed. The duchess of

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[82] Ibid., pp. 397-98. Henry VI later suggested that a meeting be held at the same location in April or May (see below).

[83] Jean Tudert, bishop-elect of Châlons sur Marne and formerly dean of Notre Dame in Paris, was one of the representatives of Charles VII at Arras in 1435 and at Calais in 1439. Beckington only notes the "bishop-elect of Châlons" at the meeting on September 15 so he may have been referring to Jean Germain, an old friend of Philip and bishop since 1436 of Châlon sur Saône, rather than Tudert who was an ambassador of Charles VII.

Burgundy answered with the uncomfortable truth that Henry VI had greater power in 1435 than he possessed in 1439. She then alluded to the towns lost by the English since Arras. Isabella next inquired with indifference whether the existing truce between England and the Low Countries should remain in force, and whether a commercial treaty should be negotiated. Whether her indifference was sincere or feigned, or whether she was merely dismayed by the recent events, remains unclear. It was agreed to negotiate a new treaty between England, and Flanders and certain other Burgundian states, which would take effect on April 15 or May 1, 1440. The English were then to give their consent to the duchess at St. Omer, and the duke of Burgundy to the king at Calais, before November 11 (St. Martin's day), if both princes agreed the treaty should be negotiated.[84]

On September 18, Philip de Nanterre, master of requests of the duke of Burgundy's household, a secretary named Louis, and Henry Utenhove arrived in Calais to treat for commercial intercourse on the part of Flanders, Brabant, and Artois. As has been noted, on May 23 Henry VI had given a commission to the archbishop of York, the bishops of St. David's and Norwich, Byllesdon, Popham, Wilton, Sprever, and the treasurer of Calais, Robert Whitingham, to treat "pro Intercursu Mercandisarum" and other related matters.[85]

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[84] Ibid., p. 399.

[85] Ibid., p. 400; Rymer, X, pp. 730-31.

The ambassadors assembled in the Great Hall of the Staple on September 19. When the archbishop requested the commissions of the Burgundian party, they replied they had only verbal authority, but would obtain written powers if terms could be agreed on. A commercial treaty between England and France in the reign of Henry IV was used as a basis for negotiations. Talks continued until September 27, when the Burgundians returned to St. Omer. After conferring with Philip of Burgundy, they returned on September 27. The treaty was collated and sealed on September 29. It provided for commercial relations between the Burgundian possessions of Flanders, Brabant, and Artois, and the possessions of Henry VI, including Calais and Ireland, as well as England, until November 1, 1442. Fishing and navigation rights on the seas were also to be observed, and provisions were made for the redress of grievances.[86]

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[86] PPC, V, pp. 400-406. A protocol of the treaty is found in the Public Record Office, Chancery, 30/9 (17). An extract of the treaty, and a statement by Isabella concerning its relationship to the fishermen of Artois, Boulenois, Ponthieu, and Crotoy, are in Galba B. I, pp. 444-47. A proclamation by Henry VI to the sheriffs of England, requiring the provisions of the treaty to be observed, is in Rymer, X, pp. 736-37, and is also noted in the PRO, Calendar of Close Rolls: Henry VI, 1435-1441, pp. 357-58. For the provisions of the treaty also see Émile Varenbergh, Histoire des relations diplomatiques entre le comté de Flandre et l'Angleterre au moyen âge (Bruxelles: Gand, 1874). This work contains a "Vidimus d'un traité de commerce avec l'Angleterre au profit de la Flandre et du Brabant," dated March 22, 1439 [1440], pp. 579-95. See also pp. 517-18 of this work.

On January 21, 1440, the commercial treaty was prorogued five years. A commission dated December 24, 1439, appointed William de Lyndewode, keeper of the privy seal, John Stopyndon, clerk of the rolls of Chancery, Wilton, Beckington, and Whitingham, to treat with the Flemish ambassadors, Henry Utenhove,

Bad weather postponed the departure of the English delegation until October 2, when, having heard mass in the Carmelite Church, they set sail at seven in the morning for England. They landed at the Downs and reached Sandwich at one in the afternoon. They traveled in brief stages for the next three days until they reached London. They had an audience with the king at Kennington on October 9, and on the following day the archbishop of York reported their proceedings to Henry VI and his chancellor, John Stafford, archbishop of Canterbury. Some other members of the King's Council were also present, but Beckington specifically noted the absence of Gloucester. Copies of their protests and their reasons for refusing the proposal of Isabella and Orléans were also delivered to the chancellor.[87]

France and England may have come closer at Calais to ending the war than at any time since the accessions of

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Paul Deschamps, and Louis Domessens (Rymer, X, p. 750). A later commission, dated February 6, was issued to allow the people of Normandy, Guienne, and the marches of Calais to be included in the commercial treaty (Rymer, X, p. 761). There is no indication that this was successful. Treaties proroguing the truce with Flanders and certain other Low Countries, and also regulating trade, were confirmed at Reading on February 14 (Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 333). English negotiations for a treaty of commerce with Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland, were continued intermittently throughout the years 1440-42, and successfully concluded sometime prior to March, 1442, for in that month commissioners were appointed to deal with those guilty of violating the treaty (Rymer, X, pp. 739, 769, 305, 848; XI, p. 4; Cal. Fr. Rolls, pp. 331, 334, 339, 344, 348, 349, 351, 352).

[87] PPC, V, pp. 406-407.

Henry VI and Charles VII. England, however, after wavering on the questions of title and homage, finally became resolute again, perhaps because of Gloucester's influence. It is not known whether Charles VII would have agreed to the schedule drawn up by Isabella and Charles of Orléans. If there was any eagerness on his part, it certainly was not evident. The conduct of the war appeared to continue in Charles's favor. The recent capture of Meaux may have encouraged him to postpone any settlement. Thus, even if Henry had approved the proposal, the French may have refused to do so. Successful negotiations were probably most likely to have occurred when both sides were exhausted, and neither side saw any chance of winning, as at Brétigny, or when one side had obviously routed the other. Valois successes at Meaux and elsewhere had probably encouraged the French to refrain from making a quick settlement. Henry VI did not give up his desire for peace, however weak that desire might occasionally have been. On October 12, in a letter to Isabella, he suggested a conference with the French in April or May, 1440, at the same site.[88] Peace in the century-old war was still being actively sought.

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[88]France, Ministre de l'Instruction Publique, Lettres des rois, reines et autres personnages des cours de France et d'Angleterre depuis Louis VII jusqu'a Henry IV, tirées des archives de Londres par [Louis Georges Oudart Feudrix de] Bréquigny, ed. J. J. Champollion-Figeac (2 vols.; "Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France publies par ordre du Roi et par soins du Ministre de l'Instruction publique," 1839-47), II, pp. 456-61. See also Lists and Indexes, XLIX, p. 181.

CHAPTER III

FRENCH PRINCES STRIVE FOR PEACE (1440-43)

The next three years after the Conference of Calais in 1439 were marked by unsuccessful intrigues on the part of some of the leading nobles of France, which were generally aimed at weakening the powers of Charles VII. Philip of Burgundy was able to bring about the release of Charles, duke of Orléans, from his English captors, and thus cause Charles VII to be wary of a possible plot against him that might even include the freed duke. Plans were even initiated to wed Henry VI to a daughter of a prominent vassal of Charles VII, the count of Armagnac, apparently without the permission of the Valois monarch. The princes of the blood, perhaps fearful of the increasing authority of Charles VII, at their expense, also worked for peace between the two kings while the English still retained much of their land on the continent. The Valois monarch was not opposed to a period of peace, but he did not allow himself to be forced to negotiate from a position of military or political weakness.

Charles VII found his control of France severely weakened early in 1440 by a plot composed mainly of nobles and

mercenary captains. The dukes of Bourbon and Alençon were the main leaders of the conspiracy known as the Praguerie, named after a recent Hussite rebellion in Bohemia. They hoped to remove Charles VII from power and form a regency under the dauphin Louis who was then sixteen years old. The nobles expressed opposition to the king's policy of relying on the advice of his personal councillors, rather than consulting them. Mercenary leaders also took part because of their opposition to the Ordinance of November, 1439, forbidding private levies. In addition to Bourbon, Alençon, and the dauphin, the brief movement was supported by the counts of Vendôme and Dunois. However it floundered mainly due to the refusal of the duke of Burgundy and virtually all of the towns in France to support it. Arthur of Richemont drove the rebels from their strongholds in France into the Bourbonnais and Auvergne, where they submitted. Charles proclaimed his reconciliation with the dauphin on July 17 and the rebels were fully suppressed before the end of the summer.[1]

While some of the other leading French nobles were engaged in a military confrontation with Charles VII, Philip of Burgundy strove on the diplomatic level to obtain the release of Charles of Orléans. As will be noted, this move by Philip may have also been calculated to weaken the authority of the French king. Preliminary plans for the release of Orléans may

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[1]J. Chartier, I, pp. 253-59; Monstrelet, III, pp. 288-92; Beaucourt, III, pp. 115-42.

have been made at Calais in 1439 between the duchess of Burgundy and the captive duke. Henry VI had approved on October 12, 1439, the agreement of Isabella and Beaufort to hold a new peace conference the following April.[2] On January 31, 1440, Henry VI issued letters of safe-conduct to the count of Vendôme, the archbishops of Reims and Narbonne, and many of the other Frenchmen who had been at the conference in 1439. The letters of safe-conduct were valid from their issue date to July 1 for the purpose of attending a conference in the marches of Calais to treat for peace and the release of the duke of Orléans.[3] The Praguerie no doubt caused its cancellation.

On April 12, 1440, during the height of the revolt, Charles VII commissioned the archbishop of Reims and other members of his Council to meet in the marches of Calais to treat for peace and the release of the duke of Orléans. Detailed powers to execute the release were also contained in the commission.[4] Shortly afterwards, on April 24, Henry VI granted a commission to William, bishop of Rochester, Lord Dudley, Sir Thomas Kyriel, lieutenant of Calais, Sir Maurice

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[2]Ministre de l'Instruction Publique, Lettres des rois, II, pp. 456-61.

[3]Rymer, X, pp. 756-57.

[4]Ibid., pp. 763-64. The archbishop of Reims, who was also the chancellor of France, is the only ambassador mentioned by name. The count of Vendôme and others were obviously omitted because they were currently in revolt. The commission was written at St. Maixent in Poitou while the king was attempting to put down the revolt.

Brown, Wilton, Sprever, Whitingham, and others, to conclude a final peace with France at a conference soon to be held at Calais.[5] Another commission, dated May 2, broadened their powers by authorizing them to conclude a truce for two years.[6] Safe-conducts were issued on April 27 and May 2 by Henry VI to several Frenchmen, including the archbishop of Tours, the bishop of Poitiers, and the count of Eu, to come to Calais.[7]

Thus there can be no doubt that a conference was planned for the late spring or early summer of 1440. However, there is no record of any conference occurring except for the meager accounts of Wavrin and Monstrelet, which are similar, that the archbishops of Reims and Narbonne, and the count of Dunois, all representing Charles VII, and the duke of Burgundy, accompanied by his advisor, Jacques de Crèvecoeur, met with the English ambassadors and the duke of Orléans at Calais. According to the chroniclers, this meeting was unsuccessful because the English made the unreasonable assertion that they had complete sovereignty over Normandy and Guienne, and also because the captors enjoyed the wealth brought into England by the duke's presence. However their account is open to question since it is not substantiated by other sources and also since

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[5] Ibid., p. 767.

[6] Ibid., p. 769. There was a similar commission dated June 20 (Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 336). They were also empowered to make a truce with Philip in Picardy and the lands around Calais.

[7] Rymer, X, pp. 757-58. The safe-conducts were valid until October 1.

they included the count of Dunois as part of the Valois delegation, although he was in revolt against Charles VII. Their account also noted the meeting of Charles of Orléans and his bastard brother, Jean, count of Dunois, at Calais. Since both had been at Calais in 1439, it is probable that this meeting occurred at that time, as noted in Hall.[8]

Although no conference appears to have been held, the duke of Burgundy kept in contact with Charles VII, the rebellious nobles, especially the dauphin and the duke of Bourbon, and with the duke of Orléans and his captors.[9] Philip actively worked for an end to the revolt and also for the release of Orléans. Jean V, duke of Brittany, carried on friendly relations with Henry VI throughout the spring and summer of 1440, obtaining a commercial treaty and a promise from Henry to give special consideration to Breton interests in any peace treaty with Charles VII. In return, Jean promised to refuse Charles VII the right to use Brittany as a base of military operations against Normandy or other English possessions.[10]

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[8]Wavrin, IV, pp. 288-92; Monstrelet, III, pp. 302-303, 305. See p. 41 n., above, for a discussion of Hall's account of the 1439 conference. This account of Wavrin and Monstrelet is probably a fragment of their 1439 account which has become separated.

[9]Beaucourt, III, pp. 148-49, 153.

[10]Rymer, X, pp. 771, 778; Cal. Cl. Rolls: 1441-47, pp. 382, 389-91; Hyacinthe Morice, Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne, tirés des archives de cette province, de celles de France & d'Angleterre, des recueils de plusieurs sçavans antiquaires, & mis en ordre par Dom Morice, prêtre, religieux bénédictin

Philip of Burgundy had had a similar policy for some time, thus providing for the security of Calais.

In January of 1440, Jean V also signed a commercial treaty with Philip. Close relations continued between Brittany and Burgundy throughout the year. Numerous ambassadors and messengers passed between the rulers of Burgundy and Brittany, and Henry VI, indicating that arrangements were probably being made for the release of Orléans. Servants of the duke of Orléans also made numerous trips between England and the continent, not only conferring with Charles VII, but with various of the dissident nobles.[11] According to the Burgundian chroniclers, Wavrin and Monstrelet, the duke of Burgundy greatly desired to bring about the release of the duke of Orléans. Philip hoped that the former Orléans-Burgundian feud would be forgotten. The Burgundian duke made frequent proposals to both the captive duke and the English throughout 1440 in order to obtain the release of Orléans. Philip desired

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de la Congrégation de S. Maur (3 vols.; Paris: De l'Imprimerie de C. Osmont avec approbation et privilege du Roy, 1742-46), II, col. 1329; Gui Alexis Lobineau, Histoire de Bretagne, composée sur les titres & les auteurs originaux par Gui Alexis Lobineau, enrichie de plusieurs portraits & tombeaux en taille douce, avec les preuves & pieces justificatives, accompanées d'un grand nombre de sceaux (2 vols.; Paris: M. David, 1707), II, col. 1767. A new commercial treaty was signed in October (Morice, II, col. 1342; Lobineau, II, col. 1067).

[11]B. A. Pocquet de Haut-Jusse, Deux Féodaux, Bourgogne et Bretagne, 1363-1491 (Paris: Boivin, 1936) pp. 88-89; Jean V, duke of Brittany, "Lettres et mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, de 1431 à 1442," Archives de Bretagne recueil d'actes, de chroniques et de documents historiques ou inédits, VII (1844), pp. 231, 245; VIII (1845), pp. 87-88; Cal. Fr. Rolls, pp. 332, 333, 334, 337, 338.

that Charles of Orléans agree to forget the old feud, marry Philip's niece, Mary of Cleves, sister of the princess of Viana, and join Philip against his enemies in France, the king and dauphin excepted. The chroniclers recorded that Charles agreed to these proposals and that representatives of Philip began to deliberate with Henry VI and his Council on arrangements for a ransom.[12]

Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, was the main opponent in England of his release. Early in 1440 he issued, in the form of a letter to Henry VI, a bitter personal attack on Cardinal Beaufort. He challenged the release of the duke of Orléans by asserting that Henry V, in his last will, ordained that Orléans should not be released until all of France had been conquered.[13] On June 2, he made a more detailed protest against the release of Charles of Orléans. Humphrey asserted that neither Charles VII nor the dauphin had the wisdom to govern, but that Orléans, as a prince of the blood, would be made a regent by the French nobles and estates. Orléans' abilities, if he were placed in such a position, would be inimical to English interests. Further, he asserted, "the grette Werre and Discention bithuen the

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[12]Monstrelet, III, pp. 305-306; Wavrin, IV, pp. 293-95. Hall gives a similar account (pp. 192-93).

[13]Stevenson, II, pp. 440-51. He attacked not only Beaufort's peace policies, but his acceptance of the cardinal's hat, his loans to the crown at high interest, his involvement in the collecting of customs and in the wool trade, and other matters of a similar nature. For evaluations of these charges see L. B. Radford, Henry Beaufort, pp. 266-74, and Kenneth Vickers, Humphrey Duke of Gloucester, pp. 260-64.

Fadur and the Sonne, in the which all the Lordes be now devided," might be ended through the able efforts of the duke of Orléans. The duke would also be under no obligation to obey any oaths that he might make to Henry, since, as a liegeman of Charles VII, he would be more heavily obligated to his "Sovereigne Lorde." His release would also endanger Henry's subjects in Normandy and Guienne by promoting a cooperation among French nobles, some of whom had hitherto been friendly to England. It would also cause Henry to lose respect among other rulers since a great concession would be made to his French opponents without any tangible benefits in return. If, however, the release was deemed necessary, Gloucester asserted, the duke should be exchanged for Englishmen imprisoned in France.[14] This document presents an interesting contrast to the earlier assertions of Humphrey, for, although he opposed the release of Orléans as a method conducive to peace, he did not oppose the idea that peace itself should be desired. Of course, it is impossible to know whether he changed his opinion, or merely his tact. Humphrey lost much of his influence in the government in 1441 when his wife, Eleanor Cobham, was found guilty of sorcery. Yet he participated in meetings of the Council until his death in 1447.

A statement was issued by the Council, probably in answer to Humphrey's assertions, giving the reasons for the

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[14]Rymer, X, pp. 764-67. Humphrey also observed that Orléans might be of value if it was necessary to ransom

liberation of the duke. The statement lamented the length and cost of the war since the reign of Edward III, the schism in the church which, it was asserted, was partly due to the distractions of the war, and the unreasonable length of the duke's imprisonment. However, the true intent of English policy was revealed in the Council declaration that:

> The kyng understandeth also, that ther be divers of the saide adversaries counsaille, and suche as ben of the grete, that do medle hem in eny suche traitee of the paix, the whiche thogh thei pretende to the saide adversarie that they desire the saide dukes deliverance, never the lesse they wolde never that he were delivered, but wolde rather that the paix were letted thanne he shulde be delivered and come hoome, thenkyng that and he cam hoome they shulde not thanne have the rieule ther that they have nowe, and so to lette the saide dukes deliverance, withoute whiche the saide adversarie wolde noo paix conclude, they sette and counsaille the saide adversarie alwey to suche offers for the paix, with the saide duks deliveraunce, as they knowe wele the kyng wol not agree him to, and so lette therby both the paix and the saide duks delyveraunce; the whiche ungodly and untrieu practyque cannot be amended, as it is thought, withoute that the saide duc might be in more fredome.[15]

Although the Praguerie was being crushed, the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany, the two French nobles most independent of Charles VII, were trying to organize a league of dissident nobles to limit the power of Charles VII and his bourgeois advisors. Orléans had become friendly with them and would add greatly to their strength. Beaufort and other members of Henry's Council,

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Englishmen taken prisoner by Charles VII in the future. (Part of his ransom was so used in 1451 [PPC, VI, p. 109].)

[15]Stevenson, II, pp. 457-58.

who could recall the Armagnac-Burgundian feud, which had so greatly increased English fortunes, probably hoped the release of Orléans would open a new period of prolonged dissension in France and a favorable end of the war.

On July 2, 1440, Charles, duke of Orléans, and Henry VI signed separate statements requiring the duke to pay 120,000 écus or crowns before leaving England and a similar amount within six months. If the latter amount could not be paid, he was to return to prison. He would be allowed to travel back and forth to English territory in order to mediate. If, within a year, he could mediate a peace successfully, he would be permanently free. However, if he failed, he was to return to captivity in England. In either case, the ransom would be returned to him.[16] As provided by the statement of the duke of Orléans, various French nobles sent bonds to insure the later payment of 120,000 crowns. By late August bonds had been sent by the dauphin for 30,000 crowns; the dukes of Brittany and Alençon for 20,000 crowns each; the count of Vendôme, the archbishop of Reims, and Bernard of Armagnac, count of Marche, for 10,000 crowns each; the archbishop of Narbonne, and the count of Harcourt and Tancarville, 6,000 crowns each; and Andrew de Valle, seigneur de Loheac and marshal of France, and Hardoyn, seigneur de Maille, 4,000 crowns each.[17] It may

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[16] Rymer, X, pp. 776-86. On his role in mediation see p. 779.

[17] Ibid., pp. 794-96; Jean V, Archives de Bretagne, VII, pp. 250-52.

appear curious that Philip of Burgundy was not among those making bond, but he may have assisted Orléans in paying the initial amount. Philip's cooperation is evident by the fact that he transmitted the bond of the dauphin to England.[18]

Charles VII, perhaps with some apprehension, ratified the agreement providing for the release of the duke of Orléans on August 16. It was countersigned by the bastard of Orléans, the archbishop of Narbonne, and several others.[19] The duke of Orléans remained in England until after the first of November. The delay in his departure was probably due in part to the completion of arrangements for his ransom. He was also making plans with Henry VI for a new peace conference.[20]

On October 28 Henry VI granted letters of safe-conduct to the archbishops of Reims and Narbonne, the bastard of Orléans, the bishop of Poitiers, William le Tur, president of the Parlement of Paris, and others, to proceed to Calais.[21] He also granted letters of safe-conduct to the duchess of Burgundy, Nicholas Rolin, chancellor of Burgundy, the bishop of Tournai,

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[18]Rymer, X, pp. 787-88. [19]Ibid., pp. 798-800.

[20]Ibid., pp. 817-21, 827. On October 28 Orléans was released by Lord Fanhope at Reading, apparently to Charles Waterby (Ibid., pp. 823, 825). Fanhope may have been his captor at Agincourt. Nothing else is known of Waterby. Orléans did not get his safe-conduct to France until November 3 and Fanhope was one of those accompanying him (see below). Lord Fanhope was the Sir John Cornwall who had been made a peer in July of 1432 (Rot. Parl., IV, p. 401). Orléans referred to Henry VI in the various documents at this time as the most Christian King -- a title which belonged to the king of France (Rymer, X, p. 787 et passim).

[21]Rymer, X, pp. 808-10.

and other Burgundians.[22] On the same day, Charles, duke of Orléans, swore "in the presence of the Kyng and all the Lordes, except my Lord of Gloucestre," in Westminster Abbey never to bear arms against the English and to fulfill the other provisions of the release agreement.[23]

On November 3, Henry VI affirmed that the ransom had been paid and the duke was free to leave England.[24] The duke and his party of one hundred were given a letter of safe-conduct, and two days later, on November 5, they departed for Gravelines, escorted by Lord Fanhope, William, bishop of Rochester, and other Englishmen.[25] As noted earlier, the members of the English escort had been empowered to make arrangement for the holding of a peace conference. The duke and his escort, traveling by way of Dover and Calais, arrived at Gravelines on

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[22] Ibid., pp. 808-12. Most or all of the Frenchmen and Burgundians named had been at St. Omer since late August (Beaucourt, III, pp. 156-57). The relative importance of each member of the French party is indicated by the number of persons authorized by Henry VI to accompany each one. The archbishop of Reims was authorized a party of 80; the archbishop of Narbonne, 60; the bishop of Poitiers, 60; Le Tur, 25; and the others, 12 to 15 each. The bastard of Orléans was authorized 120, a portion of which was probably meant for his half-brother, the duke of Orléans. (Rymer, X, pp. 808-809.)

[23] Rymer, X, pp. 826, 831; The Paston Letters, A.D. 1422-1509, ed. by James Gairdner (New Complete Library Edition, 6 vols.; London: Chatto & Windus, 1904), II, p. 40. According to a letter dated November 1 to John Paston, Gloucester, not agreeing to the release, "qwan the masse began he take his barge, &c." (Ibid.)

[24] Rymer, X, pp. 821-23. It had been paid through a Florentine establishment in London.

[25] Ibid., pp. 823-28; Stevenson, II, pp. 460-62.

November 11. He was greeted by the duchess of Burgundy, the archbishops of Reims and Narbonne, his bastard brother, Jean, and other representatives of Charles VII and the duke of Burgundy. His first words to the duchess are said to have been: "Madame, vu ce que vous avez fait pour ma délivrance, je me rends votre prisonnier." On November 12 he renewed his oath to Henry VI and acknowledged his release before the bishop of Rochester and the other members of the English escort.[26]

A few days later the duke of Burgundy came to Gravelines to meet Orléans. According to Wavrin and Monstrelet, they embraced several times, but neither could speak for awhile. Finally the duke of Orléans said that he loved Philip and Isabella more than all the princes of the world, for, without their endeavors, he would never have been set free. Philip replied that he had desired the release of the duke for some time and regretted that it did not come sooner. The entire group, including the English, then went by water to St. Omer for a great reception. A few days later, according to the chroniclers, Philip requested the duke of Orléans to swear that he would observe the treaty of Arras, and to take as his wife Philip's niece, Mary of Cleves. Charles swore to all the articles of the treaty, except those relating to the death of John the Fearless, saying that he had been ignorant of the

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[26] Rymer, X, pp. 829-34; Monstrelet, III, pp. 306-307; Wavrin, IV, pp. 295-97. (The accounts of Wavrin and Monstrelet are almost identical.) Orléans' words to Isabella are quoted in Beaucourt (III, p. 159) from the Registre de l'Hotel de Ville de Saint-Omer.

conspiracy against Philip's father, though deeply displeased by it. He was betrothed to Mary of Cleves and married a few days later, on November 30. Great processions, feasts, and other celebrations, for which the duke of Burgundy had long been noted, were held during these weeks. They were especially extravagant on the day of the wedding. Details of the celebrations have been recorded by Wavrin and Monstrelet. Charles of Orléans, in colorful ceremonies, received the collar of the Order of the Golden Fleece. A few days later the dukes of Brittany and Alençon were also elected to the knightly order. Lord Fanhope, who had been present for the wedding and other celebrations, then departed with the other members of the English escort. However Sir Robert Roos, who had been commissioned by Henry VI on an embassy to Charles VII, remained with the duke of Orléans so that he might accompany him to the French king. The dukes of Burgundy and Orléans then journeyed to Bruges for additional celebrations. After staying there about a week, the duke and duchess of Orléans then parted from Philip and journeyed on to Tournai, Cambrai, and numerous other places, where they were well received. A number of Burgundians were received into the household of the duke of Orléans. Monstrelet and Wavrin wrote that Charles VII had kept informed of Orléans' activities since he had arrived from England. The monarch was disturbed by Charles's oaths, his alliance with Philip, his admission to Philip's order, the great celebrations, and the fact that many Burgundians were admitted to his

household. The Valois king was fearful of a conspiracy of the two dukes with the dukes of Brittany and Alençon to form a new administration and take away the king's authority. His fears were increased when he heard that the dukes of Alençon and Brittany had also received the Order of the Golden Fleece. Charles VII had ordered the duke of Orléans to come to him as soon as he had learned of the duke's release. The monarch took the precaution of not permitting the duke to appear before him, except with a small retinue, leaving behind all the Burgundians that Orléans had retained. The two Burgundian chroniclers wrote that there was no real conspiracy, but that the king was overly suspicious due to the rumors begun by ministers fearful of losing their positions. Charles of Orléans arrived in Paris on January 14, 1441, but, hearing of the king's suspicions, went directly to Orléans and his other lands to be received by his vassals and subjects.[27]

Hostilities between the English and French continued throughout 1440. The Praguerie weakened the French temporarily and the English gained Harfleur after a long siege. However, by the summer of 1441 the English lost Pontoise, their

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[27]Wavrin, IV, pp. 295-307; Monstrelet, III, pp. 307-18; Beaucourt, III, pp. 159-64; "Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris sous le règne de Charles VII," Nouvelle collection des mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France depuis le XIII^e siécle jusqu'à la fin du XVIII^e, précédés de notices pour caractériser chaque auteur des mémoires et son époque; suivis de l'analyse des documents historiques qui s'y rapportent par MM. [Joseph François] Michaud et [Jean Joseph François] Poujolat (1st series, 8 vols.; Paris: 24, rue des Petits-Augustins, 1836), II, p. 356.

last foothold in the Île de France, to the forces of Charles VII. In spite of dissension among the leaders of France, the English were barely able to retain their vast lands on the continent. Although Charles VII did not have the enthusiastic support of all the princes of the blood, his suppression of robber bands and his military reforms proved popular enough among the common people to give him considerable power. The dukes of Burgundy, Brittany, and Alençon, and some other princes of the blood wished to bring about peace with England, while Charles VII hoped to overcome by military means English strength on the continent.

The duchess of Burgundy visited Charles VII in April of 1441 at Laon and was coolly received. Her various requests, part of which related to a peace with England, were turned down.[28] The dukes of Brittany, Burgundy, and Orléans had declared on March 6 that they would work for a "paix generalle des deux royaumes de France et d'Engleterre," proposing at the same time that they should act as mediators. By April 12, the dukes of Alençon and Bourbon also adhered to the agreement.[29] The duke of Orléans and the duchess of Burgundy proposed to Henry VI in the spring of 1441 that a peace conference be held which would include the princes of the blood. At a meeting

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[28]Monstrelet, III, pp. 326-29.

[29]Jean V, Archives de Bretagne, VIII, pp. 5-6, 11-12; Morice, II, pp. 1327-28; Pocquet de Haut-Jusse, pp. 88-89; Beaucourt, III, pp. 200-201.

of his Council on April 10, Henry VI ordered Adam Moleyns, keeper of the privy seal, to prepare instructions, similar to those prepared in 1440, for Lord Dudley, Sir Thomas Kyriel, Stephen Wilton, and Robert Whitingham, treasurer of Calais, to treat for peace with the ambassadors of Charles VII at Calais. Cardinal Beaufort and John Kemp, archbishop of York and also by this time a cardinal, were present. On April 24 Dudley's embassy received its commission and the authority, if necessary, to postpone the day of the meeting. It had originally been set for May 1, which was too soon for all the arrangements to be made. Letters of safe-conduct were issued on May 14 by Henry VI to various Frenchmen for the conference to be held in the marches of Calais. The letters, valid until August 16, were sent to certain of the princes of the blood, their representatives, and other leading nobles and churchmen.[30]

Henry VI declared on May 22 that his ambassadors had waited in vain since early May for the arrival of the French delegates. He then issued a new commission and new letters of safe-conduct.[31] On June 19, letters of safe-conduct were issued to the duke and duchess of Alençon and members of their party.[32] However on April 28, Charles VII had revoked all commissions previously issued by him to treat with the English. This act was probably precipitated by the actions of

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[30] PPC, V, pp. 139-40; Rymer, X, pp. 844-47; Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 347; Beaucourt, III, pp. 197-99.

[31] Rymer, X, p. 847.

[32] Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 346.

the princes of the blood and may also be partially explained by subsequent Valois military encroachments in Normandy during May and June. Charles VII said that he objected to any more conferences being held near Calais or elsewhere in enemy lands, but would agree to a conference in lands held by him. Thus there was no peace conference held at this time.[33] Yet talks were apparently held between the English ambassadors and the representatives of the duke of Burgundy pertaining, at least in part, to commercial relations with the Low Countries.[34] The fact that some of the princes of the blood were striving for peace with England and were opposed to the military exploits of the Valois troops in Normandy is substantiated by a letter in July of 1441 from Garter king-at-arms to Henry VI relaying a warning from the duke of Alençon concerning French plans.[35]

Although no general peace conference was held, the princes of the blood remained in close contact with each other throughout 1441.[36] Not only the duke of Alençon, but also the

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[33] PPC, V, p. 146; Monstrelet, III, p. 346; Beaucourt, III, p. 197.

[34] Rymer, X, pp. 848-49.

[35] Stevenson, II, pp. 189-93. Stevenson places the letter in July, 1447. However Ramsay (II, p. 44), and Auguste Vallet de Viriville (Histoire de Charles VII, roi de France, et son époque: 1403-1461 [3 vols.; Paris: Corbeil, 1862-65], II, p. 432) place it in July, 1441. The content of the letter indicates that 1441 is the more likely year.

[36] There are numerous records indicating they and their messengers maintained communications. See Morice, II, cols. 1327-49; Beaucourt, III, pp. 200ff.

dukes of Burgundy and Brittany remained in close contact with Henry VI and his lieutenant in Normandy, Richard, duke of York. In September the dukes of Brittany and Alençon, and perhaps also other princes of the blood or their representatives, held talks at Calais with the duke of York, Jean de Rinel, Henry's French secretary, and other English representatives. The dukes of Brittany and Alençon were apparently to act as mediators at a peace conference at this time but Charles VII again refused to send ambassadors. The fall of Pontoise to the forces of Charles VII on September 19 may have dampened any intrigues planned at this conference, for no direct results of it are apparent. In addition to the loss of Pontoise in the Île de France, various English setbacks also occurred in Normandy, where Évreux was lost on September 15, and in Anjou and Maine. Messengers continued to travel between England and the princes of the blood throughout the winter and Nicholas Rolin was in England in December.[37]

The independent-minded French princes gathered at Nevers in March of 1442 and, after considerable discussion, forwarded their complaints to Charles VII concerning his refusal to negotiate with the English. They also forwarded other grievances relating to such matters as the taxes levied in their lands, and various pensions and offices due them. According to

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[37]Monstrelet, III, p. 346; Morice, II, cols. 1347-49; Lobineau, II, cols. 1075-78; Rymer, XI, p. 1; Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 350; PPC, V, pp. 173-75. On military developments see Wavrin, IV, pp. 341-48; J. Chartier, II, pp. 17-32.

Monstrelet, the king was upset because the nobles had met to discuss national affairs without his presence and not by his command. He feared that the nobles were planning to unite with the leading churchmen and other peoples of France to make various reforms and to place control of the government within the Estates-General. Charles VII threatened that, if such proposals were to come forth, he would immediately postpone his planned military endeavors against the English in Gascony and attack them. Concerning peace negotiations, he again offered to meet with the ambassadors of Henry VI, but not at Calais or at any other location controlled by the English. He had earlier consented to conferences between Calais and Gravelines in order to expedite the release of the duke of Orléans, but believed that it was now the turn of the English to meet in his lands. He would agree to a peace conference not earlier than October 25, 1442, between either Pontoise and Mantes, Chartres and Vernueil, or Sablé and Le Mans. However, he would not consent to a conference before then because of his plans to relieve the town of Tartas in Gascony, and because it would be necessary to invite his allies, the kings of Castile and Scotland, to send delegates. He stressed his determination not to concede any French lands to Henry VI except under terms similar to those of his other vassals, i.e., by doing homage and service. He then requested the nobles to forward his conditions for a peace conference to Henry VI, thus recognizing that they had been carrying on relations with the English

king.[38] The duke of Burgundy and the other recalcitrant princes kept in contact with the duke of York and Henry VI throughout the summer of 1442 and by early autumn began to make plans for a general peace conference as will be discussed below.[39]

Meanwhile the ambassadors of Henry VI conducted negotiations with Jean IV, count of Armagnac, for an alliance and for the marriage of one of the count's daughters to the English king. English relations with the count of Armagnac had been cordial since at least the summer of 1437, when a truce had been negotiated with the French count providing for the cessation of hostilities and the free movement of peoples between Armagnac and Guienne.[40] The English had probably negotiated the truce in order to strengthen the security of Guienne. This same reason, as well as a wish to promote the defection of a Valois vassal, probably accounts for the interest of the English in the negotiations of 1442. Since Henry would be twenty-one on December 6, 1442, a matrimonial alliance for the continuation of his dynasty was also desirable.

The motives of Jean IV, other than the obvious desire to marry one of his three daughters to the king of England, are

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[38]Monstrelet, III, pp. 344-56; Morice, II, cols. 1349-54; Beaucourt, III, pp. 212-31.

[39]Stevenson, II, pp. 324-27; Beaucourt, III, pp. 258-61. For subsequent plans concerning a peace conference see below, pp. 106 et passim.

[40]PPC, V, pp. 44-45; Rymer, X, p. 673; Gironde, France (Dept.), Archives, Archives historiques du département de la Gironde, comp. Jules Lépicier et al. (56 vols., in progress;

not clear. He had been in conflict with Charles VII and the dauphin over lands in neighboring Comminges.[41] Perhaps he had reason to believe that the tide of war would begin to go in favor of the English. However, according to Jean IV himself, his primary motivation was a suggestion from the dukes of Brittany, Orléans, and Alençon, in separate letters to him.[42] Thus, the three princes apparently hoped to bring Jean IV to their side in their quarrels with Charles VII. Yet, whatever the count's motives were, his timing was bad, for during the summer and autumn of 1442 Charles VII initiated in and around Guienne one of the largest offensives of the war.

On May 13 a letter of safe-conduct was granted by Henry VI to Jean de Batute (Batucc), canon and archdeacon of St. Antonine in the church of Rodez, Hugh Guisardi, canon and archdeacon major of the same church, eighteen other ambassadors, and a retinue of fifty.[43] Negotiations between Henry VI and the members of the Armagnac delegation proceeded quickly.[44] On May 28,

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Bordeaux: Société des archives historiques de la Gironde, 1859--), XVI, pp. 237-41, 245-47.

[41]Hall, p. 202.

[42]PRO, Thomas Beckington, Memorials of the Reign of King Henry VI: Official Correspondence of Thomas Bekynton, Secretary to King Henry VI., and Bishop of Bath and Wells, ed. by George Williams ("Rolls Series," no. 56), II, p. 40. Referred to hereafter as PRO, Beckington.

[43]Rymer, XI, p. 6.

[44]According to Hall (pp. 202-203), the count of Armagnac "sent solempne Ambassadors to the kyng of Englande, offeryng

Henry VI commissioned Sir Robert Roos, a member of previous embassies, Thomas Beckington, the king's secretary and later bishop of Bath and Wells, and Edward Hull, who had just returned from Guienne, to go to Armagnac and negotiate a marriage agreement.[45] The English ambassadors were to choose the

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hym his doughter in mariage, not onely promisyng hym siluer hilles, and golden mountaines with her, but also would be bound, to deliuer into the kyng of Englandes handes, all suche castles and tounes, as he or auncestors deteined from hym, within the whole duchie of acquitayn or Guyen, either by conquest of his progenitors, or by gyfte or deliuery of any Freche kyng: offryng farther, to aide the same kyng with money, for the recouery of other citees, within thesaied duchy, from him and his auncestors, by the Frenche kynges progenitors, the lorde de Albrethe [Charles II, sire d'Albret, who occasionally changed sides], and other lordes of Gascoyn, iniustely kept and wrongfully withhoulden."

[45]Rymer, XI, pp. 7-8. Hull remained in England and was to cross later with forces going to Guienne. He arrived in Bordeaux on October 22. (PRO, Beckington, II, pp. 180-81, 216.)

A journal or protocol of the embassy to the count of Armagnac was written by Thomas Beckington or a member of his retinue. Similar in nature to Beckington's protocol of the 1439 conference at Calais, it was first edited, in translation, by Nicholas Harris Nicolas under the title: A Journal by One of the Suite of Thomas Beckington, afterwards Bishop of Bath and Wells, during an Embassy to Negotiate a Marriage between Henry VI and a Daughter of the Count of Armagnac, A. D. MCCCCXLII. (London: William Pickering, 1828). An abridged French translation by G. Brunet, based upon this English edition, was published in the Indicateur, an obscure Bordeaux journal, and reprinted at Paris (Journal du voyage d'un ambassadeur anglais a Bordeaux en 1442 traduit et accompagné de quelques éclaircissemens [Paris: Techener, place du Louvre, 1842]. See also Henry Ribadieu, Histoire de la conquête de Guyenne par les Français de ses antécédents et de ses suites [Bordeaux: Impr. de Vve Dupuy, 1866], pp. 142ff.). The protocol, written mainly in Latin, but including various documents in French and English, was edited by G. Williams and published in the original languages in the "Rolls Series" (no. 56): PRO, Beckington, II, pp. [177]-248 (see note 42, above). Though all of the editions contain valuable notes, the edition of Williams is preferred to that of Nicolas. The latter contains numerous errors, particularly concerning place-names in France.

daughter of the count named in their instructions. However, before they departed from Plymouth, Henry sent them a letter dated June 23, in his own hand and containing his personal seal, saying that their instructions were to be interpreted in a broad sense, i.e., that, as Batute had offered, the choosing of a wife from the three daughters should be left to Henry. The ambassadors, stating this letter abrogated their original instructions and commission, returned these documents to Henry on June 30 and asked for new ones. The king returned the documents and wrote that they were valid as amended by his personal letter. He also specified that an artist be commissioned to:

> portraie the iij. doughters in their kerttelles simple, and their visages, lyk as ye see their stature and their beaulte and color of skynne and their countenaunces, with almaner of fetures; and that j. be delivered in al haste with the said portratur to bringe it unto the Kinge, and he t'appointe and signe which hym lyketh; and thereupon to sende you word how ye shal be gouverned.[46]

On Tuesday, July 10, the English ambassadors and Batute sailed for Bordeaux. After a shark had been speared, Beckington led an interesting religious ceremony in order to gain a favorable wind:

> Demum pro vento habendo dictus dominus meus secretarius devoto et humili corde promisit et flexit argentum [?] beatissimae et gloriosissimae Virgini[s] Mariae de Etona; et post votum sic factum in honore dictae Virginis, cum ceteris in navi quos incitabat facere ut ipse fecerat: quo facto cantaverunt antiphonale Sancta Maria. Qua finita, ventus vertit se in aquilonem, et ibi flavit magis continue.[47]

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[46]PRO, Beckington, II, pp. 177-84.

[47]Ibid., p. 184.

They reached the Garonne on Saturday, July 14, and arrived in Bordeaux on the following Monday. Batute left the party on July 21 to report to the count of Armagnac.[48]

Meanwhile Charles VII had invaded Guienne with one of the largest armies he had ever assembled. On June 24 he relieved the town of Tartas, sixty miles south of Bordeaux, and, after a four-day siege, gained the town of St. Severs in the following week. Roos and Beckington wrote letters to Henry VI and to Lord Ralph Cromwell, treasurer, apprising them of French gains. According to the ambassadors, even Bordeaux and Bayonne were threatened and the people hesitated to resist, for they held little hope of aid from England.[49] The bearer of the letters was accompanied by Pierre Berland, archbishop of Bordeaux, who was going to England to plead for aid. The archbishop appeared before the King's Council on August 21.[50]

Roos received letters on July 31 from the count of Armagnac and Batute. The count's letter had been written at Lectoure on July 21, the day of Batute's arrival there. Batute's letter had been written on July 29. The count regretted the existing circumstances that prevented Roos and his party from

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[48] Ibid., pp. 185-86. During the embassy, the count was either at Lectoure, the main town of his county and located about seventy miles southeast of Bordeaux, or Auch, his capital, which is located about ninety miles southeast of Bordeaux and twenty miles south of Lectoure.

[49] Ibid., pp. 186-93. Monstrelet (III, pp. 356-61) provides details on the military undertakings of Charles VII in Guienne.

[50] PPC, V, p. 198.

journeying to his lands and Batute assured them that a safe-conduct for them had been requested from Charles VII and should be received shortly.[51] Roos and Beckington wrote another melancholy letter on August 9 to Henry VI informing him that the well-fortified town of Dax in Gascony had fallen to Charles VII on August 3, Bayonne was being besieged, and they feared that the armies would next march towards Bordeaux. For the utmost secrecy the letter was written in three lines on parchment across the length of the skin and was sewn into the hem of an old pilgrim's garment. According to the letter, unless Henry sent aid, all of Guienne would be lost.[52] Roos was chosen regent of Guienne on August 15 and he began to plan with Gaston de Foix, captal de Buch, for the defense of Bordeaux.[53] Roos

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[51]PRO, Beckington, II, pp. 193-95. Note that the time required for traveling from Bordeaux to Lectoure, a distance of seventy miles, was two days. As will be seen, the time necessary for this trip was greatly increased as the Valois threat became greater.

[52]Ibid., pp. 196-97. According to Monstrelet (III, pp. 359-61), Dax(also spelled Ax, and Daqs,) had been besieged five weeks. Dax was recaptured by the English before the end of August (PRO, Beckington, pp. 246-47).

The letter apparently reached the king at about the same time as the archbishop of Bordeaux appeared before the Council (August 21). On August 22, the Council ordered wheat to be sent to Guienne, and on August 24 plans were made to raise money for forces. For a letter sent to the wealthy abbot of Bury outlining the conditions noted in Roos's letter of August 9, and requesting money, see Stevenson, II, pp. 465-66.

[53]PRO, Beckington, II, p. 197 et passim. Captal, or captau in Gascon, was the title of the chiefs or lords of Buch, Traine, and Le Testede, all in Gascony. He was strongly partisan to England, as was his son Jean, viscount of Longueville. Both became knights of the Garter.

received letters on August 24 from Armagnac and Batute, dated August 20, reiterating their honorable intentions. The count had sent messages to Charles VII requesting safe-conducts, but no reply had yet been received; Batute believed the king was aware of the purpose of the mission and doubted if he would grant a safe-conduct. He believed Roos might have been able to come and depart in early August, but that since that time the king's forces had come very near to the lands of the count of Armagnac.[54] Roos replied to the count on August 24 that he should accept as truthful, the contents of a letter he would send to Batute. Roos then showed clearly his ire and lack of patience in a letter he penned on the same day to Batute. He stated that he doubted that Henry VI would agree to the marriage if he knew that the count's eldest son, Jean, viscount of Lomagne, had joined the forces of Charles VII.[55] Roos asserted that he was confident that when the English forces arrived they would first attack and destroy the Armagnac possessions. He concluded by saying that he and his party would return to England on the next ship after they had made arrangements for the defense of the area, unless Batute and his master changed their attitude. This letter did not reach Batute until about September 15, indicating a Valois presence in the lands

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[54] Ibid., pp. 198-200.

[55] He had been an active supporter of the Valois for several years and was a participant in some of the recent military engagements. Apparently Isabel of Navarre, the countess of Armagnac, was also a partisan of the Valois monarch (Ibid., p. 201).

between them.[56] Batute's answer, written at Auch and dated September 15, did not reach Bordeaux until October 11. Batute replied that both he and the count had beer astonished and pained by Roos's letter. They could not understand what Roos had meant when he said they should change their attitude, for Roos was well aware that they were highly desirous of completing the negotiations. Batute asserted that the recent actions of the viscount of Lomagne should not impede the planned marriage for, since a treaty had not yet been agreed to, neither the viscount nor the count could disobey the commands of their king. Indeed, if they had, their lands would have been seized and pillaged. He reminded Roos that the marriage was first suggested by the dukes of Brittany, Orléans, and Alençon, and further asserted that the English had no cause for invading the lands of the count of Armagnac since the current military conflicts had not originated with him.[57]

Roos and Beckington answered Batute's letter of September 15 on Friday, October 12. The English ambassadors tried to qualify some of the more bold assertions contained in Roos's letter of August 24. They replied that they were pleased that the count still wished to arrange a marriage and would have been astonished if he had changed his mind, in spite of the fact recent developments had implied such a change. They hoped

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[56] Ibid., pp. 200-201.

[57] Ibid., pp. 206-209.

that he would effect his plans for a marriage agreement so that they might return to England without delaying further. Roos wrote on the next day that, since there appeared to be no opportunity for them to go to the count safely, Batute or another person with full powers should come to Bordeaux or a safe intermediate location to negotiate the dowry and other such matters.[58]

The ambassadors sent letters to Henry VI, Humphrey of Gloucester, and Cardinal Beaufort on October 18. Only the letter to the king is copied in Beckington's protocol. They described in detail the rapid advances of Charles VII in Guienne, and asserted that even a small English force would have been able to halt the French. They noted how the French advances had impeded their mission and informed the king that Batute had been unable to obtain safe-conducts for them from Charles VII. However, they in no way questioned the sincerity of the count, as they had done earlier in the letter to Batute.[59]

On Monday, October 22, Edward Hull arrived from England with letters to the ambassadors and the people of Bordeaux announcing that an English force was being formed and would shortly come to their aid. On October 26 Roos, Hull, and the

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[58] Ibid., pp. 210-12. Letters from the count were addressed only to Roos, who was head of the embassy. From September 15 onward Batute's letters were also addressed to Beckington and, after his arrival, to Hull. It was apparently proper diplomatic practice for the count to correspond only with the person of highest rank.

[59] Ibid., pp. 212-16.

captal de Buch successfully led a force of four hundred against the French in and near the town of St. Loubés, located about seven miles from Bordeaux and across the Garonne. Hull had brought from England an artist named Hans, presumably a Dutch or German painter, to paint the portraits. Roos wrote to the count on November 3 that Hans had been sent to him and urged the count to encourage the rapid completion of the portraits. A more detailed letter to Batute, signed by all the ambassadors, urged that a person be sent to Bordeaux or the intermediate point of Mount Secure (i.e., Monségur, near Marmande and La Réole) to negotiate various matters relating to the marriage. They noted that Hull was astonished by the long delay and asked Batute to hasten matters since their embassy had begun nearly half a year ago.[60]

Another copy of Batute's letter of September 15, which had been originally received on October 11, arrived on November 5 with the notation that, since he had not received a reply, he was sending a copy of his previous letter. Letters dated November 7 and 8 were received on November 19 from the count and Batute. The count thanked Roos for his efforts. Batute assured the English ambassadors of the count's continued desire to meet with them or to send representatives to a safe location to do so. However, the state of the country prevented a meeting at the present time. He hoped that, since English forces were coming to Guienne, roads would soon be open. He concluded

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[60] Ibid., pp. 216-22.

by stating that, if the English so desired, the count would be willing to mediate a truce or peace with the French. Batute wrote that this would be desirable for a number of reasons, but especially for the completion of the marriage.[61]

Letters dated November 22 from the count and Batute were received on December 16. The count acknowledged that Roos's last letters had been received and the artist was at work. Batute observed that the first portrait would be completed in a few days, and promised that he would encourage the painter to complete them all as soon as possible. He and the count saw no reason to take any risks concerning a possible meeting, since the count had offered to mediate a peace which, if successful, would remove any obstacles. The English ambassadors replied on December 22 that the artist should have completed his task by then. If the paintings had not yet been sent, they urged that they be forwarded immediately. They believed that if the count attempted to mediate a truce, it would cause his activities to become more suspicious and would jeopardize plans for the marriage. The English ambassadors wrote to Batute on December 30 that they were leaving soon for England, but hoped to return shortly. They praised Batute's conduct and anticipated the return of the artist to Bordeaux soon.[62]

Beckington left Bordeaux for England on January 10, 1443. Forced to remain at Crowdon in Brittany (perhaps Crozon, south of Brest), because of bad weather, he did not reach England

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[61] Ibid., pp. 222-27.

[62] Ibid., pp. 228-34.

until February 10. On January 14 Roos, still at Bordeaux, received letters dated January 3 from the count and Batute. He left for England soon after. Beckington reported to the king at Maidenhead on the morning of February 20, and met Roos on the latter's arrival there that evening. According to the letters from the count and Batute, dated January 3, the artist had completed one painting and was beginning the other two. However, the extremely cold weather had prevented him from mixing and applying the colors, thus causing the long delay. Batute observed that the count had anticipated Roos's reaction to his offer to mediate. The count was sincere in the offer, though opposed by both sides. Batute and the count emphasized their sincere desires for the completion of arrangements for a marriage.[63]

No further activities are known to have occurred between representatives of Henry VI and the count of Armagnac relating to the proposed marriage. Charles VII abandoned his winter campaign in Guienne because of the weather and a lack of provisions.[64] The presence of French forces in Guienne had not only interferred with communications between Jean IV and the English ambassadors, but had also caused the count to procrastinate in his relations with the English. The fact that his eldest son was serving with Charles VII probably helped lessen

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[63] Ibid., pp. 235-43. Hull remained in Bordeaux where he was made constable of the city.

[64] Ribadieu, pp. 164-67; PPC, V, pp. 256-64, 415-16.

the chance that his lands might be invaded, although any agreement with the English that would have been unpopular with his lord, Charles VII, would probably have resulted in his lands being confiscated. His fears kept him from carrying out his wishes. The only way he could agree to the marriage without arousing the ire of Charles VII was to negotiate a truce. This held no hope of success because of the military advantage of the French at that moment, yet it gave Jean IV an excuse for additional delaying. If English forces had arrived earlier, the embassy might have been a success. It has been suggested that the Armagnac marriage was supported by Gloucester but opposed by William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, a leader of the Beaufort party.[65] Suffolk may have had a more conciliatory attitude towards Charles VII at this time, but there is no conclusive evidence that he caused plans for the marriage to be cancelled, or that Gloucester had specifically favored the marriage.[66] However, within a few months the dauphin invaded the lands of Jean IV and imprisoned him and his family. This was mainly because of Jean IV's claim to lands in Comminges.

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[65] Ramsay, II, p. 47.

[66] At his trial in 1450 Suffolk was accused, among other things, of acquainting Charles VII with the purpose of the embassy and thereby causing his invasion of Guienne (Rot. Parl., V, p. 180). However, according to Monstrelet (III, pp. 344ff.), Charles had planned as early as March, 1442, to go into Guienne. The Armagnac embassy to England was in May. Gloucester used the earlier intention of Henry VI to marry an Armagnac princess as an excuse for opposing the king's marriage to Margaret of Anjou in 1444, but this does not mean he had supported the Armagnac marriage in 1442 (Hall, p. 204).

This event, more than any other, served to end thought on the part of Henry VI concerning the daughters of the count of Armagnac.

As noted earlier, the various French princes had kept in contact with Henry VI and his lieutenant in France, Richard, duke of York, throughout the summer and autumn of 1442. Jean de Luxembourg, bastard of St. Pol, conferred with the duke of York at Rouen for about two weeks in July on behalf of the duchess of Burgundy.[67] Shortly afterwards, before the end of August, a herald of the duke of Brittany was in England.[68] These missions were apparently undertaken for the purpose of arranging a peace conference. The death of Jean V, duke of Brittany, on August 28 probably delayed plans for a conference. However on October 9, Henry VI commissioned Richard, duke of York, Louis of Luxembourg, archbishop of Rouen and the English chancellor of France, the bishops of Lisieux and Bayeux, John, earl of Shrewsbury, and a dozen others to agree with the French on a location near the borders of Brittany and lower Normandy for a conference on or near October 25.[69] The duke of York and his party were to attempt to negotiate a peace settlement with the French, but, if this proved to be

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[67]Stevenson, II, pp. 324-27. [68]PPC, V, pp. 208-209.

[69]This commission is dated in Rymer (XI, pp. 13-14) as September 9. However, according to the minutes of the King's Council, the commission was granted on October 9 (PPC, V, p. 212). The discussions of the Council on October 7 and 8 relating to peace with France indicated that the later date is probably correct (PPC, V, pp. 210-12).

impossible, they were instructed to agree to a truce, preferably one of long duration. However, they should agree to a short truce if it was necessary for the prevention of a rupture in the talks.[70] As noted above, Charles VII had informed the princes of the blood at Nevers in the spring that he would consent to a conference not earlier than October 25. He had also requested the princes to make arrangements with the English for such a meeting.[71] However, it was more than a year before a meeting between the representatives of Henry VI and Charles VII was held. Burgundian representatives were at Rouen and in England during October of 1442.[72] During this month the duchess of Burgundy and the duke of York agreed to abstain from war and to respect the possessions of the king of England and the duke of Burgundy on the continent.[73] In December the alliance that had existed between Philip the Good and the late Jean V of Brittany was renewed by Philip and the new duke of Brittany, Francis I.[74]

The French offensive in Guienne during the autumn of 1442, which so greatly troubled the count of Armagnac and the English

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[70] PPC, V, pp. 210-11.

[71] Monstrelet, III, pp. 345-46.

[72] Stevenson, II, p. 329; Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 355.

[73] PPC, V, pp. 210-12; Cal. Fr. Rolls, pp. 355, 358; Rymer, XI, pp. 24-26. This was important to the English for the security of Calais since it was surrounded by Burgundian possessions. The truce was confirmed by both sides the following spring.

[74] Beaucourt, III, p. 262.

embassy at Bordeaux, also probably caused the peace conference, planned for late October, not to be held. Charles VII had hoped to complete his invasion in the south by late October. However, not only did his forces remain throughout the winter, but other French forces had to be sent to Dieppe which was besieged by the earl of Shrewsbury. This latter action had perhaps been initiated by the duke of York to answer criticisms concerning his inactivity.[75]

The attention of the English Council was drawn from peace efforts to the need for the military protection of Guienne and Normandy. The Council members debated whether to come to the aid of Guienne or their lands in the north. Cardinal Beaufort emphasized that both areas should be relieved. In March of 1443, John Beaufort, earl of Somerset and a nephew of the cardinal, was made a duke and appointed captain-general of all "France and Guienne" for seven years. His title conflicted with that of the duke of York, but his commission excluded those areas actually controlled by Richard of York. Cardinal Beaufort and his supporters hoped that Somerset would show more aggressiveness against the Valois forces than had York.[76] The

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[75]Monstrelet, III, pp. 345-46; PPC, V, pp. 222-29; Chronicle of London, from 1089 to 1483, ed. J. G. Nichols (London: Printed by and for J. B. Nichols and son, 1827), p. 131.

[76]PPC, V, pp. 251-63, 281, 298, 409; Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 359; Wavrin, IV, pp. 352-53. For letters of the king to the abbot of St. Edmund's requesting aid for the struggles in Guienne and Normandy see PRO, Memorials of St. Edmund's Abbey, ed. Thomas Arnold, (3 vols.; "Rolls Series," no. 96), III, pp. 262-71.

dauphin and the count of Dunois were able to defeat the English at Dieppe in August of 1443, before the forces of Somerset arrived. While discussing the subsequent campaign of Somerset, the chronicler, Thomas Basin, observed that he was not sure whether Somerset had discovered his own intentions. The cardinal's nephew had apparently planned on sailing to Bordeaux, but landed at Cherbourg and marched southward, pillaging the lands of Francis I of Brittany, a supporter of English efforts for peace. After enjoying the hospitality of Richard of York at Rouen, he returned home, and died soon afterwards.[77]

In spite of the curious activities of Somerset, the new duke of Brittany strove to remain on good relations with Henry VI. Francis sent his brother Giles to England in the summer of 1443 with an offer to mediate between Henry VI and Charles VII. On August 26, 1443, Henry VI accepted the duke's offer to mediate, and reminded him of the exertions his father, the previous duke, had made for peace. Henry promised the duke that he would be favorably treated in any treaty with Charles VII, and added that he was going to send ambassadors into France shortly. Later in the year Francis wrote to Henry VI

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[77]Thomas Basin, Histoire des règnes de Charles VII et de Louis XI, par Thomas Basin, évêque de Lisieux, jusqu'ici attribuée à Amelgard, rendue à son véritable auteur et publiée pour la première fois avec les autres ouvrages historiques du même écrivain, ed. Jules Etienne Joseph Quicherat (4 vols., Société de l'histoire de France, nos. 81, 85, 89, 98; Paris: J. Renouard, 1855-59), I, p. 150; Ramsay, II, pp. 54-55. See PPC, VI, pp. 12-22, for complaints of Francis to Henry VI. John Beaufort should not be confused with his younger brother Edmund, marquis of Dorset, who succeeded him as earl (later duke) of Somerset.

that Charles VII had requested him to be present when the English ambassadors arrived at the Valois court and to assist in concluding a peace. The French monarch had promised Francis that he would be included in a treaty in an honorable manner and treated as the other princes of the blood. Francis told Henry VI that he had refrained from replying to Charles VII until he knew Henry's wishes on the matter. Henry VI did not answer the Breton duke's questions directly, but merely assured him again that he would be favorably treated in any peace. The activities of Somerset in Brittany during this period, and also Breton attacks on English subjects on both land and sea, caused relations between the duke and Henry VI to become strained. However, both sides took steps to rectify any damages and improve relations. It is then clear that, although no peace conference was held in October of 1442, both Charles VII and Henry VI had corresponded with Francis I of Brittany on plans for a peace conference in the near future.[78]

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[78] PPC, VI, pp. 3-24. Part of these letters are also in Morice, II, 1360ff. Giles had been reared in England and was more closely identified with English interests than his elder brother, the duke. A portion of this correspondence also deals with the duke's claim to the earldom of Richmond which was rejected by Henry VI. Francis wished to have Giles do homage to Henry VI for him, apparently for Richmond rather than Brittany. Henry rejected the proposal that Giles act as a proxy as being without precedent. Certain lands belonging to Giles in France were confiscated by Charles VII on August 28. Giles' relations with Henry VI became very close in late 1443. He was given presents and awarded a pension in return for his services and allegiance to Henry VI. ("Documents inédits sur Gilles de Bretagne, 1443-1445," Mélanges historiques, littéraires bibliographiques publiés par la Société des

The traditional close ties between Brittany and England were apparently becoming weak by the end of 1442. The duke of Orléans had been freed but he had failed to pose any significant threat against the Valois monarch. Various plots and intrigues aimed at Charles VII by some of the princes of the blood had failed. Their plans for a marriage between Henry VI and a daughter of a prominent Valois vassal, the count of Armagnac, also went awry due mainly to the military advances of Charles VII in the south of France. Charles VII was apparently not opposed to a period of peace that would allow him to consolidate his control over the French princes, but he would not allow himself to be forced to negotiate from a position of weakness. The French princes of the blood continued to work for a treaty between the two kings in late 1443 and early 1444. The voices for peace in Henry's Council also became more powerful by 1444, as will be noted in the next chapter.

Bibliophiles Bretons, II (1883), pp. 239-41; Stevenson, I, pp. 439-41; Morice, II, cols. 1359ff; Rymer, XI, pp. 48-49; A. Bourdeaut, "Gilles de Bretagne -- Entre la France et l'Angleterre -- Les Causes et les Auteurs du drame," Mémoires de la Société d'historique et d'archéologie de Bretagne, I [1920], pp. 53-145.)

CHAPTER IV

A TRUCE AND A ROYAL MARRIAGE (1444-45)

The French princes of the blood, particularly the dukes of Burgundy and Orléans, and the late and current dukes of Brittany, had long striven for peace between Charles VII and Henry VI. The war had been costly to them. The duke of Burgundy had especially felt the pressures of commercial interests in his lands to end the conflict. They may also have believed that a continuation of the war would weaken their political independence, especially if Charles VII should emerge as the only strong ruler in France. Charles VII had been strongly pressed by the princes at Nevers in 1442, and before and after, to work for an agreement with Henry VI. Although his recent campaigns had been fairly successful in Guienne, they had been less so at Dieppe and other areas in northern France. His subsequent actions also indicate that he wished to have a period of peace to carry out further military, economic, and political reforms in order to strengthen his power. Thus during the winter of 1443-44, through the offices of Francis I of Brittany and other princes of the blood friendly to England, plans were made for the first great peace conference since 1439.

Henry VI had not given up the pursuit of a satisfactory settlement with Charles VII despite the failure of the Conference of Calais in 1439. His policies were heavily influenced by his great-uncle, Henry Beaufort, cardinal of Winchester. Beaufort, while supporting strong military action against Charles VII, had long sought ways toward peace. His policy was one of negotiation through strength. With political realism he had supported proposals in the past which would have allowed Henry VI to retain most of his lands in France, but would have caused him to cease claiming title to the crown of France. He had not worked for outright abandonment of English interests in France, but had apparently feared that those lands England still held on the continent would be lost, if the war continued indefinitely. The only solution, he realized as early as 1439, was a compromise on the part of Henry concerning his title to the French crown. Cardinal Beaufort had been active in religious and governmental circles since the latter part of the fourteenth century. Now past seventy years of age, he still attended meetings of the Council but his policies were enunciated more clearly by younger members, particularly William de la Pole, earl of Suffolk.

Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, the king's uncle, opposed any concessions to Charles VII and had violently disagreed with Beaufort's programs in the past, particularly the proposals that came out of Beaufort's negotiations in 1439. However, his small following had probably dwindled even further after

his wife had been found guilty of sorcery in 1441. Although he had apparently been successful in thwarting the negotiations in 1439, he had not been successful in his opposition to the release of the duke of Orléans in 1440. In 1444 he opposed the peace or truce with Charles VII and was also hostile to the marriage of Henry VI to a French princess. His ideas were apparently influenced by his admiration for the continental achievements and ambitions of his late brother, Henry V, and also by his deep envy of Cardinal Beaufort.[1]

Suffolk had shown a conciliatory attitude to Charles VII even before the Congress of Arras.[2] He had been active in various negotiations with the Valois in the years preceeding the confrontation at Arras. Charles of Orléans had been in his custody until May, 1436, when Reginald Cobham, Gloucester's father-in-law, succeeded to the charge of the captive prince. Suffolk supported the peace policies of Beaufort in 1439 and remained in close contact with Jean de Dunois, bastard of Orléans, whose prisoner he had been briefly in 1429. His role in the English government increased significantly in the 1440's. He was one of the commissioners who inquired into the sorcery charge against Eleanor Cobham, Gloucester's wife, in 1441. As Gloucester fell into disgrace, and because Beaufort had reached his later seventies, Suffolk inherited the leadership of those who supported the peace policies of Beaufort. He was active

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[1]Basin, I, p. 189; Hall, p. 204; Stevenson, I, p. 123.

[2]Stevenson, II, pp. 218-40.

in obtaining the disastrous appointment, as it proved, of John Beaufort, earl of Somerset, to go to the aid of English forces in Guienne. However, although he desired peace, he believed that a favorable peace could only be gained by the fervent prosecution of the war. Thus, while making plans for a conference, he wrote to York that the war must be waged with determination and vigor.[3]

As was noted in the previous chapter, Henry VI and Charles VII discussed their plans for a peace conference with Francis of Brittany late in 1443. On January 22, 1444, Henry VI granted letters of safe-conduct to Jean de Dunois, Louis de Bourbon, count of Vendôme, Gauffridus Vassal (de Vassalli), archbishop of Vienne, Bertrand de Beauvau, seigneur de Précigny, Pierre de Brézé, seneschal of Poitou and the Île de France, and fifteen others, including Jean Descampes, who had been in the service of the duke of Burgundy. They were authorized to travel in English-held lands with their retinues of from six to one hundred each for the purpose of negotiating a peace under the mediation of the duke of Orléans.[4]

At a meeting of the Council on February 1, Suffolk asked Henry VI that he not be sent on an embassy going into France.

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[3] PPC, V, pp. 25-64; Rymer, X, pp. 658-59; Beaucourt, III, p. 92; C. J. Kingsford, "The Policy and Fall of Suffolk," Prejudice and Promise in Fifteenth Century England (2nd. ed.; London: Frank Cass & Co., 1962 [first publ. 1925], pp. 150-54. Also see the article on Suffolk by T. F. Tout in the DNB (XVI, pp. 50-56).

[4] Rymer, XI, pp. 49-51.

Suffolk recalled that he had become well known among French leaders when he had been a captive of the bastard of Orléans in 1429 and that he had also held long conversations with the duke of Orléans when the latter had been in his custody as an English prisoner. He further noted that his name had been suggested by the French to head the planned English embassy and that this had caused much criticism of him in London. He recalled that the motives and actions of members of some previous embassies had been strongly criticized both in Parliament and elsewhere. Because of these various factors he requested that the king excuse him from the embassy. John Stafford, the chancellor, replied to Suffolk that it was the desire of the king and all of the councillors present that he should head the delegation. Suffolk then answered that he would serve but that he wished to be accompanied by men of ability. He also desired that in the event the negotiations were not successful

> therefore noe charge be laid upon him nother that he therefore ronne into any daunger or hevynesse of the King nor on any other behalfe nor wise, but that he may stand alway in the Kings good conceit and grace.

The chancellor then expressed the king's agreement that if the mission should fail, the king, his heirs, councillors, officers, and other subjects would levy no charges against Suffolk or his heirs, or other members of the embassy. Suffolk then thanked the king and expressed his desire to obey the king's command to lead the embassy.[5] With one exception, which is

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[5]PPC, VI, pp. 33-35. As will be noted later, Suffolk

noted below, materials available from this period give no mention of a possible marriage between Henry VI and a French princess, but plans were presumably being made for such a marriage. It was perhaps this as much as the negotiations for peace that caused Suffolk to hesitate about leading the embassy. This is indicated by the fact that on February 20 Henry VI exonerated Suffolk of all blame for his future actions in the matter of peace or matrimony.[6]

On February 11 Henry VI commissioned the following people to negotiate with the representatives of Charles VII for perpetual peace: Suffolk, Adam Moleyns, keeper of the privy seal and dean of Salisbury, Robert Roos, the English chancellor of France, Richard Andrew, secretary, and John Wenlock, knight. In case a general or perpetual peace could not be arrived at, a separate commission was written authorizing the embassy to agree to a truce.[7] Nothing in the commissions granted powers

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had reason to hesitate to accept the mission, for his purported actions on the mission were among those items he was charged with at his trial in 1450 (Rot. Parl., VI, p. 177).

[6]Rymer, XI, pp. 53-54.

[7]Rymer, XI, pp. 53, 59-61. Moleyns had succeeded Beckington as keeper of the privy seal on February 11. He had been on a diplomatic mission to Rome in 1441, and, as will be noted, was engaged in diplomatic activities throughout this decade. He was consecrated bishop of Chichester in 1446. Generally considered as a follower of Beaufort and Suffolk, he had aided the prosecution of Gloucester's wife for sorcery in 1441, and, as keeper of the privy seal, probably sealed the warrant for Gloucester's arrest in 1447. Roos had led the embassy to the count of Armagnac in 1442 and was also active in diplomacy throughout this decade. He was considered a friend of Gloucester, but is not known to have taken sides in

to negotiate a marriage, but since on February 20 Henry VI had referred to the powers of Suffolk to arrange a marriage, this power was apparently granted only to him, as head of the embassy, in a separate commission not extant. His role in this regard is not unlike that of Beaufort in 1439 when the latter had been granted certain powers apart from those of the embassy to Calais. Certain modern historians have suggested that the marriage of Henry VI to Margaret of Anjou, daughter of René, titular king of Sicily, and niece of the wife of Charles VII, had been suggested by Charles of Orléans.[8] There is no documentation showing that this suggestion had been made initially by him. However, the suggestion may well have been made by him or other princes of the blood as early as 1443, since, by 1444, steps were already being made to implement the suggestion. Basin states, nevertheless, that the English had hoped to arrange a marriage with a daughter of Charles VII, and that Margaret of Anjou was agreed to by Suffolk during the talks at Tours.[9] Thus the initial arrangements for a marriage are not clear.

Charles VII and his Council made plans with the princes of the blood in February of 1444 to continue the war "au recouvrement de ses pays," while, at the same time, the king

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Humphrey's differences with the Beaufort party. He may have been chosen, not only because of his diplomatic experience, but in order to lessen criticism against the activities of the embassy.

[8]Ramsay, II, p. 56; Kingsford, p. 154.

[9]Basin, I, pp. 155ff.

made arrangements for the planned peace conference.[10] He also requested Jacques Jouvenel des Ursins, bishop of Laon, to study the various documents relating to the rights of the Valois throne to hold sovereignty over the lands in France possessed by the English. The bishop's memorandum, based upon historical and legal assertions, defended the Valois right to the throne against Edward III and his heirs because of the invalidity of female inheritance. The bishop declared the Treaty of Troyes to be null and void, and asserted that Normandy, Guienne, Anjou, Maine, Ponthieu, Touraine, and Poitou were part of the French royal domain. He concluded by stating that the crown of England was legally held by the members of the house of Lancaster, rather than the other descendants of Edward III, causing the lands to revert to Charles VII, even if the claims of Edward III had been legitimate.[11] The main difference with the English position was, of course, the refusal of Charles VII to recognize the Treaty of Troyes, concluded in 1420, in which Charles VI had recognized Henry V, the father of Henry VI, as his successor to the crown of France.

Suffolk and the other members of the English delegation left London for France in about the middle of February.[12] Suffolk wrote to his friend the duke of Orléans, and also to

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[10]Stevenson, I, p. 119; Beaucourt, III, pp. 269-70.

[11]Beaucourt, III, p. 270.

[12]PRO, Beckington, I, p. 175. Beckington noted on February 14 that they were to leave shortly.

Pierre de Brézé, seigneur de la Varenne, near the first of March that he and his party would arrive at Calais shortly. Upon hearing this, Charles VII appointed a delegation to accompany the English embassy to Compiègne or another location near the Seine where the duke of Orléans would meet them. Charles VII also wrote the duke of Burgundy that he should dispatch some of his court to accompany the embassy through Burgundian lands. The French king also sent his chancellor and other members of his Council to greet the English embassy and make further arrangements for the conference.[13]

Suffolk wrote to Orléans and Pierre de Brézé in early March stating that the English party would arrive at Harfleur, rather than Calais. From this town at the mouth of the Seine they would then journey southward to Le Mans, by way of Rouen. Charles VII learned of this change shortly after his arrival in Tours on about March 15 and immediately called together his advisors, including his brother-in-law, King René of Sicily, the duke of Orléans, and the counts of Maine and Vendôme, to make further arrangements for the meeting. Messengers were sent to inform the duke of Burgundy of the change and to recall Regnault de Chartres, archbishop of Reims and chancellor of France, from Paris, where he had been waiting for the English. Before the end of March, Charles VII received the message that

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[13]Stevenson, I, pp. 167-69. The duke of Burgundy was engaged in border skirmishes with the dauphin at this time (Monstrelet, III, pp. 377-78).

the English delegation had arrived at Le Mans and was awaiting his call.[14]

On March 31 Raoul, sire de Gaucourt, and Guichard de Cisse, both councillors, and Jacques Aude, the king's secretary, were sent by Charles VII to confer with Suffolk on arrangements for the conference and other related matters. Hue de Saint-Mars, governor of Blois, representing the duke of Orléans, accompanied the three representatives of the king. Detailed instructions for the four were prepared. The three representatives from Charles VII were to inform the English of the difficulties the king had learning of their route of travel. They were also to express the king's pleasure at their arrival and his willingness to agree to "tous termes honnestes et raisonnables." The governor of Blois was then to say, on the part of the duke of Orléans, that the king was still somewhat weak from a recent accident, and, because of the earlier plans to disembark at Calais, the chancellor and the duke of Burgundy had not yet arrived at Tours. For these reasons he was to suggest that a conference not be held in 1444 until after Easter (April 12). Orléans' representative was to suggest the town of Vendôme for the conference and promise that the duke of Orléans, other princes of the blood, the chancellor, and other members of the King's Council would be there. Gaucourt and Guichard were then to express the belief that the king would

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[14] Stevenson, I, pp. 67-71. The archbishop of Reims died on April 8.

be well satisfied with these arrangements and would send his representatives to such a meeting. If the English agreed to a meeting at Vendôme, the French representatives were then to suggest an abstinence from war in the nearby parts of the duchy of Touraine and the counties of Blois and Vendôme, and, if agreed to, make arrangements for the agreement to be carried out. If the English agreed to wait until after Easter for a meeting, the four representatives were to return to the king. However, if they did not wish to wait until after Easter, they should so inform the king by messenger, and remain with the English to accompany them to Vendôme on a day to be specified. It was noted that it would take three or four days for a message to be sent from Le Mans to Tours and for a reply to be received.[15]

Suffolk apparently did not agree to wait until after Easter, for on April 8 the conference opened at Vendôme. Pierre de Brézé, a member of the king's Council,[16] directed negotiations for the French, although the duke of Orléans and the count of Vendôme headed the Valois delegation. Apparently it was agreed at this time to abstain from war in the regions around Vendôme. Talks here were very amicable. Suffolk visited his former prisoner, Charles of Orléans, in Blois. On April 16 the English ambassadors, accompanied by the duke of

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[15]Stevenson, I, pp. 67-78. Charles, duke of Orléans, was also the count of Blois.

[16]For the career of Pierre de Brézé, Charles VII's most influential advisor during this period, see Vallet de Viriville, Histoire de Charles VII, III, pp. 102-108.

Orléans and his bastard brother, Jean, count of Dunois, sailed the Loire from Blois to Tours. Upon their arrival at the gates of the town, they were greeted with much pomp by René, king of Sicily, his son, Jean, duke of Calabria, the dukes of Brittany and Alençon, the counts of Maine, Vendôme, Richemont, St. Pol, Étampes, and Tancarville, and numerous other nobles and other dignitaries. Charles VII received them on the following day at his castle of Montils-lès-Tours. They presented their commission to the king. Charles VII received the English ambassadors and confirmed the preliminary agreements already arrived at.[17] Suffolk also presented to Charles VII a letter from Henry VI which was addressed not to his adversary in France, as had been customary in the past, but to the "très hault et excellent prince nostre très cher oncle de France." This may have been the first time that Henry VI had used this more friendly greeting. The letter expressed Henry's affection for Charles VII and his desire for an amicable solution to their differences.[18]

Philip of Burgundy had not arrived. However he was represented by Jean de Croy, seigneur de Chimay, Jean Jouffroy, dean of Vergy (later cardinal of Arras), Oudart Chuperel (Caperal), master of requests of the duke's household, and Louis Domessent, secretary. There were also envoys from the

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[17]Bodley Ms., Digby 196, folio 151ff., as discussed by Vallet de Viriville (II, p. 451), and Stevenson (II, p. xxxvi).

[18]Beaucourt, III, p. 274.

principal towns in Philip's lands. On May 4, Isabella of Lorraine, queen of Sicily, arrived at Tours with her daughter Margaret.[19] Peter de Monte, bishop of Brescia and papal nuncio in the realm of France, had been sent by Pope Eugenius IV to help bring about peace between England and France since their strife had weakened the struggle against the Turks. There is no indication that he played a significant role in the deliberations.[20]

The negotiators representing Charles VII were Charles, duke of Orléans, Louis of Bourbon, count of Vendôme, Pierre de Brézé, seigneur de la Varenne and seneschal of Poitou and [the Île de] France, and Bertrand de Beauvau, seigneur de Précigny.[21] Pierre de Brézé appears to have been the principal negotiator. Charles of Orléans, a friend of Suffolk, may have assumed the role of a mediator. The same differences which had existed between the two monarchs at earlier conferences were present at Tours. The representatives of Charles VII were willing to allow Henry VI to retain certain lands in France only upon the condition that he do homage for them to Charles VII.

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[19]Monstrelet, III, pp. 377-78; Vallet de Viriville, II, p. 452; Stevenson, I, p. 132; II, p. xxxvi.

[20]O. Raynaldi, an. 1444, no. 5 (pp. 415-17); Cal. Pap. Reg: Papal Letters, VIII, p. 248. Peter de Monte was later an ambassador to England (see Georg Hofmann, "Briefe eines päpstlichen Nuntius in London über das Konzil von Florenz," Orientalia Christiana Periodica, V [1939], p. 431).

[21]"Trève conclue à Tours entre Charles VII et Henry VI, Le 28 Mai 1444," Traites de la guerre de cent ans (ed. Cosneau), p. 154.

The English ambassadors insisted that the lands be held in complete sovereignty, i.e., without the performance of homage for them. Disagreement also existed on which lands should be retained by the English. However, if this had been the only difference, it could probably have been resolved. As he had apparently offered in 1439, Henry VI was willing to give up his claim to the crown of France in return for undisputed sovereignty over the lands he would retain in France. He would not agree to doing homage for his lands since, according to the English position, these lands had been held by the English throne prior to any English claim on the crown of France. Charles VII was willing to treat Henry VI as he did his other vassals, some of whom, such as the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany, were actually quite independent of his authority. However, he refused to give up his claim, as the king of France, to sovereignty over the English-held lands. The French offered at Tours to concede to the English, the possession of the duchy of Guienne, the counties of Quercy and Perigord, and the marches of Calais, including the lands around Guines. However, Henry VI would be required to do homage for these lands. Suffolk replied that he did not have the authority to accept such an offer. He informed Charles VII that he had been instructed

> demander les terres esquelles le roy son nepveu, avoit droit, sans la question de la couronne, cest assavoir, Guienne et Normandie, etc.[22]

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[22]Stevenson, I, pp. 132-33, 151. Normandy thus was the only major area the English wished to retain but the French

Suffolk held that Normandy and Guienne, and presumably Calais and other lesser areas, should belong to the king of England without the performance of any homage, since they had long been held by English kings, and further stated that if Charles VII would agree to this, Henry VI was prepared to abandon "son droit de la couronne de France au roy."[23] However, Charles VII refused to concede his claim of sovereignty over the lands held by the English and, on May 20, gave his negotiators the power to sign a truce.[24]

Before the truce was signed, René of Sicily and the English ambassadors, with the agreement of Charles VII, drew up the conditions for the marriage of Rene's fifteen-year-old daughter, Margaret, to Henry VI. According to the agreement, signed on May 22, Margaret forfeited all claims to the possessions of her father and mother in France, and retained only René's tenuous claims to the kingdom of Majorca and Minorca. Henry VI was to confirm this renunciation after the consummation of the marriage. A dowry of twenty thousand francs was agreed upon. On May 24 in the church of St. Martin, Margaret was affianced to Henry VI. Suffolk acted as the king's proxy. The bishop of Brescia presided over an elaborate ceremony in

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did not offer to concede. The "etc." probably refers principally to Calais and Guines.

[23]Stevenson, I, p. 151. The accounts cited in this and the previous note in Stevenson are summaries of the 1444 negotiations made by French and English ambassadors at a conference in 1445.

[24]Rymer, XI, pp. 61-62.

which Charles VII and the princes of the blood also participated. A festive supper was held in the evening at the abbey of St. Julian. Various entertainments were provided. Two giants entered, each carrying a large tree. They were followed by two camels bearing towers, each holding a man armed with a lance. The men then engaged in combat. Other festivities were provided in the following days.[25]

The ambassadors of the two kings, having given up any hope for an agreement providing for the settlement of the claims of the two kings over sovereignty of the lands held by the English in France, agreed on the royal wedding to improve relations, and also on a temporary truce providing for the cessation of hostilities for two years. This truce, commonly referred to as the "Truce of Tours," was signed by the representatives of Henry VI and Charles VII on May 28, 1444.[26] It

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[25]Vallet de Viriville (II, pp. 452-53n.) includes an extract by a member of the English embassy describing the ceremonies and festivities. Another contemporary account occurs in A. Lecoy de la Marche, "Pièces Justificatives," Le Roi René: sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires, d'après les documents inédits des archives de France et d'Italie (2 vols.; Paris: Librairie de Firmin-Didot frères, fils et Cie, imprimeurs de l'Institut, 1875), II, pp. 254-57. See also Basin, I, pp. 154-60; Beaucourt, III, pp. 276-78; Stevenson, II, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii.

[26]The most complete copy of the truce is probably the one in French edited by E. Cosneau: "Trève conclue à Tours entre Charles VII et Henry VI, Le 28 May 1444," Traités de la guerre de cent ans, pp. 152-71 (the actual treaty begins on p. 162). A Latin copy from English archives is in Rymer (XI, pp. 59-67 [treaty begins on p. 62]). Another copy, incomplete, is in Monstrelet (III, pp. 378-83). The principal items are also summarized in a calendar of Henry VI's proclamation of the truce on June 27 (Cal. Cl. Rolls: 1441-

provided for the cessation of hostilities throughout France, England, Wales, and Ireland on June 1, except for Guienne and Gascony where fighting was to cease by June 15. The truce was not to be effective upon the seas until July 1.[27] Neither ruler could aid the subjects of the other against their king. The subjects of both rulers were to be allowed to carry on trade, except in war materiel, and other lawful pursuits. The truce provided for reparations in case of violations, and for conservators of the truce to be appointed to settle any conflicts that might threaten to cause a breach. The truce was to be in effect until April 1, 1446, during which time attempts were to be made for a "paix generale." Provision was also made for the recognition of the truce by the allies of each king, i.e., by the kings of Castile, Sicily (and Jerusalem), and Scotland, as French allies, and the kings of Denmark, Sweden,

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1447, pp. 232-34). All of the versions contain the most important features of the truce, although the French versions (i.e., Cosneau and Monstrelet) differ in certain details from the English versions (i.e., Rymer and Cal. Cl. Rolls). The French versions (Cosneau, p. 170), as might be expected, refer to Charles as "nostre dit très redoubté et souverain seigneur, le Roy de France," whereas the English copy (Rymer, p. 63) of the treaty speaks of it as being a treaty with "Serenissimo Principe Karolo Franciae Avunculo nostro Nobis adversante." This difference is understandable; the issue of title to the crown of France had not been resolved. The French versions list only the allies of Charles VII (Cosneau, pp. 162-63; Monstrelet, p. 380); the English versions also list those of Henry VI (Rymer, XI, p. 64; Cal. Cl. Rolls, p. 233). See note 28, below.

[27] This delay for more remote areas was a common feature of such medieval agreements, and was due primarily to the problem of slow communications.

Norway, Portugal, and the imperial electors, as allies of the English. The English copies of the truce list the king of the Romans as an English ally, whereas the French copies state he is an ally of Charles VII.[28]

An undated document of unknown authenticity, perhaps written late in 1445, asserts that, at the time of the signing

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[28]The copies of Cosneau and Monstrelet list the king of the Romans as an ally of Charles VII; the copies in Rymer and the Close Rolls list him as an English ally along with the electors of the Empire. This rather insignificant difference may explain the omission of the English allies in the French copies. Except for the king of the Romans, there is no difference between the lists of French allies in the four versions.

In addition to the allies noted in the text, other allies of Charles VII named were: the dauphin of Vienne, the dukes of Orléans, Burgundy, Brittany, Bourbon, and Alençon, the count of Maine (part of the versions also list René of Anjou, who was titular king of Sicily and Jerusalem, separately as the duke of Anjou, Bar and Lorraine) and their allied subjects. English allies noted by Rymer and the Close Rolls, in addition to those already named, were the dukes of Gloucester, York, Exeter, Somerset, Norfolk, the earl of Stafford, Thomas Stanley for the lordship of Man, and their allied subjects.

The most significant feature of these lists of allies is the fact that both the English and French versions acknowledge the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany as allies of Charles VII. This is later resisted by the English. None of the other alliances noted in the treaty were particularly significant at this time as far as relations between Henry VI and Charles VII are concerned. Frederick III was on good relations with both Henry and Charles. A marriage between the German emperor and Margaret of Valois had been proposed in 1442 (Beaucourt, III, p. 302ff.). He also continued friendly relations with England (PRO, Beckington, I, p. 107 et passim; II, pp. 94-100). John II, king of Leon and Castile, had signed an alliance with France in 1408 but occasionally had strained relations with both France and England (for his ratification of the truce see Rymer, XI, p. 80, or Cal. Cl. Rolls: 1441-47, p. 293). The traditional alliance between France and Scotland had been reasserted by the marriage of the dauphin to Margaret of Scotland, daughter of James I, in 1436. However, his son James II signed a nine-year truce with England in 1438, virtually suspending the "old alliance." In May, 1444, this truce was prorogued until 1454 (Rymer, XI, p. 58).

of the truce of Tours, certain promises "furent adoncques dites touchant la deliverance du Maine." The question of the delivery of the province of Maine by the English into the hands of Charles VII, René of Sicily, who was also duke of Anjou and Lorraine, and René's brother, Charles, who was count of Maine, was to become an important issue by the latter part of 1445. Since such a transfer concerned the relatives of Margaret of Anjou it is possible that it was discussed at this time although there is no other indication of this.[29]

On May 29, Suffolk and the English delegation set out for home. Their trip to the sea was a triumphal procession. At Rouen the people shouted "Noel, Noel," upon their arrival. They reached London on June 27 and Henry VI immediately ratified and proclaimed the truce. Meanwhile Charles VII had proclaimed the truce in Paris in early June.[30] Henry VI thanked

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[29]Beaucourt (IV, pp. 284-85n.) quotes at length from this document which is apparently a rough draft of the "Advis et d'instructions" given late in 1445 or early 1446 to French envoys negotiating the transfer. See p. 157, below.

[30]The proclamation of Charles VII is not extant. According to Chartier (II, p. 43) it was made at Paris on June 1, and according to the Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris (p. 373) it was made on June 3. The English ratification of June 27 was recorded by the Parlement of Paris on August 14 (Rymer, XI, p. 70). Date of the return of the ambassadors to London is indicated in A. Mirot and E. Déprez, "Les Ambassades Anglaises pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans," Bibl. de l'Ecole des chartes, LXI (1900), p. 40. For the welcome in Rouen see the extract from the register of the cathedral at Rouen, published by Charles de Robillard de Beaurepaire in Les États de Normandie sous la domination anglaise (Évreux: Impr. de A. Herissey, 1859), p. 83.

On July 8, Charles VII appointed the duke of Orléans, the count of Vendôme, Pierre de Brézé, and Bertrand de Beauvau

Charles VII in a letter dated August 21, for the friendly reception given to the English embassy. He also reiterated his desire for a general peace and asserted that he would welcome a French embassy to England, as Charles VII had apparently suggested in an earlier letter, for the purpose of negotiating a permanent agreement.[31]

The arrival of Margaret in England was delayed by various difficulties. Financial arrangements were begun in August of 1444 for her journey to England.[32] In late August or September, Robert Roos, Thomas Hoo, and Garter king-at-arms were sent to France to arrange for the journey of Margaret to England and for another peace conference. They stressed to Charles VII, the English king's desire for another conference and for the hastening of Margaret to England. In a letter to Henry VI, dated October 29, Charles VII stated that Margaret would be conducted to the town of Pontoise so that she might be received there on Henry's behalf by Suffolk. However, he wished to know when Suffolk might be able to meet her and stressed that there would be a delay in her arrival at Pontoise because of the extensive preparations which must be made by her father for her journey and delivery to the English.[33]

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as conservators of the truce in Guienne and other nearby regions (Mathieu d'Escouchy, "Pièces justificatives," Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy, ed. G. Du Fresne de Beaucourt [3 vols., new rev. ed., Société de l'histoire de France, nos. 118, 120, 126; Paris: Mme Ve J. Renouard, 1863-64], III, p. 146).

[31]Stevenson, II, p. 356. [32]Stevenson, I, pp. 443-62.

[33]PRO, Literae Cantuarienses: The Letter Books of the

On the previous day, October 28, Suffolk, who had recently been made a marquis because of his exertions for peace, was commissioned to lead a party into France for the purpose of escorting Margaret to England.[34] Financial problems beset the embassy and it did not depart from England until November 13.[35] Suffolk was accompanied by his wife, by Adam de Moleyns, the counts and countesses of Shrewsbury and Salisbury, and numerous other nobles, knights and others. Those traveling with Suffolk, including their retinues, totalled over two hundred. The French court had been at Nancy for several months when the embassy arrived there. Although Charles VII was there, René of Sicily and his daughter were not. Two wars had begun in recent months. René, aided by the forces of Charles VII, was attempting to reduce the contumacious city of Metz, which had claimed to be a part of the Empire and refused to give allegiance to Lorraine. The dauphin, aided by an English force sent by Richard of York, was warring with the Swiss. Margaret remained at Angers since her father was unable to bring her to Nancy. This delay has

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Monastery of Christ Church, Canterbury, ed. J. Brigstocke Sheppard ("Rolls Series," no. 85), III, pp. 176-83. Henry VI wrote a letter to Charles VII, dated August 21, which was probably carried by the ambassadors. In it he spoke in general terms of his marriage, his desire for peace, and his pleasure in looking forward to greeting ambassadors from his uncle to arrange a final peace (Stevenson, II, pp. 356-60).

[34]Rymer, XI, p. 74. He was elevated to a marquisate in August or September (DNB, XVI, p. 52).

[35]See the pleas for financial aid in the PRO, Memorials of St. Edmund's Abbey ("Rolls Series," no. 96), III, p. 243ff.

caused speculation that Margaret was purposely prevented from joining Suffolk so that certain concessions could be obtained from him. Thomas Gascoigne, who wrote within a decade of these events, asserted that the French refused to turn Margaret over to Suffolk because, since she was now queen of England, rather than a French princess, Suffolk did not have a proper safe-conduct for her. In order to obtain Margaret, according to Gascoigne, Suffolk agreed to cede Maine to her uncle, Charles, titular count of Maine, and Anjou to her father, René, titular duke of Anjou.[36] However, except for a brief allusion in the chronicle of Berry,[37] the assertions of the pro-Yorkist Gascoigne are not confirmed. None of the numerous documents of this period refer to such an occurrence, and the chronicle of Mathieu d'Escouchy, which provides numerous details on the events surrounding the marriage, makes no mention of such a concession. It is true that one of the charges made by Parliament against Suffolk in 1450 was that he had ceded these lands,[38]

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[36]Thomas Gascoigne, Loci e Libro Veritatum, ed. J. E. Thorold Rogers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), pp. 190, 204-205, 219-21.

[37]Gilles-Jacques Le Bouvier [dit Berry, Herault du Roy], Histoire chronologiqve dv Roy Charles VII in Histoire de Charles VII, roy de France, par Jean Chartier, Jacques Le Bouvier, dit Berry, Mathieu de Coucy, et autres auteurs du temps, qui contient les choses les plus mémorables advenues depuis l'an 1422 jusques en 1461, mise en lumière et enrichie de plusieurs titres, mémoires, traittez et autres pièces historiques par Denys Godefroy (Paris: Impr. royale, 1661), p. 430. Hereafter referred to as Le Bouvier (Godefroy ed.).

[38]Rot. Parl., VI, p. 177.

but there is no contemporary indication that he did so. As will be noted in the next chapter, the earliest recognition of such a concession by the English is in correspondence written late in 1445, several months after Margaret had arrived in England. The concession made late in 1445 concerned only Maine, not Anjou.[39]

Margaret arrived in Nancy early in February, 1445, shortly before René made a final peace with the people of Metz. This conflict was probably the only reason for her delayed arrival. Elaborate festivities, including jousts and feasts, were held at Nancy in honor of Margaret, the queens of France and Sicily, and the pending marriage. In early March, Louis de Heraucourt, bishop of Toul, performed the marriage ceremony. As at the betrothment in Tours, Suffolk acted as proxy for Henry VI. Charles VII escorted Margaret and her elaborate party a short distance from Nancy. René went with her as far as Bar-le-Duc, and her brother Jean, duke of Calabria, as far as Paris. On March 16 she received a royal welcome at Notre Dame. The next day, Charles, duke of Orléans, whose attentions accord

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[39]Kingsford (pp. 157ff.) and Beaucourt (IV, pp. 116-17, 143) both reject Gascoigne's assertion. Ramsay (II, pp. 62-63) believes it should be further investigated. Kingsford suggests that Suffolk's use of "etc." ("Guienne, Normandy, etc.") at Tours when he noted the lands claimed by Henry irrespective of the crown (Stevenson, I, pp. 132-33) may have referred to Maine and Anjou. However, there is no indication that Maine and Anjou were discussed at Nancy. T. F. Tout believes the story is "mere gossip" and suggests it may be based upon the articles of Suffolk's impeachment (DNB, XIII, p. 1025). It was noted earlier in this chapter that the delivery of Maine may have been discussed at Tours in May, 1444, but there is no certainty of this.

well with the idea he worked for the match, escorted her to Pontoise, on the English frontier. Here she was met by Richard of York, governor of Normandy, and then sailed down the Seine to Rouen. According to D'Escouchy,[40] she did not appear in the procession in the Norman capital because of an illness. The countess of Salisbury, dressed as the young queen, took her place. She did not depart across the channel for two or three weeks, probably because of illness. She arrived at Portsmouth on April 9, ill from the sea and from the "pokkes." It is doubtful that her illness was smallpox for she joined Henry at Southampton on April 14. The marriage ceremony was repeated a week later, on April 23, at Tichfield Abbey before William Ayscough, bishop of Salisbury. She entered London on May 28 and was crowned at Westminster Abbey by the archbishop of Canterbury on May 30. Born on March 23, 1430, she was barely past her fifteenth birthday at the time of her coronation.[41]

The marquis of Suffolk, his policy of peace now popular in England, reported to Parliament on June 2 on his recent mission to France. He announced that, although French ambassadors were coming to England very soon to negotiate for a permanent

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[40] Chronique, I, pp. 88-89.

[41] Stevenson, I, pp. 80, 447-48; II, pp. 560-61; D'Escouchy, I, pp. 87-90; The Brut, II, pp. 48-49; Ingulf et al., Ingulf's Chronicle of the Abbey of Croyland with the continuations by Peter of Blois and Anonymous Writers, transl. and ed. by Henry T. Riley (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854), pp. 402-403; PPC, VI, p. xvi; T. F. Tout, "Margaret of Anjou," DNB, XIII, pp. 102-105. The writer of the Brut gives numerous details of the marriage not found elsewhere.

peace, he had taken the precaution, when in Normandy, to advise Richard of York to make provision "in all gooddely hast" for the defense of the king's lands in France, including the supplying of "Castelles, Tounes, and alle maner Forteresses of the Kynges obeissance, in the parties of Normandie and Fraunce." This action, Suffolk asserted, "shall be grete mene to the better conclusion of peas." As Cardinal Beaufort had earlier realized, England could only negotiate a satisfactory treaty of peace by maintaining her strength. Suffolk also stated that he had not, when in France, uttered any matters concerning the nature of a treaty, but had suggested that all such questions be taken up with Henry VI by the French ambassadors soon to come to England. This declaration by Suffolk contradicts the charges of Gascoigne that he had agreed to concede Maine and Anjou to the French. He had, in accordance with his instructions and commission, discussed the contents of a permanent treaty at Tours, but according to his own testimony, he had refrained from discussing such matters on his mission into France to escort Margaret to England. The fact that he had been granted no commission or instructions to discuss such matters, indicates that if he had done so, Henry VI would have been in no way obligated to accept the results of such discussions. However, Suffolk asserted that he did not engage in such an imprudent activity, and, except for Gascoigne's questionable assertions, there is no indication that he did. On June 4, William Burley, speaker of Commons, commended the notable work

of Suffolk in obtaining peace and arranging the marriage of the king to a French princess. The speaker, in the name of the House of Commons, requested the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, then present, to beseech the king to take Suffolk into "his goode and benygne grace." The duke of Gloucester and many of the other lords present then "arose of their fetis, and besoghtyn humbly the Kyng of the same." Stafford, chancellor and archbishop of Canterbury, thanked the members of Commons and Lords present for their prayers and desires on behalf of Suffolk.[42]

The English Parliament then was virtually unanimous in its support of Suffolk's policy. Though Gloucester still had reservations about such a policy,[43] even he felt compelled to support the popular endorsement of Suffolk's activities. The fact that all parties concurred, at least briefly, with this policy is indicated by the fact that Richard, duke of York, had begun a correspondence with Charles VII to obtain a French princess as a bride for his son Edward (the future Edward IV), and had asked Suffolk's aid in the matter.[44] There was in 1445 no great dissension among the leaders of England concerning the diplomatic activities of Suffolk.

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[42] Rot. Parl., V, pp. 73-74. [43] Stevenson, I, p. 123.

[44] For Richard's correspondence with Charles VII see Stevenson, I, pp. 79-86, 160-63, 168-70. The correspondence extended from at least February to December, 1445. Charles VII offered his infant daughter, Magdelene. Richard preferred his elder daughter, Jeanne, but accepted Magdelene. No further correspondence appears to have taken place after December. Ramsay (II, p. 62) suggests the marriage plans were suppressed in London.

However, no permanent settlement had been made concerning the conflicting claims of the two monarchs to the crown of France and to the control of various areas in France. These matters received the attention of the diplomats of the two kings in the summer of 1445. The diplomacy of the next three years was also to be marked by controversy surrounding the county of Maine. It is regarding this latter matter that the influence of the young queen upon her husband appears to have been decisive.

CHAPTER V

THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON AND THE CESSION OF MAINE (1445)

The embassy of Charles VII, which had been mentioned to Parliament by Suffolk, arrived in London on July 14, 1445.[1] The group was headed by Louis de Bourbon, count of Vendôme, and Jacques Jouvenel des Ursins, the new archbishop of Reims. Other members of the delegation were Guy, count of Laval, Bertrand de Beauvau, seigneur de Précigny, Guillaume Cousinot, seigneur de Monstreuil and master of requests, and Étienne Chevalier, the king's secretary. Ambassadors of various other personages accompanied them. Alfonso de Breciano, ambassador of Henry IV, king of Castile, was present. Guillaume de Malestroit, bishop

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[1]There are three extant protocols of this conference, all written in French, presumably by members of the Valois delegation. All have been printed by the Public Record Office in Stevenson's Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry the Sixth, King of England, I, pp. 87-159. Only the first is of considerable length. It covers the period from the arrival of part of the ambassadors at Calais on July 2 and ends with the third audience of the Valois delegation with Henry VI on July 30. The second protocol covers only the events of July 19. It may have been written by the archbishop of Reims since a portion of it, which appears to have been a speech delivered by the archbishop, is in the first person. The third protocol covers the period from July 2 to July 16. The last two protocols give fewer details than the first but supplement it with a few additional items. See Stevenson, II, pp. xl-xlii, pp. 563-67.

of Nantes, the seigneur de Guemenée, chancellor of Brittany, and Henri de la Villeblanche represented the interests of Francis I, duke of Brittany. King René of Sicily was represented by Baudoin de Champagne, seigneur de Tuce and treasurer of Anjou, and Guillaume Gauquelin, called Sablé, René's secretary. Jean Gillian and the herald Alençon represented Jean, duke of Alençon. A letter of safe-conduct had been written by Henry VI for the bishop of Verdun, Jean, bastard of St. Pol, and several other ambassadors, all representing the duke of Burgundy. However, they did not attend, apparently because the letter of safe-conduct had not been received.[2]

Most of the ambassadors were men with some experience in diplomatic affairs. Précigny, who had figured prominently in achieving the Truce of Tours, was the most active French diplomat at this conference. Charles VII had granted two commissions to this embassy. The first, dated June 9, empowered them to treat for a final peace, and the latter, dated June 11, commissioned them to negotiate for a personal interview between

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[2]Stevenson, I, pp. 87, 126-27; Rymer, XI, pp. 86-89; Thomas Carte, Catalogue des rolles gascons, normans et françois conservés dans les archives de la Tour de Londres, tiré d'après celui du garde desdites archives, et contenant le précis et le sommaire de tous les titres qui s'y trouvent concernant la Guienne, la Normandie et les autres provinces de la France, sujettes autrefois aux rois d'Angleterre (2 vols.; London & Paris: J. Barois, 1743), II, p. 314; Beaucourt, IV, p. 145. Letters of safe-conduct for the representatives of Charles VII and the duke of Burgundy were dated July 5. Jacques Jouvenel des Ursins should not be confused with his brother Jean, the writer, who succeeded him as archbishop of Reims in 1449.

the kings of England and France.[3] Most of the ambassadors had reached Calais on Friday, July 2, where they were met by Garter, king-at-arms. They had crossed at Dover the next day and by Monday, July 5, had reached Canterbury. On Wednesday, July 7, at the invitation of John Stafford, the archbishop of Canterbury, the archbishop of Reims had officiated at the service observing the translation of St. Thomas à Becket. Afterwards he and others of the embassy had been sumptuously feasted by the archbishop of Canterbury. The counts of Vendôme and Laval, the bishop of Nantes, and various other ambassadors who had been delayed, arrived at Canterbury on July 8.[4]

On Friday, July 9, the entire party had proceeded to Rochester. Henry VI had sent Robert Roos and Thomas Hoo here to meet them and request them to remain briefly in Rochester since he had only recently been informed of their arrival in England. They had agreed to do so but had requested that part of them be allowed to lodge outside of the town of Rochester

> pour ce que on se mourroit au dit Rochestre, et ny avoit nulles eaues que sallees, et en puis, et nen pouvoient estre bien aisiez, ne pour eulx, ne pour leurs chevaulx.

Roos and Hoo saw no objection to their lodging at some nearby village. Part of the group went to nearby Maidstone. Vendôme and Précigny had received letters from Suffolk on Saturday, July 10, informing them that Henry VI would be in London by

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[3]Rymer, XI, pp. 86-88.

[4]Stevenson, I, pp. 87-93, 153-54.

next Tuesday or Wednesday and that they could have an audience with him on Thursday, July 15.[5]

On Tuesday, July 13, the envoys had arrived at Dartford. In the evening the ambassadors of Charles VII had conferred on the actions they and the other ambassadors should undertake as they entered London and came before the king. The question of precedence had been decided by the French king's ambassadors as follows:

> lambassade du roy les premiers, et incontinent apres eulx messire Alphons, ambassadeur Despaigne [i.e., of Castile], et ceulx du roy de Secille, et puis ceulx de Bretaigne, et puis ceulx Dalencon; et que cet ordre seroit entre eulx tenu en autres choses, et a seoir en conseil, et en tout.

The other ambassadors had also been cautioned to maintain good behavior, not to contradict the positions taken by the ambassadors of Charles VII, and to do nothing without first conferring with the Valois ambassadors. Later in the day they had learned that Henry VI had arrived in London.[6]

The various matters decided by the Valois ambassadors had been agreed to by the other French ambassadors the next morning, Wednesday, July 14. In the afternoon they all set out for London, escorted by Roos and Hoo. About three or four miles from London they were met by Suffolk, Edmund Beaufort, earl of Somerset and marquis of Dorset, John Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury, Richard Neville, earl of Salisbury, "et grant nombre de chevaliers et escuiers." Soon after they were also met by Henry

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[5] Ibid., pp. 93-96.

[6] Ibid., pp. 97-99.

Beauchamp, duke of Warwick, Humphrey, duke of Buckingham and Stafford, Henry Holland, duke of Exeter, John, earl of Huntington, Hugh Douglas, earl of Ormonde, Thomas Scales, lord of Nucelles and seneschal of Normandy, Thomas Brown, bishop of Norwich, Thomas Bourchier, bishop of Ely, Adam de Moleyns, keeper of the privy seal and archdeacon of Salisbury, many other lords and barons, and over 100 knights and squires. The French entourage had about 350 horses in its procession and the English who met them over 300 horses, "toux vestus moult richement de drap dor, et de soie, et dorfaverie, et harnachiez leur chevaulx dargent dore et dorfaverie, et aucuns de drap dor."[7]

They were met at London Bridge by the mayor of London. A man carried a gilt sword before him. The mayor and the other representatives of the city, totaling about sixty, were all dressed in scarlet and gray fur. Along the sides of the streets were "les bourgois et marchans dicelle ville vestus les cent, les 1. [by hundreds and by fifties], de paireilles robes lun de lautre," and totaling about one thousand. Behind them, in the streets and windows were great throngs of people totaling, according to one French estimate, fifty thousand or more. The French were escorted by the English nobles and prelates to their residences "en grant reverence et honneur."[8]

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[7] Ibid., pp. 101, 155-56. Moleyns was made bishop of Chichester during July.

[8] Ibid., pp. 102, 156-57. This type of reception was a characteristic of medieval diplomacy. Cf. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp. 37-40.

Suffolk informed Précigny on the day of their arrival in London that they had an audience with Henry VI on the following morning, Thursday, July 15. The dukes of Buckingham and Exeter, the earls of Somerset and Shrewsbury, the marquis of Suffolk, and several other nobles met the members of the Valois embassy and the other embassies at the residence of the count of Vendôme the next morning and escorted them by water to Westminster.[9]

They entered Westminster Hall where the king was seated on a chair covered with gold cloth. He was dressed in a rich robe of gold and red, trimmed with fur. The furniture was draped with blue patterned cloth or diaper on which was embroidered the livery of the late king, Henry V, and the motto, "Jemais." The French apparently interpreted this as the attitude of Henry on the question of whether he should surrender his French crown. The French also noted, and probably considered in questionable taste, a tapestry above the king showing some ladies presenting the arms of France to a lord. To the right of the king stood the archbishops of York and Canterbury and numerous other prelates, and to his left were various dukes and earls, including the duke of Gloucester and many of those who had escorted the embassies into London and to Westminster. Cardinal Beaufort was not present, probably because of his advanced age. The king came forward to meet the envoys and tipped his hat to the count of Vendôme and the archbishop of Reims. The ambassadors greeted him in the order of their rank

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[9]Ibid., pp. 102-103, 157.

with the members of the Valois embassy followed by those of the kings of Castile and Sicily, and the dukes of Brittany and Alençon. The archbishop of Reims addressed the king in French since Suffolk had advised that the king understood that language. He introduced the members of the Valois delegation and expressed the wish of Charles VII that he be in good health and prosperity. The count of Vendôme then presented the king with letters from Charles VII. John Stafford, the archbishop of Canterbury and the king's chancellor, answered the archbishop of Reims in Latin on behalf of the king that he was happy to hear news from the "tres hault et tres noble prince, son oncle de France." The chancellor inquired about Charles VII's health at the time of their departure, and the archbishop of Reims replied in French that his uncle was in good health. Numerous other expressions of friendship and concern for peace passed between the archbishop of Reims and the king's chancellor, and the king read with satisfaction the letters from his uncle which included the credentials of the Valois embassy. The French writer of the protocol noted that at one point during the exchange of felicitations the king looked towards his left at Gloucester and then turned to his right and smiled at his chancellor and at Suffolk and Cardinal Kemp, all of whom were smiling at him. He obviously made a signal and it was afterwards mentioned to the French writer that he had pressed the chancellor's hand and said in English the equivalent of: "Je suis moult joyeulx de ce que aucuns, qui cy sont, oyent

ces parolles; ils ne sont pas a leur aise." Later, when the chancellor said that the king would inform them at what time he could hear them, the king reprimanded the chancellor in English for not speaking words of greater friendship. He later greeted each of them personally and requested the marquis of Suffolk to inform them that he did not consider them strangers. He wished them to do as they did at the residence of his uncle by entering and leaving Westminster as they desired. Following this, the other embassies presented their credentials and the various delegations were escorted to their residences by the English lords.[10]

That evening Suffolk conferred with Précigny and the archbishop of Reims. He informed them that they would have another audience the next day and suggested that they not indulge in great ceremony, but state their business as though they were among friends. On the next day, Friday, July 16, the Valois ambassadors met at two o'clock at the residence of the count of Vendôme. From here they were escorted by the dukes of Buckingham and Somerset, and the earl of Shrewsbury, by water to Westminster. While they were waiting to enter the king's privy chamber, Suffolk said to the Valois ambassadors, in a voice loud enough for many of the English nobles to hear, that he wished all to know that he was a servant of the

> roy de France, et que excepte la personne du roy Dangleterre, son maistre, il le serveroit de corps

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[10] Ibid., pp. 103-14, 157-59.

> et de biens contre toute homme; et dit "Je dy, excepte mon maistre sa personne; je ne parle point des seigneuries, et nexcepte ne Daulphin, ne Clocestre [Gloucester], en autre, fors sa personne."[11]

The French thanked him for his remarks and he responded by repeating his statement even more loudly three or four times, saying also that he knew this to be the sentiments of his master also, that, except for his wife, the king loved his uncle more than anyone else. The delegation then entered the king's privy chamber. The archbishop of Reims again addressed the king at length, expressing the love of Charles VII for him and the desire of the French king for a lasting peace. The meeting, in accordance with Suffolk's suggestion, was not overly ceremonial. The king and Suffolk conversed at length with the French. At one point, when it had been remarked that the subjects of both kings supported peace, Suffolk said quite loudly, according to the French writer of one of the protocols, that when he was in France there was a report

> que monsieur de Glocestre faisoit empeschement au roy, et que le roy soffroit a y venir en personne luy ayder, mais que le dit sieur de Suffork respondit quil ne le creut point; et que monsieur de Glocestre ne le vouldroit faire, et aussi navoit il pas le povoir.[12]

Later Suffolk asserted that the second person in the world whom Henry VI loved best was "le roy, son oncle." The English king quickly confirmed this. Henry VI directed John Kemp, cardinal and archbishop of York, Suffolk, and Ralph Butler, Lord Sudley

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[11] Ibid., p. 116.

[12] Ibid., p. 123.

and treasurer of England, to confer with the embassies on the matter of peace.[13]

The cordial hospitality that the English showed to the French is further emphasized by the fact that on Saturday and Sunday, July 17 and 18, Vendôme moved into the residence of Thomas Montague, earl of Salisbury, the archbishop of Reims into the home of Warwick, and Précigny into Suffolk's home. After dinner on Sunday the duke of Buckingham escorted the envoys to the Cordeliers (Grey Friars), and to see the ornaments and tombs in Westminster Abbey.[14]

The Valois ambassadors received messages from Charles VII and the duke of Burgundy on Monday, July 19. The messages from the king related to agreements recently made at Châlons with the duke of Burgundy and King René of Anjou, who was also the duke of Lorraine, relating mainly to land disputes.[15] The envoys decided that these matters did not relate to the discussions in London and should not be brought up.[16] Philip of Burgundy wrote to the envoys that he still wished to send his

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[13] Ibid., pp. 115-23. A commission dated July 20 was granted to these three and to Humphrey, duke of Buckingham, to treat for peace and for a meeting of the kings (Rymer, XI, p. 94; Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI: 1441-1446, p. 359.

[14] Stevenson, I, pp. 124-25. It was customary for the nobles and barons, as well as the religious orders and the bishops, to have inns or town houses in London.

[15] See Plancher, "Preuves," Histoire de Bourgogne, IV, pp. clxxxiii-clxxxviii; Monstrelet, III, pp. 388-91; Beaucourt, IV, pp. 133-39.

[16] Stevenson, I. pp. 125-26.

ambassadors to London to join in the talks, but that their safe-conducts had not yet arrived. He urged the ambassadors in London to inquire concerning their delay and not to make any agreements with the English until his representatives had arrived. He cited an agreement he had with the French king that no agreements relating to peace with the English would be concluded without his consent. The French envoys agreed to mention the delay of the safe-conducts to Suffolk.[17]

At eight o'clock on the morning of July 19 the Valois ambassadors went to "lostel des Jacobins"[18] where they met with Kemp, Suffolk, and Butler. John Kemp, cardinal and archbishop of York, was an experienced diplomat. He had been, among other confrontations, at Arras in 1435 and at Calais in 1439. Humphrey, duke of Buckingham, who had also been commissioned to meet with the French envoys, was not at this meeting.[19] The

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[17] Ibid., pp. 126-28. A letter of safe-conduct for the Burgundians had been signed by Henry VI on July 5 (Rymer, XI, p. 88). In view of his recent disagreements with Charles VII, Philip may have been fearful of the possibility of a French treaty with England at his expense. He still maintained close commercial relations with England. In April a treaty for free commercial intercourse between England and Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland had been concluded. For treaty see PRO, Exch. T. R. (Dipl. Doc.), 30/498. See also Rymer, XI, pp. 82ff.; Cal. Fr. Rolls, pp. 362, 365.

[18] The Jacobins were Dominicans. Stevenson wrongly suggests that they were Carmelites (II, p. 566).

[19] The commission appointing these four to treat with the French ambassadors, dated July 20, refers to Charles VII as "Karolus Avunculus noster Franciae" although Suffolk had earlier referred to him as the "roy" on at least two occasions, one being in the presence of Henry VI (see above, p. 146). If the writer of the French protocol is reliable on these

two groups of ambassadors first discussed which side should speak first.[20] Suffolk noted that he had conferred with Charles VII at Tours and had told him that his master had demanded Guienne, Normandy, and the other lands held by the English before the question of the crown arose, and that he held no other powers at that time. The king had therefore sent the present delegation to London to discuss these matters, "et pour ce quils dissent ce qui leur plairoit." The archbishop of Reims then spoke about the great desire of both sides for peace and repeated the suggestion of Suffolk that the negotiations be conducted without ceremony, but with simplicity and sincerity. He suggested as a point of departure that the delegations review the various proposals and decisions made at Tours.[21] The archbishop of Reims and Suffolk then engaged in a discussion on the offers made at Tours.[22]

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points, it appears that the English were not as serious about Henry's claim to the crown of France as they had been previously. References to Charles VII in documents composed by the English still avoided styling him as the king of France, except that the duke of York referred to the Valois monarch as "le roy" in his correspondence to Charles VII concerning the marriage of his son with a Valois princess (Stevenson, I, pp. 163, 170).

[20]It was generally considered a concession in medieval diplomacy to make the first offer (see above, p. 49; also see Dickinson, pp. 136-37).

[21]Stevenson, I, pp. 128-32, 149-51.

[22]Ibid., pp. 131-33, 151-52. These have been summarized in the previous chapter. This conversation, noted in two of the protocols, provides one of the main sources for the conference at Tours.

The French then renewed their offer made at Tours that the English hold in homage Guienne, Querain, Perigord, Calais, and Guines. The archbishops of Reims and York then disagreed over what areas were held by the English kings before the crown of France was claimed by them. The archbishop of Reims held that only Guienne and Ponthieu should be so considered. The archbishop of York asserted that Normandy and Poitou should also be included, which the French denied ["sauve sa grace"]. Further disagreements over the lands that should be so considered continued until Suffolk asked them to cease debating. He suggested that the negotiations be held with simplicity, and that the French reveal the most generous offer they could make and the English would then do likewise.

> Et [according to Suffolk] selles saccordent, loue soit Dieu; si non, nous adviserons apres quil sera de faire, et ne tenons point ces longueurs daller de euffre en euffre.

The French replied that they had been charged otherwise and that their offers were extensive and reasonable. The hour was late so they departed for dinner. The archbishop of York invited the Valois embassy to dinner on the next day and the Valois returned to the temporary residence of the count of Vendôme to inform the other ambassadors what had transpired. However, only the delegates from Brittany attended the briefing.[23]

The Valois embassy dined with Cardinal Kemp on the next

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[23] Ibid., pp. 132-36.

day, Tuesday, July 20. After the meal Suffolk told the ambassadors that if they wished to have the various diplomatic matters resolved they should state plainly how far they intended to go with their offers, and the English would do likewise. If, he asserted, they went from offer to offer they would never accomplish their goals. After considerable discussion the French agreed to re-examine their instructions and reply frankly to the English at their meeting the following morning. The French also implored the English to speak clearly and openly, and they replied they would.[24]

On the next morning, Wednesday, July 21, the Valois ambassadors and also those of the duke of Brittany visited Cardinal Beaufort ("le cardinal Dangleterre"), who had just arrived in London. The Valois ambassadors then met with the three English ambassadors and also the duke of Buckingham, who joined these talks for the first time, at the Jacobins. The French read their second offer which added the province of Limousin to the lands to be held by Henry VI with homage due. The English then conferred among themselves, and Cardinal Kemp afterwards asserted that he had understood the day before that the French ambassadors would plainly reveal the intentions of Charles VII. He cited the great love Henry VI and Charles VII had for each other, and was quite sure that the French king had given his envoys the authority to make a more reasonable offer. Kemp urged that the final offer be revealed, "autrement naurions

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[24] Ibid., pp. 136-37.

de long temps fait." Suffolk then implored the French to state their last offer so that it could either be accepted or a satisfactory remedy found without longer delay. The French thus conferred among themselves and decided to offer also Saintonge, a province between Poitou and Guienne. Précigny had already stated this privately to Suffolk. They then returned to the English ambassadors. The archbishop of Reims emphasized the desire of Charles VII for peace, as indicated by the recent truce and marriage, and by their mission to London. He further observed that the Valois delegation had acted in complete frankness and that, with the offer of Saintonge, they had reached "le dernier de leur charge, sans avoir ung seul point oultre." He concluded by asserting that with pleasure they had proceeded in good faith and charity. Cardinal Kemp replied that the English had repeated their request to proceed to the final proposals because the offers were the most meager that had ever been proposed to them, though they had anticipated that they would be greater than on previous occasions. Since the king was near at hand, Kemp suggested that the English delegation speak with him before answering the final French offer.

> Lors Precigny ouvrit en disant, "Pleust a Dieu quils fussent ensemble, et quils se peussent veoir;" (chascun dit "Amen"), "et que ils feroient paix sans point de faulte."[25]

After considerable discussion, Suffolk said that he would go

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[25] Ibid., p. 142.

to the king at Windsor and discuss with him the suggestion that he meet with Charles VII. According to Suffolk, on the following day the king would be at Fulham, the manor belonging to the bishop of London about four miles from Westminster. Suffolk agreed to let the members of the Valois embassy know when they might visit the king.[26]

A week later, on Wednesday, July 28, Suffolk wrote to Précigny that the king had arrived at Fulham the previous night; he would meet with his Council on Thursday, and two or three members of the Valois delegation on Friday. On Friday, July 30, Vendôme, the archbishop of Reims, and Précigny went to Fulham. The king, accompanied by Suffolk, Kemp, and Butler, met the three in his privy chamber. The archbishop of Reims spoke at length on the deliberations that had been held. He asserted that the Valois embassy had faithfully offered as many concessions as they had been authorized to do and that the French proposals had been drawn up by Charles VII only after much consultation with the princes of the blood. Since the question of a permanent peace was of such importance to both rulers and since the servants of the two kings were unable to go beyond what had been authorized by their masters, he hoped that the two kings could meet and confer together so that a solution of their differences might be found and agreed on. He spoke at length on the friendship of the two rulers and the evils of war, and concluded by stating that, since the truce was to

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[26] Ibid., pp. 136-42.

expire next April 1, he and his delegation had the authority to agree to a prorogation until All Saints Day, i.e., November 1, 1446. He stated that they were not authorized to agree to a longer extension, but that, if Henry VI chose to send a delegation back to France with them, he was sure that a longer time could be agreed upon. According to the author of the French protocol, Henry VI appeared pleased at these words and tipped his hat when the name of his uncle was mentioned.[27]

The king conferred privately with Cardinal Kemp, Suffolk, and Butler for a brief period. The cardinal then addressed the Valois delegation "en Latin bien orne." He said that the king well understood the advantages of peace and the evils of war, and that he would be greatly pleased to see his uncle. Although the Valois offers had been unsatisfactory, he wished not to hesitate to cross the channel and meet with his uncle because of his desire for peace and his wish to see his uncle. However, because of the importance and expense of such an undertaking, and the lack of a truce of sufficient length to allow it, there should be further deliberation and counsel. The king agreed to send an answer to Charles VII along with a well-instructed delegation.[28] Nevertheless, further delay did not prove necessary for on Friday, August 13, the Valois and English negotiators signed a treaty providing for the prorogation of the Truce of Tours from April 1, 1446, to November 1, 1446. The principal

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[27] Ibid., pp. 143-46.

[28] Ibid., pp. 146-48. The main French protocol ends here.

reason given for the extension of the truce was to provide the time necessary for the complex arrangements which had to be made prior to a meeting of the two kings.[29]

Meanwhile, on August 11, Adam Moleyns, keeper of the privy seal and bishop-elect of Chichester, was empowered to treat for a peace with France and for a meeting between the two kings.[30] Little is known for certain about the subsequent activities of Moleyns. He went to France with the returning envoys shortly after the signing of the treaty. The main purpose of his mission was apparently to gain a longer extension of the truce in order to provide a greater period for the preparations necessary for a meeting of the two kings. As has been noted, the Valois ambassadors to London had only been empowered to agree to an extension to November 1, as was subsequently done, and had suggested that, if a longer extension was desired, English envoys be appointed to return with them to negotiate it.[31] Moleyns' mission did not result in an extension agreement at the court of Charles VII, but did result in Charles VII sending another embassy to London in October to negotiate this issue. However, it is the other alleged activities of Moleyns in France that are in considerable doubt. According to the anonymously authored document previously alluded to which

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[29]Rymer, XI, pp. 97-100. This treaty is often referred to as the Treaty of London. Charles VII ratified it on September 18 (Rymer, XI, pp. 101-102).

[30]Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI: 1441-1446, p. 359.

[31]Stevenson, I, p. 145.

alleges that certain promises had been made at Tours in May, 1444, concerning the delivery of the province of Maine by the English to the French, Moleyns had further committed the English in this regard. This document alleges that during the negotiations at London in July, 1445, promises had been made "de bouche" to Précigny "touchant la deliverance dessus dicte dedans le premier jour d'octobre l'an mil CCCCXLV." It further asserts that, when Moleyns came to France in September, he had been "charge de faire ladicte deliverance dedans le terme susdit," but had done nothing except agreeing that Charles VII should send a new embassy to London "qu'il n'y auroit point de faulte que la choise ne se feist." This new embassy, consisting of Guillaume Cousinot and Jean Havart, was able to obtain from Henry VI, according to this document, an agreement that Maine would be delivered on April 30, 1446. Henry VI did agree to deliver Maine by this date, as will be shown.[32] The French document concerning Maine also asserts that Auvergnas

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[32]Beaucourt, IV, pp. 284-85n. See also p. 130, above. If this document is correct it appears that Suffolk, when he was accused by Parliament in 1450 of conspiring to deliver Maine to the French, was correct in placing the blame on Moleyns:

> And as for the delyveraunce therof, he leyde all that charge to the Pryvy Seall late Bysshop of Chichestre [Moleyns], declarynge the fourme howe and in what wise the seid Pryvy Seall delyvered the seid Towne, declarynge the seid Pryvy Seall also in dyvers maters laboured by hym to the grete disclaundre of the seid Duke, full falls and untrue.

He also noted that the decision to give Maine to the French had been made in the Council, "saiyng that other Lordes were as privy therto as he." Unfortunately Council minutes for this period are not extant. (Rot. Parl., V, p. 182.)

Chaperon and Charles de Castillon, seigneur d'Alboigne, were sent to England after Moleyn's embassy in order to ascertain the intentions of Henry VI. These men were both councillors of René of Anjou and were granted a commission by him on October 17.[33] There are no other documents which verify most of the assertions contained in this anonymous account. However, perhaps significantly, there are also no other materials that greatly contradict these statements. Although this document may not be accurate in every detail, there is reason to believe, as will be shown, that discussions had been held at various times before October, 1445, concerning the delivery of Maine.

On October 17, Charles VII commissioned Guillaume Cousinot, master of requests, who had been a member of the delegation sent to London in the summer of 1445, and Jean Havart, the king's valet carver, to negotiate various matters with the English.[34] The commission noted that Adam Moleyns had stressed

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[33]Lecoy de la Marche, Le roi René, I, p. 250n.; Beaucourt, IV, p. 164n. Although, as is discussed below, the embassy consisting of Cousinot and Havart was commissioned by Charles VII and René on that date, there is no English record of this embassy of Chaperon and Alboigne. According to Lecoy (I, p. 250) there is a note added to this commission stating that it was granted conditionally:

> Il y a ung aultre povoir en meilleur forme, duquel il se fauldra ayder, et non pas de celuy-ci, sinon en cas de necessité et pour eviter la rompture de la delivrance du Maine.

Apparently it was never used. See also André Joubert, "Les Négociations relatives à l'evacuation du Maine par les anglais (1444-1448)," Revue historique et archaéologique du Maine, VIII (1880), pp. 221-50.

[34]Rymer, XI, pp. 102-104. Positions such as "valet

to the French king that the truce had not been prolonged for a sufficient period to allow arrangements to be made for a meeting of the kings, but that "certaines Difficultez & Differances" had prevented the French from arriving at an agreement with Moleyns. It empowered Cousinot and Havart to reconcile these differences with the English, extend the truce, and agree on future talks between ambassadors for the purpose of arranging a meeting of the two kings. However, these do not appear to have been the main purposes of their mission. A portion of the difficulties and differences that Moleyns had encountered at the French court may have dealt with Maine, for Cousinot and Havart also carried a commission and a lettre de créance from René of Anjou to Henry VI.[35]

René asserted in his commission for Cousinot and Havart that "par le bon plaisir et voulor" of Charles VII the marriage of his daughter Margaret to Henry VI had been accomplished with the hope that it would facilitate the resolving of the differences that had thus far prevented a "traité de paix finale."

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carver" or "varlet tranchant" were commonly held in the kings' households in both England and France by commoners who had diplomatic or other governmental responsibilities.

[35]Both letters to Henry VI have been printed in Lecoy de la Marche, "Pièces justificatives," Le roi René, II, pp. 258-60. The commission is certified by Jacques Jouvenel de Ursins, archbishop of Reims and chancellor of France, Pierre de Brézé, seigneur de la Varenne and seneschal of Poitou and France, and Charles de Harcourt. The lettre de créance is certified only by Harcourt. They also carried a letter from Charles VII to Margaret which is no longer extant but which is mentioned in a letter from her to Charles VII on December 17 (Stevenson, I, pp. 164-65).

He then went on to say:

> et mesmement que espérons fermement que par le moyen dessusdit la délivrance de la conté du Maine ou de ce que nostredit très chier fils y tient nous sera faicte, ainsi que de ce l'avons requis.

René then proposed that an alliance "à nostre vie" and a truce for twenty years be made between himself and his "très chier fils." He asserted that Charles VII had already granted permission for these agreements and then stressed his hope that, "par le moyen desdictes aliances et trêves et autres choses dessusdictes," ways could more easily be found for peace. He then granted Havart the power

> traicter de bonne et vraie aliance, ligue et confédéracion,...à vie ou à temps,...pour aider, servir et secourir l'un l'autre, deffendre et offenser l'un pour l'autre envers tous et contre tous, de quelque estat, condicion et prééminence qu'ils soient, excepté seullement la personne de mondit seigneur le Roy et de ses hoirs et successeurs qui vendront à la couronne.[36]

Henry VI granted a letter of safe-conduct to Havart and a party of twenty-four on October 28,[37] and he empowered Suffolk, Moleyns, John, viscount of Beaumont, and Ralph Butler (Lord Sudley), treasurer of England, on November 12 to treat with Cousinot and Havart on a general peace, an extension of the truce, and arrangements for a meeting of the kings.[38] The two French ambassadors had apparently arrived in England early

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[36]Lecoy, II, pp. 258-59.

[37]Rymer, XI, pp. 104-105. Presumably Cousinot was granted a similar letter no longer extant.

[38]Ibid., XI, pp. 106-107.

in November and remained there until about the last week in December. Two treaties, both dated December 19,[39] were agreed to by the French ambassadors and the representatives of Henry VI. One treaty prorogued the truce from November 1, 1446, to April 1, 1447.[40] The second treaty provided that Henry VI and Charles VII would meet in France before November 1, 1446, to treat for a final peace.[41] Thus Cousinot and Havart accomplished the missions that had been assigned to them by Charles VII in his commission of October 17, except for obtaining a general peace treaty which had obviously been included in the commission as a formality. However, it appears that these accomplishments were not their most significant for they were

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[39]Exchequer copies of both treaties are dated December 22. However, they are dated December 19 in Rymer, and the French ratifications recorded in the Exchequer refer to the treaties as having been made on December 19 (PRO, Calendar of Diplomatic Documents in the Exchequer, Treasury of Receipt, in the Forty-Fifth Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records [1884-85], pp. 327-28).

[40]Rymer, XI, pp. 108-11. This was ratified by Henry VI on January 3, and by Charles VII on February 20 (Ibid., pp. 111, 121). However, Henry proclaimed the prorogation of the truce on January 2 (Ibid., pp. 111-12; Cal. Cl. Rolls, Henry VI: 1441-1447, pp. 366-67).

[41]This treaty was ratified by Henry VI on January 3 (Rymer, XI, p. 114) and by Charles VII on February 20 (Ibid., p. 122). Charles VII also authorized Cousinot on February 20 to deliver his ratifications to Henry VI and to receive the English ratifications (Ibid., pp. 122-23). On February 28 Cousinot gave a receipt to Garter king-at-arms at Chinon for the English ratifications (Ibid., pp. 123-24). Garter also carried a letter from Henry VI to Charles VII, dated January 2, in which Henry expressed his desire for peace and stated that Garter was to relate to Charles VII various matters concerning their planned conference (Stevenson, II, pp. 368-70).

also able to achieve the mission assigned to them, with the knowledge of Charles VII, by René of Anjou. There appears to have been an effort on the part of the English, and perhaps the French, to obscure the negotiations that occurred concerning the transfer of Maine, for none of the documents preserved in the records of the English Chancery and Exchequer allude, in any way, to this matter, nor does the commission of Charles VII refer to it. Maine was not mentioned in Henry VI's commission to his negotiators or in the resulting treaties.[42] Thus the various documents pertaining to an extension of the truce and a meeting of the kings were preserved among English governmental records, but documents relating to the transfer of Maine were not so preserved, giving the impression that no negotiations pertaining to Maine were conducted. However, among the items published by Stevenson are letters dated December 17 and 22 from Margaret and Henry VI to Charles VII which discuss the negotiations that had occurred in recent weeks with Cousinot and Havart concerning Maine. These letters were carried back to Charles VII by the two ambassadors, along with a second

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[42]The items in Rymer are taken from official records found mainly in the Chancery and Exchequer collections. Cf. the calendars in the Forty-Fifth and Forty-Eighth Reports of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records (1884-85, 1887), and PRO, Lists and Indexes, XLIX. The only known records pertaining to the transfer of Maine are several in French archives which have been published by Lecoy de la Marche and Stevenson, and a large number originally collected by William of Worcester (William Batoner) and published by Stevenson from mss. in the libraries of the College of Arms and Lambeth Palace. William of Worcester had dedicated the collection to Edward IV (those citations from Stevenson in which the pagination is in braces, are from the Worcester collection).

letter to Charles VII from Henry VI, also dated December 22, which merely discusses in general terms his desire for peace and pleasure at the agreements extending the truce and providing for a meeting with Charles VII.[43]

The letter dated December 17 from Margaret, "par la grace de Dieu royne de France et Dangleterre," to her "tres chier oncle de France," does acknowledge the recent negotiations concerning Maine. After expressing her appreciation of his love towards her and her husband, and her desire for a final peace, she observed that her husband was writing to the French king about the delivery of Maine and that she would do what she could to bring it about.[44] The letter she was primarily referring to from her husband was apparently not the one concerning the extension of the truce and the agreement to meet, but, rather, the other letter also dated December 22 which discusses in detail the negotiations that had been recently conducted concerning Maine.[45]

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[43]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 151-53.

[44]Et quant au fait de la delivrance que desirez avoir de la conte du Maine, et autres choses continues en vos dictes lettres, nous entendons que mon dit seigneur en escript devers vous bien a plain; et neantmoins en ce ferons pour votre plaisir au mielx que faire pourrons, ainsi que tousjours avons fait, comme de ce pouviez estre acertenez par les dessus diz Cousinot et Havart. (Stevenson, I, pp. 164-66.)

[45]This letter was preserved by William of Worcester as one of the exhibits produced at a conference at Le Mans on October 31, 1447, concerning the delivery of Maine (Stevenson, II, pp. [639]-[642]).

Henry stated in this letter that he knew from talks with the French ambassadors that Charles VII would be pleased at the delivery of Maine to René of Anjou and his younger brother, Charles of Anjou, count of Maine. According to the letter, the ambassadors, presumably Cousinot and Havart, had also expressed to Henry the view of the French king that this was one of the surest means to obtain a final peace. Henry also observed that such a concession on his part would prove his desire for peace and his affection for his uncle. He also observed that his wife, Margaret of Anjou, had requested him on numerous occasions in the interests of her father and uncle to grant the delivery of Maine to them. He also hoped that the concession would promote a quick and satisfactory conclusion to negotiations for a permanent peace. He then promised to deliver, out of his regard for Charles VII, and René and Charles of Anjou, the county of Maine, including the town and castle of Le Mans and all other English possessions in the county, by April 30, 1446. His only condition was that the original letters of the French king to René and Charles of Anjou authorizing them to make truces and alliances for Anjou and Maine with him, be submitted to him. The complete letter is as follows:

> A TRESHAULT et puissant prince nostre treschier oncle de France, Henry, par le grace de Dieu roy de France et Dangleterre, naturelle inclination damour avecques tout desir de bonne paix et concorde.
>
> Treshault et puissant prince, nostre treschier oncle; pourceque savons que seriez tres joyeux que feissions la delivrance de la cite, ville, et chastel du Mans, et de tout ce que avons et tenons en la conte

du Maine, a treshault et puissant prince et noz treschiers pere et oncle, le roy de Sezille et Charles Danjou, son frere, ainsi que par voz gens et ambaxadeurs presentement envoiez devers nous nous a este plus a plaine dit et expose, et lesquelz bien affectueusement de par vous nous en ont requis, et en oultre dit quil vous sembloit que cestoit ung des meilleurs et convenables moyens pour parvenir au bien de paix entre nous et vous, voulans monstrer par effect le grant voloir et affection que avons de entendre ou dit bien de paix, et de querir tous moyens convenables pour y parvenir, pour lamour et affection que avons a vostre tresnoble personne, a laquele en tout ce qui nous seroit honnorablement possible et licite vouldrions complaire de tresbon cuer; en faveur aussi de nostre treschiere et tresamee compaigne la royne, qui de ce par pluseurs foyz nous a requis, et pour contemplacion de nos diz pere et oncle, pour lesquelz bien raissonnable chose est que feissions plus que pour autres qui ne sont pas si prouchains de nous, et que nous esperons avecques ce que la matiere de paix principale sen conduira mieulx et prendra plus briefve et meilleure conclusion, ainsi que avons entendu par vos diz gens et ambaxadeurs, vous signifions, promettons en bonne foy et en parolle de roy, de baillier et delivrer realement et de fait, en faveur et en contemplacion de vous principalement, a nos diz pere et oncle le roy de Sezille et Charles Danjou, son frere, ou a leurs commis et depputez en ceste partie, cessans et non obstans toutes excusations et empeschemens, les dictes cite, ville, et chastel du Mans, ensemble toutes les villes, chasteaulx et fortresses, et generalement tout ce que avons et tenons et qui est en nostre obeissance en la conte du Maine, dedens le derrenier jour Davril prouchainement venant, et denvoier de noz gens et officiers pardevers vous avecques povoir suffisant pour fair la dicte delivrance, ainsi que dessus est dit, et tout sans fraude ou decepcion quelzconques, en nous baillant les lettres originalles de congie de par vous donne a nos diz pere et oncle, le roy de Sezille et Charles Danjou, son frere, de prendre alliances a leurs vies et faire trieves avecques nous pour le pais Danjou et du Maine durant vint ans, en la fourme et maniere dont par vos diz ambaxadeurs nous a este baillie la copie soubz leurs seaulx et saings manuelz.

Et en oultre, pour plus grant seurte des choses dessus dictes, et pour vous complaire, et

ad ce que y adjoustiez plus grant foy, nous avons voulu ces presentes signer de nostre main et a icelles faire mettre et poser nostre seel de secret.

Donne a Wyndesore, le xxij. jour de Decembre, lan mil cccc. quarante cinq.

Ainsi signe, HENRY.[46]

It cannot be determined when talks concerning the delivery of Maine first occurred. As has been noted, the anonymous document found among papers relating to Savoy asserts that certain promises concerning the delivery of Maine had been made at the signing of the Truce of Tours in May, 1444. Gascoigne asserted that Suffolk was compelled to make concessions concerning Maine in 1445 when he went to France to escort Margaret to London. The anonymous document which alleges that promises had been made in 1444 also asserts that an oral promise had been made in July of 1445 to a member of the French embassy to London that Maine would be delivered by October 1, 1445, and that Moleyns, on his embassy to France in September of 1445, had been authorized to carry out the delivery by that date. According to this document, various difficulties resulted in another French embassy to London during the months of November and December of 1445, consisting of Cousinot and Havart, which obtained an agreement from Henry VI that the delivery would be effected on April 30, 1446. The various allegations that Maine had been discussed before the autumn of 1445 cannot be either substantiated or refuted, though those made by Gascoigne

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[46]Stevenson, II, pp. [639]-[642].

appear especially questionable. Discussions very likely arose by the summer of 1445 or, at the latest, in September when Moleyns went to France, for the French goals set out in René's commission of October 17 had probably been based on some indication that they had a chance of success. However, it seems clear that, since his commission called for negotiations on the delivery of Maine, no significant concession had yet been made by the English. Of course English diplomats could have intimated that such concessions, if pursued, would have been forthcoming. Yet, regardless of present uncertainties concerning diplomatic developments relating to Maine before November, 1445, it is obvious that the delivery was discussed by Cousinot and Havart with the English and agreed upon not later than December 22, 1445.

It appears, however, that an understanding may have been arrived at to deliver Maine at a date later than April 30. Although there is no document substantiating this, friendly diplomatic relations continued throughout 1446, and no diplomatic conflict is known to have arisen during this year concerning Maine. The unusual secrecy surrounding the negotiations probably indicates that opposition was to be expected from some English quarters. Humphrey of Gloucester, if made aware of the agreement, would obviously have opposed. The delivery also contradicted the previously enunciated principles of Cardinal Beaufort and Suffolk that, although peace should be pursued and the English claim to the crown of France had become illusory,

the English should, if they wished peace negotiations to succeed, maintain their military strength on the continent. The loss of Maine, it may have been believed, would seriously damage the security of Normandy. At least one historian has suggested that this concession was contrary to the policies supported by Suffolk.[47] Though Margaret was only sixteen and probably not fully aware of the significance of such a concession, it seems probable that her father and uncle were able to influence her to persuade her husband to grant the delivery. Such an approach seems natural and, indeed, is suggested by Henry in his letter of December 22 as having occurred. Whether Suffolk, Moleyns, or any of the other councillors of the king enthusiastically supported or opposed the delivery is not known, though it may have been supported at least reluctantly by a portion of the Council as a possible means of obtaining a final peace. That the councillors of Henry VI, and perhaps the king himself, had second thoughts on the delivery is indicated by the dilatory proceedings that were to occur over the next two years.

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[47]Kingsford, p. 162.

CHAPTER VI

THE DELIVERY OF MAINE (1445-48)

The diplomatic activities of the latter part of 1445 and of the year 1446 were not to be highlighted either by the promised delivery of Maine to the French or by a meeting of the two kings. However, relations between the two courts remained cordial. A series of conferences occurred from April to December at various locations in France for the purposes of rectifying violations of the truce, and determining the possession of certain places and the distribution of revenues from them. The first such meeting was held at Évreux between unidentified representatives of Henry VI, and Cousinot, Havart, and other envoys of Charles VII. The areas possessed by each side were not yet well defined in numerous provinces and both sides had attempted to obtain revenues from the local inhabitants. The conference was moved to Louviers in late April or early May, and a treaty, not extant, was signed there on May 27 settling a portion of the differences. Another agreement was arrived at in a conference at Rouen on July 19.[1] Another conference

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[1]Stevenson, I, pp. 171-82. The May 27 and July 19 treaties are cited in a treaty signed near Meulan (Seine et Oise) on the same matters on December 15 (France, Treaties, Recueil

was to have been held on the same matters at Granville in August but only French representatives were present.[2]

On September 23 Charles VII commissioned Jean Havart and Jean Herbert to meet at Rouen, Évreux, Louviers, or other places with English representatives to settle various questions relating to violations of the truce and the determining of reparations. They were also authorized to arrange a later meeting between Dunois and Thomas Hoo, Henry VI's chancellor of France, to settle some of the same questions.[3] That the issues dealt with in these conferences were considered minor is indicated by the rank of the envoys, for, except for Dunois, they were all commoners. Charles VII commissioned Dunois, Jean Herbert, and two others on November 24 to meet with the English representatives on these matters.[4] A similar commission was granted by Henry VI to Thomas Hoo on December 5 to confer with the French representatives at Mantes.[5] The representatives met in December of 1445 between Mantes and Meulan, and signed a treaty

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des traitez de paix, de treve, de neutralite', de confederation, d'alliance, et de commerce, faits par les rois de France, avec tous les princes, et potentats de l'Europe, et autres, depuis pres de trois siecles, ed. Frederic Leonard [6 vols.; A Paris: Imprimé par Frederic Leonard, premier imprimeur du Roi, & de Monseigneur le Daufin, avec privilege du Roi, 1693], I, pp. 41-44). See below, note 6. Hereafter cited as Leonard.

[2]This is indicated in instructions by Charles VII, dated September 23, for a later meeting ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 158-61). See below.

[3]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 158-61.

[4]Ibid., p. 161.

[5]Ibid., p. 162.

there on December 15 settling minor jurisdictional disputes and claims for reparations for the general region in and near Normandy.[6]

There appears to have been no significant diplomacy between the English and French during the first half of 1446, although, as was noted in the previous chapter, an agreement of some nature may have been arrived at postponing the delivery of Maine, for no dissension appears to have occurred over this matter until the summer of 1447. Charles VII wrote to Margaret on March 24, 1446, that he was looking forward to his meeting with her husband and also hoped to see her at that time. Margaret expressed her desire to accompany her husband to France in her answer to Charles VII dated May 20. She also stated her hope that, at the meeting,

> moiennant la grace du Saint Esperit, verrons effectuelement la fructueuse conclusion en la

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[6]Copies of the treaty are in Leonard, I, pp. 41-44, and Jean Du Mont, baron de Carlscroon (ed.), Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens; contenant un recueuil des traitez d'alliance, de paix, de treve, de neutralité, de commerce, d'échange, de protection & de garantie; de toutes les conventions, transactions, pactes, concordats, & autres contrats, qui ont été faits en Europe, depuis le regne de l'empereur Charlemagne jusques à présent; avec les capitulations imperiales et royales; les sentences arbitraies dans les causes importantes; les déclarations de guerre, les contrats de mariage des grands princes, leurs testamens, donations, renonciations, & protestations; les investitures des grands fiefs; les erections des grandes dignités, celles des grandes compagnies de commerce, & en général de tous les titres, sous quelque nom qu'on les désigne, qui peuvent servir à fonder, etablir, ou justifier les droits et les interets des princes et etats de l'Europe (6 vols.; A Amsterdam: Chez P. Brunel et al., 1726), Vol. III, Pt. 1, p. 158. It was ratified by Henry VI on December 23 ("Pieces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 163).

> matiere de paix generale.... [She also requested her] tres chier oncle, tous jours nous vueillez signifier toutes choses a vous aggreables, pour les acomplir a notre pouvoir joyeusement et de tres bon cuer.[7]

On April 9, 1446, in the presence of the king, John Stafford, archbishop of Canterbury and chancellor of England, made a statement, which was placed on the rolls of Parliament by the order of the king, to the effect that the king was acting entirely on his own in assenting to the approaching meeting with his uncle, and that none of the members of Parliament should be considered responsible for what would occur.[8] This declaration probably indicates some apprehension existed on the part of at least a portion of the members, or that Suffolk, Moleyns, or some of the king's other councillors had been criticized for the nature of English diplomacy towards France. Either this session of Parliament, or one shortly thereafter, also repealed the provision of the Treaty of Troyes requiring that the estates of both realms approve any treaties of peace made with the dauphin, i.e., Charles VII. While this act may have been made to give Henry VI more freedom at his approaching meeting with Charles VII, it seems more likely that it was passed so

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[7]Stevenson, I, pp. 183-86. The content of the letter of Charles VII is indicated in the queen's letter of May 20.

[8]Rot. Parl., V, p. 102. This is wrongly placed in 1445 in: Great Britain, Parliament, The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, from which Last-Mentioned Epoch It is Continued Downwards in the Work Entitled, "The Parliamentary Debates," Vol. I: A. D. 1066-1625 (London: T. C. Hansard, 1806), col. 379 (commonly referred to as Hansard's Parliamentary History).

that the members of Parliament would not have to take a stand on any new agreement.[9] There appears then to have been some dissatisfaction in Parliament with the diplomacy of the king. This may help account for the lack of diplomatic activity with France during the year.

Yet extensive talks were held with the duchess of Burgundy during the spring and summer of 1446, though they did not relate primarily to English relations with France. Negotiations were conducted with the duchess, Henry Utenhove, and other diplomats, for the continuation of commercial treaties previously agreed upon in 1445, 1442, and earlier, with the various dominions of the duke of Burgundy. The talks, which extended from May to August, also dealt with the redress of grievances under existing treaties. The existing truce of the duke of Burgundy with England was renewed on July 12, and the commercial treaty with the Low Countries was renewed for twelve years, i.e., until November 1, 1459.[10]

Since at least the Truce of Tours the duke of Burgundy had ceased to play a significant role in the relations between

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[9] Rot. Parl., V, pp. 102-103. Since the English did not sign a peace treaty at Arras in 1435, and in view of the fact that the Truce of Tours in 1444 was not a treaty of peace, but merely an agreement to cease hostilities for a specific time, there had never been any occasion for the enforcement of this provision of the Treaty of Tours. Hansard's Parl. Hist., I, cols. 379-80, also placed this act in 1445 and considered it as a tribute to Suffolk for his achievement of a truce and marriage.

[10] Rymer, XI, pp. 125-49; Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 368. See also Kerling, pp. 51, 77 et passim.

Charles VII and Henry VI. This may have been due to other distractions both within the Empire and relating to the dauphin. Yet he may have also been hesitant about encouraging a final peace which could have been at his expense, and was unsure of which side, if any, he wished to favor if a conflict broke out again. His attempts and those of the other princes of the blood to obtain some control of Charles VII had failed even before the truce, and Charles VII had spent considerable effort and money since about 1435 or 1440 strengthening his armies and his administration.[11]

England, while pursuing peace, did not plan as thoroughly for war. Plans comparable to those being carried out by

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[11]Since about 1444 these reforms had become even more extensive. English partisans were removed from various portions of Burgundian France following the Treaty of Arras and by 1447 he personally appointed the members of the Parlement. The "gentry of the robe" rose quickly as a class during these years and was yet an asset to the throne. The signing of the Treaty of Arras had resulted in the releasing of large numbers of mercenaries ("écorcheurs") who scoured the countryside. Various steps providing for regular pay, strict discipline, a royal monopoly on recruiting, and the limiting of companies to one hundred men, along with strong enforcement from military and civilian authorities, led to the purging of uncontrollable elements and the retention and improvement of the better disciplined forces. Because only a truce, not a treaty, had been signed at Tours, men were kept under arms after 1444. Each town and area supported a certain number of lancers and archers with little complaint, for it meant protection against pillagers. A well-disciplined cavalry of fifteen thousand or more existed in France by 1448. In the same year a permanent infantry force consisting of volunteers exempt from taxation was organized. They followed their normal occupations but were required to practice archery once a week and join their unit in case of war. Thus Charles VII could no longer be easily challenged by the princes of the blood. See Beaucourt, III, passim; IV, passim.

Charles VII in France would have been costly to the English, and Parliament controlled the sources of revenue. The king and his advisors did little to maintain strength, hoping for a permanent peace. Henry VI sent Mathieu Gough to Charles VII in early July "au quel avons chargié vous dire et exposer, à votre bon plaisir, aucunes choses de nostre part."[12] Gough apparently made arrangements for an embassy that followed a few weeks later. On July 20, 1446, Henry VI commissioned Adam Moleyns, bishop of Chichester and keeper of the privy seal, and John Sutton, Lord Dudley, to plead for a postponement of the planned meeting.[13] That the postponement was at least partially necessitated by a shortage of funds, due probably to parliamentary dissatisfaction, is indicated by the fact that on July 20 his Council sent letters to various counties requesting that money be loaned for his trip to France.[14] It is not known whether these requests specified that the trip would be in October. Earlier requests, dated June 1, for loans

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[12] Lettre de créance, dated July 2, is in "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 156-57. It was received by Charles VII on July 23. A letter of safe-conduct is dated July 5 (Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 368). Gough is variously spelled as Goo, Goth, and Go.

[13] Rymer, XI, pp. 138-39; Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI: 1441-1446, p. 456. Michael de Paris, the king's French secretary, Garter king-at-arms, and a pursuivant were appointed to go with them. They carried letters to Charles VII and also letters of introduction to the English officials in Normandy. Wages for three months were paid to the ambassadors (PPC, VI, pp. 52-53). On Michael de Paris see J. Otway-Ruthven, pp. 100-101.

[14] PPC, VI, pp. 46-49.

for the trip in October were apparently unsuccessful.[15] Such a trip would have involved an elaborate entourage of at least three to five hundred people and probably considerably more. The opposition of various leading nobles, certainly including the duke of Gloucester, may have also necessitated the postponement. The planned disgrace of Gloucester in February of 1447 gives some credence to the belief that the king and those of his councillors who wished a meeting, such as Suffolk and Moleyns, may have found his opposition a hindrance. The delivery of Maine, which had not yet been executed, perhaps due to the opposition of Gloucester and others, may have also been a factor in the delay. A postponement may have also been necessitated by the negotiations concerning various infractions of the truce, noted above, which were carried on intermittently during the year.

The request for a prorogation was unsuccessful, but plans for a December meeting of ambassadors were apparently made by the French with Moleyns and Dudley. On November 28, 1446, Henry VI granted a letter of safe-conduct to Jean Havart and Guillaume Cousinot, both envoys of Charles VII, and Regnault Godelin, seneschal of Nantes and an envoy of the duke of

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[15] Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI: 1441-1446, pp. 430-31. The state of government finances worsened in these years. The debt in 1433 was £168,000; by 1449 it had risen to £372,000 (see A. R. Myers, The Household of Edward IV: The Black Book and the Ordinance of 1478 [Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1959], pp. 5-7; Ramsay, II, pp. 89-90, 250-67).

Brittany.[16] In his instructions to Havart and Cousinot, Charles VII asked the envoys to express his desire for a meeting with his nephew, and his opposition to a postponement of the meeting. The envoys were also to press for the sending of English envoys to execute the delivery of Maine, and for an agreement concerning the collection of church revenues due his subjects from lands held by the English. If the matters were resolved, the envoys were to intimate, a postponement of the meeting could be more easily arranged.[17] On December 1, safe-conducts, valid until November 1, 1447, were also granted to Guy, count of Laval, and several others.[18] Two commissions were granted by Henry VI on December 14 to Moleyns and Dudley to treat with the representatives of Charles VII. One empowered them to negotiate for a prorogation of the truce in order to provide time for the meeting of the rulers,[19] and the other authorized them to negotiate on various other matters, including the exchange of lands in France.[20] Another commission authorized them to treat with the ambassadors of the duke of Brittany on problems related to keeping the truce.[21] Although Suffolk's name does not

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[16]Carte, II, p. 317; Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 371.

[17]Beaucourt, IV, pp. 288-89.

[18]Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 371; PRO, Chancery (Dipl. Doc.), 28/7(21).

[19]Rymer, XI, pp. 152-53.

[20]Lettres des rois, II, pp. 468-69.

[21]Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 372. There is no record of a

occur on the commission, he apparently took part in the deliberations for his name appears on a treaty concluded on December 18, 1446.[22] This treaty did not deal with the question of a prorogation of the truce or a meeting of the kings, but did include provisions not authorized in the English commissions. However, in view of the fact that the talks occurred in London, it may be assumed that the English representatives consulted with the king and his Council before agreeing to any of the provisions. The treaty provided that ecclesiastics living under either king could appoint agents for the collection of income due them from subjects situated in the lands held by the other king. According to Ramsay,[23] this was a concession to France more fatal even than the promised delivery of Maine because of the large number of ecclesiastical revenues in Normandy claimed by the French. Other provisions provided for the suppression of piracy, restitution of goods seized at sea, and for the attendance of Normans at the Université de Paris. No mention was made in the treaty of the delivery of Maine.

It was during the following weeks that plans were laid for the final destruction of any influence that the king's uncle, Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, retained. This was a critical period in English diplomacy, for the hope for a meeting of

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separate agreement. The Bretons presumably agreed to the treaty, noted below, signed with the French.

[22] Lettres des rois, II, pp. 470-76.

[23] II, p. 72.

the kings and a permanent peace treaty with France appeared to depend on a conciliatory policy towards Charles VII and particularly upon the delivery of Maine. This delivery had originally been promised by April 30, 1446, and it was probably believed that further delay would damage any hope for a satisfactory peace. It is difficult to measure the influence of Gloucester, but the fact that he was toppled early in 1447, and that after the Treaty of London of December 18, 1446, no further developments occurred in Anglo-French relations until his fall may indicate that his influence had thwarted the peace efforts of Henry VI, his wife, and a number of his councillors, e.g., Suffolk and Moleyns. On December 14, 1446, writs were issued for Parliament to meet on February 10. According to numerous chroniclers, it was called "to sle the noble duke of Gloucestre."[24] The Parliament had been summoned to meet at Cambridge, but the site was changed to Bury St. Edmund's, where Suffolk's influence was stronger. Suffolk apparently spread the report that Humphrey might lead an uprising and extensive precautions were taken to guard the king during his sojourn

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[24] An English Chronicle of the Kings' Reigns from Richard II to Henry VI, ed. J. S. Davies, Camden 1st ser., no. 64, London: Camden Society, 1856), p. 62. This was written by an unknown author who apparently died between 1461 and 1471. Another account of this session of Parliament by Richard Fox of St. Albans is included in the same volume. Fox's chronicle is probably the most detailed contemporary account of Gloucester's arrest and death. Also see Hall, p. 209; Ingulf's Croyland, pp. 403-404; D'Escouchy, I, pp. 114-19, and numerous other chroniclers who wrote of this period and are cited by Vickers (Humphrey Duke of Gloucester, pp. 290-94, 459-66).

at Bury. There is some question as to whether Gloucester had actually made any display of force. The Parliament was opened at the Abbey of Bury St. Edmund's by the king. The chancellor, John Stafford, announced that the session had been called to provide the means for Henry VI to meet with Charles VII in France. However, he also alluded to various biblical texts that were critical of those who give bad counsel, presumably referring to Humphrey.[25]

Gloucester arrived on February 18 with a retinue of eighty.[26] When he neared the town shortly before noon, he received a message from the king that he did not desire to see him and that he should go directly to his place of lodging. After dinner, Humphrey, duke of Buckingham, Edmund Beaufort, earl of Somerset and marquis of Dorset,[27] Lord Sudeley, and John, viscount of Beaumont and high constable, arrested Gloucester on a charge of high treason, by command of the king.

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[25] Rot. Parl., V, p. 128.

[26] According to Ramsay (II, p. 74) this was large enough to cause suspicion, but Vickers (p. 292) notes that such a retinue was not unusual for a prince of the blood who was undertaking a long journey.

[27] Edmund Beaufort was the nephew of Cardinal Beaufort. Like Buckingham, Sudeley and Beaumont, he was an adherent of the foreign policies of the old cardinal and Suffolk. Cardinal Beaufort, then in his late seventies, apparently had not been active in the government for at least three or four years. He died on April 11, just a few weeks after the death of his nephew, Humphrey of Gloucester. Some chroniclers were critical of the role played by Suffolk in the arrest of Gloucester, but none mentioned Cardinal Beaufort as playing a part. They spoke highly of him at the time of his death a few weeks later (Cf. Croyland, p. 404, and most others cited in Vickers.).

The shock of his arrest apparently caused him to go into a coma, and three days later, on the afternoon of February 23, 1447, he died. Though the circumstances of his death have caused some suspicions, it appears that he died from natural causes. His friend, Abbot John Whethamstede of St. Albans asserted this,[28] and the duke's body was displayed on the following day to show that there were no signs of violence. No contemporary English chroniclers asserted that foul play occurred, though some later pro-Yorkists did. French chroniclers probably reflected foreign opinion when they asserted he had been murdered.[29] Although Suffolk had undoubtedly conspired to bring about his downfall, his innocence concerning the duke's death is supported by the fact that among the many crimes Parliament charged him with in 1450, there was none concerning the arrest or death of Gloucester.[30] Yet it cannot be denied that Suffolk and the others supporting his policies towards France, including the king, were now freed of one of their chief opponents. As will be shown, opposition still remained.

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[28]PRO, Chronica Monasterii S. Albani, Part VI: Registra quorundam Abbatum Monasterii S. Albani, qui saeculo XV^mo floruere, Vol. I: Registrum Abbatiae Johannis Whethamstede, ed. H. T. Riley, ("Rolls Series," no. 28), p. 179. Hereafter referred to as PRO, Whethamstede.

[29]Basin, I, p. 190; Wavrin, V, p. 3; D'Escouchy, I, p. 118.

[30]For 1450 charges against Suffolk see Rot. Parl., V, pp. 178-83. For details concerning the arrest and death of Gloucester see Vickers, Humphrey Duke of Gloucester, pp. 290-94; Ramsay, Lancaster and York, II, pp. 72-78; Kingsford, pp. 163-65; T. F. Tout, "Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester," DNB, X, pp. 238-45, and the numerous chronicles cited by these writers.

Nevertheless, it is probably not coincidental that on February 22 at Tours the truce with France was prorogued until January 1, 1448.[31]

Charles VII had commissioned Dunois, Pierre de Brézé, Précigny, Cousinot, and Havart to negotiate with the representatives of Henry VI concerning a general peace and a meeting of the two kings. Their main mission was to agree on a prorogation of the truce which was to expire on April 1, 1447, and on a meeting of the two kings. The commission empowered them to make an agreement for Charles VII to meet with Henry VI in Paris, the marches of Chartrain (the area near Chartres), or another location at a time when the English king could come to the continent.[32] The English negotiators were Adam Moleyns and John Sutton, Lord Dudley, who were acting under their earlier commission of December 14.[33] The representatives of the two kings met at Tours during the latter half of February. On February 22 they agreed to a prorogation of the existing truce to January 1, 1448.[34] Three days later, on February 25, the envoys agreed to a treaty asserting that Charles VII would meet with Henry VI at Paris, Chartres, or in the marches of France (i.e., of the Île de France) and Chartrain by November 1.[35]

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[31]Rymer, XI, pp. 153-55.

[32]Ibid., pp. 149-51. [33]Ibid., pp. 152-53, 165-66.

[34]Ibid., pp. 153-55.

[35]Ibid., pp. 156-57. The latter was confirmed by Charles VII on April 14 (PRO, Exch. T. R. [Dipl. Doc.] 30/509). The

Following the agreements reached between the envoys of Charles VII and Henry VI in February, there was another lull in diplomatic activity until July. That this was attributable to dissension in England concerning the agreement to deliver the province of Maine to Charles VII is indicated by the fact that a declaration was made in the Council acquitting Suffolk of any guilt concerning the charges being made that he was implicated in the agreement to surrender Anjou and Maine.[36] A royal proclamation was issued on June 18 declaring that the king was satisfied that Suffolk had always acted in the interests of the throne and was innocent of all charges against him.[37] It was also at about this time, that the king appointed Edmund Beaufort, earl of Somerset and marquis of Dorset, to be lieutenant and governor of France. The post was apparently vacant since the end of 1445, when Richard, duke of York, had returned to England.[38] According to the various chroniclers, Suffolk and Margaret had finally prevailed over the

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treaties were ratified by Henry VI on April 26 (Rymer, XI, pp. 163-66, 166-68). See also D'Escouchy, I, pp. 119-20.

[36] Rot. Parl., V, p. 447; Rymer, XI, pp. 172-73. The duchy of Anjou was occasionally specified along with Maine as part of the area agreed upon to be delivered although none of the documents originating from the courts of René, Charles VII, or Henry VI included it. The fact that Anjou was only partially controlled by the English, René was the duke of Anjou, and the boundaries and areas of occupancy in this region were vague probably account for it occasionally being included with Maine. However, none of the correspondence among the governmental figures of England and Valois France mention it as being included.

[37] Rot. Parl., V, pp. 447-48; Rymer, XI, pp. 172-74.

[38] Stevenson, II, pp. [585]-[586].

wishes of York to be reappointed even though his reinstatement had earlier been proclaimed at Rouen. Not only was he replaced by Somerset, a nephew of the late cardinal of Winchester, but, being appointed for ten years lieutenant of Ireland, he was practically banished. It is apparently from about this time that York, who did not leave immediately for Ireland, began to assume the role, that had been played by Gloucester, as the leading opponent of the peace policies of the king and Suffolk.[39] Suffolk was promoted to a dukedom on July 2, 1448. Thus he was at the heighth of his power during the approaching months. The most extensive effort ever made to bring about the delivery of Maine to the French began in the summer of 1447. Suffolk, the opposition to his policies weakened, played the leading role in these subsequent relations with France.

Charles VII had commissioned the bastard of Orléans, Précigny, Cousinot, Havart, and Jean Jouger, his secretary, on April 14 to negotiate in England, with the representatives of Henry VI, for a general peace, and a prorogation of the truce and of the time of the meeting between the two kings.[40] However, negotiations were not held on these matters until

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[39]Basin, I, pp. 191-93; Incerti Scriptoris Chronicon Angliae de regnis trium regum Lancastrensium Henrici IV, Henrici V, et Henrici VI, ed. John Allen Giles (London: Bohn's Antiquarian Library, 1848), p. 35; Wavrin, I, pp. 352-53; PRO, Whethamstede, I, p. 160. This presented a contrast to his ambitions in 1445 to marry his son to a daughter of Charles VII. York was next in line to the crown since there had not yet been an issue from the king's marriage.

[40]Rymer, XI, pp. 160-62.

July, perhaps because of the opposition to the policies associated with Suffolk, which the king encountered in June. On July 1, Henry empowered Suffolk, Buckingham, Moleyns, Dudley, and Lord John le Scrope to treat with the French ambassadors who had arrived in London.[41] On July 27 the representatives of the two kings agreed at London that the kings were to meet in France before May 1, 1448, rather than November 1, 1447.[42] The next day the truce was prorogued from January 1, 1448, to May 1, 1448.[43] However, the French did not agree to these extensions until they had exacted certain promises from Henry VI. The prorogation of the truce was apparently dependent on the delivery of Maine. A statement by Thomas Kent, clerk of the Council, dated July 27, confirmed the promise made by Henry VI on December 22, 1445, to deliver the county of Maine to René and Charles of Anjou. It included a copy of the December 22 letter and asserted that the delivery would be made by November 1, 1447. The statement also expressed the desire of Henry VI to receive reasonable provision or compensation for his subjects because of the losses that would be encountered by this surrender.[44] On July 28 Henry VI wrote two letters to Charles VII. One letter announced that he was sending the

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[41] Rymer, XI, p. 175.

[42] Rymer, XI, pp. 182-84.

[43] PRO, Chancery (Dipl. Doc.), 30/10(5). They also signed a treaty on July 28 regulating the holding of ecclesiastical benefices in France during the truce (Rymer, XI, pp. 184-86).

[44] Stevenson, II, pp. [637]-[642]. On the relation of the prorogation to the delivery of Maine, see below, pp. 189-90, 205-206.

bishop of Norwich to France to negotiate further on the matter of peace.[45] The other letter of July 28 expressed the great affection in which he held Charles VII and his desire to deliver the county of Maine to "notre beau père le roy de Sicile et à notre oncle Charles d'Anjou, son frère," by November 1.[46]

On July 28, Henry VI also commissioned Mathieu Gough and Fouques Eyton to receive from Somerset and his agents, the city, town, and castle of Le Mans, and all the other towns, castles, and fortresses in the county of Maine, and to deliver these to the commissioners of Charles VII according to the manner described in other letters.[47] A second letter of the same date ordered them to execute the commission given them under the circumstances to be related to them by Garter.[48] The latter was presumably to inform them of the details of the transfer including the submission by the French representatives of

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[45]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 168-69. The bishop of Norwich, Dudley, and others were so commissioned on August 16 (Rymer, XI, pp. 189-91). See below, p. 189.

[46]"Preuves," in Thomas Basin, IV, pp. 286-87. He also announced that he was sending an envoy to assist the assembly which was to be held at Lyon for the "pacification de l'Eglise." See also his letter of July 22 concerning his desire to assist in resolving the schism in the church ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 165-68). Felix V was elected pope by the Council of Basel in 1439. After the death of Eugenius IV in 1447, the new pope, Nicholas V, soon reconciled the Roman papacy with Germany and thus weakened the support of the anti-pope Felix. Charles VII and Henry VI were instrumental in bringing about the abdication of Felix in 1449 and the end of the brief schism. Robert Botyll, prior of St. John of Jerusalem, was appointed ambassador to Charles VII and Nicholas V in August of 1447, along with several others (Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI: 1446-1452, p. 284).

[47]Stevenson, II, p. [696]. [48]Ibid., pp. [698]-[699].

the letter of Charles VII to René authorizing him to make a truce and an alliance with Henry VI. A third letter to Gough and Eyton, also dated July 28, repeated their authority to receive Maine from Somerset and also gave certain orders to the latter:

> Mandons en oultre par ces mesmes presentes a nostre dit cousin de Dorset [Somerset], et a tous noz autres lieuxtenans, cappitaines et officiers, et subgietz dicellui conte du Maine, ou a leurs lieuxtenans et commis, et a chascun deulx, si comme a lui appartent, que en lexecucion de ceste nostre commission, les circonstances et dependences dicelle, ilz vous obeissent et entendent dilligeamment, et vous baillent conseil, confort, aide par puissance de gens et autrement, se mestier en aurez et requis en sont.[49]

On September 23 Gough and Eyton read the letters dated July 28, noted above, to Mundeford, bailiff of Maine.[50] They then ordered Mundeford to surrender the "cite, ville, et chastel du Mans" to them so they might deliver it to the "treshault et trespuissant prince loncle de France du roy." Mundeford requested copies of the letters so that he might consider them further. He then inquired whether they had any letters from the king to Somerset or anyone serving under him ordering the delivery of Le Mans, whether they carried a letter from Somerset to him for this purpose, or perhaps a personal letter from Somerset on this matter. Gough and Eyton replied that they had no other letters pertaining to the delivery, but

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[49] Ibid., pp. [700]-[702]. There was apparently no order sent to Beaufort.

[50] He is also occasionally referred to as the captain-general of Le Mans and Beaumont-le-Vicomte.

that they would supply him with copies of the letters they had already read to him. After Mundeford had inspected the copies provided him, he conceded that the letters were "bonnes, amples, et contenans noble puissance et belle charge aus dis escuiers." However, he pointed out, "il semble que les dictes ne contiennent aucune descharge pour mondit seigneur, le marquis de Dorset, ne au dit Mundeford, ou autres ses commis." Mundeford asserted that, in view of the fact that the king had given the government and administration of the county of Maine, including the town and castle of Le Mans, to Somerset, and had also awarded him for life the lordship of Maine, and that Somerset had entered into indentures with the king and was thus bound to him, there should have also been letters of discharge from the king giving Somerset and his commissioners sufficient authority to turn over the lands to another. Mundeford then noted that he had been placed in charge of the town and castle of Le Mans, and the fortress of Beaumont-le-Vicomte by Somerset, and was bound, until instructed otherwise by the marquis, to turn them over to no one but him. Mundeford then suggested that Gough and Eyton should have presented their letters to Somerset so that they could have obtained a discharge from the marquis, which would have authorized him to turn over the places in Maine. Mundeford next expressed his hope that Gough and Eyton would excuse him for not delivering the places in Maine since they had no letter from the king to Somerset or him, or from Somerset to him, ordering that it be done.

Mundeford then requested sufficient time to go or send messengers to the king and Beaufort, asking for the authority to make the delivery. He expressed the wish that his action would not be displeasing or prejudicial to the king and stressed that he only wished to avoid any future blame or reproach for acting without direct authority.[51]

Meanwhile, on August 16, 1447, Henry VI had commissioned Walter Lyhert, bishop of Norwich, Robert Botyll, prior of St. John of Jerusalem, John Sutton (Lord Dudley), Vincent Clement, a member of the Council, and Thomas Kent, clerk of the Council, to negotiate with the representatives of Charles VII on a general peace, a prorogation of the truce, and a postponement of the planned meeting of the kings.[52] They met at Bourges in the middle of October with Dunois, Pierre de Brézé, Précigny, Cousinot, and Havart, ambassadors of Charles VII. On October 15, 1447, they signed treaties proroguing the existing

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[51] Ibid., pp. [704]-[710]. A letter from the king, sent from Rouen on September 9, authorized Mundeford, Nicolas Molyneux, one of the masters of the chamber of accounts at Rouen, and Thomas Direhille, the English viscount of Alençon, to negotiate with the French on behalf of Henry VI's subjects in Maine, for compensation because of various properties that would have to be left behind. It is not known whether this letter reached Mundeford by September 23, but even if it did, it would not have granted him the authority he desired (Ibid., pp. [666]-[669], see below). Direhille, a squire as Mundeford, probably held an appointive, rather than an hereditary position.

[52] Rymer, XI, pp. 189-91. They were apparently also granted certain powers concerning the schism in the church (Cal. Pat. Rolls, Henry VI: 1447-1454, p. 284).

truce from May 1, 1448, to January 1, 1449,[53] and extending the time at which Henry VI would confer in France with Charles VII from May 1, 1448, to November 1, 1448.[54] This prorogation of the truce, as the previous one signed in July, was not to be promulgated until after the delivery of Maine, if, as happened, the delivery did not occur by November 1.[55]

Henry VI had appointed Mundeford, bailiff of Maine, Thomas Direhille, viscount of Alençon, and Nicolas Moleyneux, one of the masters of the chamber of accounts at Rouen, on September 9 to meet with the envoys of Charles VII in Le Mans, or other places commonly agreed upon, "pourparler, adviser, traitier, accorder, deliberer, et conclurre" upon the matter of "provision raisonnable" for the liegemen and subjects of the English king who, because of the delivery, would be required to leave some property behind in Maine. The commission did not specify whether the negotiations were to be conducted before or after the transfer.[56] Charles VII refrained from

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[53]PRO, Chancery (Dipl. Doc.) 30/10(6). For proclamation of truce by Henry VI on December 1, see Rymer, XI, pp. 193-94, and Cal. Cl. Rolls, Henry VI: 1447-1454, pp. 37-38.

[54]Rymer, XI, pp. 189-91. Confirmed by Henry VI on November 4 (Ibid., p. 191). For letter from Henry VI to Charles VII, dated December 11, which accompanied notice of ratification, see "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 172-75.

[55]Stevenson, II, p. [714]. The delay in effecting the truce prorogation because of the delivery of Maine was not stated in the October treaties, but was apparently agreed to at least tacitly, for such an understanding was acknowledged in December (Ibid.). On July prorogation see above, p. 185; on the relation of the October prorogation to the delivery, see below, pp. 206-207.

[56]Ibid., pp. [666]-[669].

commissioning any representatives to negotiate with these men until after the treaties noted above were signed at Bourges on October 15. On the next day, October 16, he commissioned Guillaume Cousinot and Jean Havart to confer with the representatives of Henry VI and with "tous autres qui pourroient avoir interest en la dicte matiere," and to conclude agreements for fitting and reasonable provision or compensation for those who would suffer losses by the transfer of Maine. He also asserted that Henry VI had agreed to deliver Maine by November 1, putting aside all excuses and hindrances. He then noted that his ambassadors who were recently in England had agreed "que provision raisonnable sera faicte aux liges subgiez dicellui nostre nepveu." However, the commission did not specify whether these negotiations were to occur before or after the transfer.[57] On October 17, Charles VII issued a second commission to Havart and Cousinot in which he recited the promises made by Henry VI concerning Maine and empowered them to receive the county of Maine, and the various possessions therein, from the representatives of Henry VI on November 1.[58] Neither of the two commissions of Charles VII to Cousinot and Havart, nor the one commission of Henry VI to Mundeford, Direhille, and Molyneux, specified whether the negotiations relating to provision were to be conducted and concluded before or after the delivery of Maine. Yet they indicated that there were no conditions related to the

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[57] Ibid., pp. [654]-[658]. [58] Ibid., pp. [645]-[650].

transfer, thus intimating that the settlement of provision and the delivery of the county were to be handled separately and that one was not conditional upon the other. The fact that Charles VII had issued his two commissions only about two weeks before November 1, also probably indicates that he assumed, or least wished, the delivery to occur prior to the negotiations for a "provision raisonnable." Although the three Englishmen had only been empowered to negotiate the matter of provision, Cousinot and Havart had also been empowered to accept the delivery of Maine. Henry VI still desired that Eyton and Gough make the delivery. On October 23 he wrote to them that he appreciated their diligence in attempting to recover Maine and deliver it to the French. He then stated that, because of the answers given to them by Mundeford and also by Richard Frogenhale, he was sending them additional letters to insure the successful conclusion of their mission.[59] He also sent letters to Frogenhale on this date ordering him to surrender his places in Maine to Gough and Eyton.[60]

On October 28, Henry VI wrote a letter to Edmund Beaufort, earl of Somerset and marquis of Dorset, reciting his agreement to deliver Maine by November 1, and recalling that Beaufort had been in the Council on July 28 when letters to this effect had been drawn up and delivered to the count of

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[59] Ibid., pp. [702]-[703]. Frogenhale, the bailiff of Alençon, had apparently given them the same response as Mundeford.

[60] "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 172.

Dunois and the other French ambassadors then in London.[61] The king then stated that Gough and Eyton, who had been appointed to receive the possessions in Maine from Beaufort and those under him, had been refused custody of various places by Frogenhale and Mundeford. He then ordered Beaufort "sur tant que doubtez nous desplaire," to require Frogenhale, Mundeford, and others serving under him, to turn over the various possessions in Maine to Gough and Eyton "sans plus en faire de fuites, excusations, ou delays."[62] It is obvious that Henry VI did not wish negotiations concerning "provision raisonnable" to interfere in any way with the delivery of Maine to Charles VII by November 1. As will be seen, various English subjects in Maine felt differently on this matter.

Havart, Cousinot and several other Frenchmen met with Molyneux, Mundeford, Direhille and other subjects of Henry VI at Le Mans on Tuesday, October 31. Gough and Eyton were not present.[63] Cousinot opened the conference by summarizing the

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[61]As noted above, letters dated July 27 and 28 were sent to Charles VII agreeing to deliver Maine by November 1 ("Preuves" in Basin, IV, pp. 286-87; Stevenson, II, pp. [637]-[642]).

[62]Stevenson, II, pp. [692]-[696].

[63]Other English subjects present included Pierre Bovin, licentiate in laws and an officer of justice at Le Mans, Andrew Peguyneau, Jean de Beauvoir, Etienne de Vaulx, and numerous others (Stevenson, II, pp. [635]-[636], see also pp. [691]-[692]). Jean d'Hierrai, bishop of Le Mans, and various other officials of the cathedral at Le Mans were also present. Those accompanying Cousinot and Havart included Pierre de Beauveau, seigneur de la Bessiere, Pierre Parcant, treasurer of Anjou, Adam Hodon (Hodum), a secretary of

circumstances surrounding Henry VI's agreement to deliver Maine to Charles VII, and presenting a notarized copy of Henry VI's letter of December 22, 1445, promising the delivery, and an English confirmation, dated July 27, 1447, attesting to the veracity of the 1445 letter and promising delivery by November 1, 1447. Cousinot noted that the promise of the English king to deliver the various possessions in Maine by November 1 denied that there would be any "delays, fuytes, et dissimulacions." He then stated that, since the delivery was to occur by November 1, he and his party had been commissioned by Charles VII on October 17 to accept it from the representatives of Henry VI. He next presented the commission empowering him and Havart to receive the county.[64]

The English delegates requested copies of the commission and the other documents presented. They said they wished to discuss them during the hour of vespers and that they would give an answer to them in the evening. Cousinot stated his trust of the English delegation and gave them the original of the commission and the copies of the other documents so they

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Charles VII and Charles of Anjou, and various others (Ibid., pp. [635]-[636]).

A protocol of this two-day conference, which includes copies of the commissions of the two delegations, Henry VI's letter of December 22, 1445, and numerous other documents, was written by a member of the English delegation and preserved in the "Collection of William of Worcester." It has been printed in Stevenson (II, pp. [634]-[692]). Since it is in French, rather than Latin, it was probably written by one of the French subjects of Henry VI.

[64] Ibid., pp. [636]-[650].

could study them. Following vespers the commissioners of the two kings met again. Nicolas Molyneux stated that there was a "rature et glose" in one of the copies and that the signatures of the notaries were unknown to his delegation. Because of these reasons, and also since the originals had not been produced, he stated that they could not accept them in full faith. Cousinot affirmed that the letters were true copies and offered to show the originals to any of the commissioners who wished to go to the town of Sablé or to anyone they wished to send there. He then urged the English commissioners to fulfill the promises contained in the documents, reminding them the period within which delivery was to be made was to expire on the next day. Cousinot then offered, when the delivery had been made, to discuss the matter of "provisions qui doyvent estre donnees a ceulx qui aucune chose delaisseroient ou dit pays du Maine a cause dicelle delivrance."[65]

Molyneux asked whether they had any letters, other than those already presented, and, if so, to produce them, promising that he and his delegation would carry out that which they had been commissioned to do. He neglected to tell the French that he and his party had only been commissioned to negotiate on the matter of provisions, not to carry out the delivery. Hodon then presented the commission of Cousinot and Havart from Charles VII, dated October 16, which empowered them to make arrangements for "provision raisonnable." Cousinot, on behalf

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[65] Ibid., pp. [650]-[653].

of himself and Havart, then repeated their offer to consider the matter of provisions after the delivery of the county, and

> protestant que se ainsi ne se faisoit, et aucuns dommaiges, pertes, interestz, ou inconveniens sen ensuivoient en deffault dicelle delivrance.[66]

The two delegations met together again on the following day, Wednesday, November 1, at the Cathedral of St. Julian in Le Mans after the celebration of high mass in observance of All Saints Day. Immediately after the mass, five hundred or more people, including many churchmen and merchants, presented themselves to the members of the two delegations, probably to express their concern over the delivery, and particularly the matter of provisions. The conference at the cathedral was held in the presence of the bishop of Le Mans, Jean d'Hierrai. Molyneux reviewed the discussions of the preceeding day. He referred to the documents presented by the French and noted that their copy of the letter of Henry VI, dated December 22, 1445, had referred to a request by Henry that Charles VII give to him the letters to René and Charles of Anjou authorizing them to sign an alliance for life and a truce for twenty years on behalf of the duchy of Anjou and the county of Maine. Molyneux also noted that in the confirmation of July 27, 1447, which had promised to deliver the county by November 1, Henry VI had also expressed his desire that his liegemen and subjects should have "provision raisonnable" for anything they

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[66] Ibid., pp. [653]-[660].

should be required to leave behind. Molyneux stated that "provision raisonnable" was "proprement entendue deue recompense." He then read aloud the commission from Henry VI, dated September 9, empowering Mundeford, Direhille and himself to negotiate on the matter of provision. A copy was given, at their request, to Cousinot and Havart. Molyneux then stated that he and the other commissioners had been at Le Mans since October 1 "esperans y trouver les commissaires du dit oncle avecques eulx ou fait de la dicte provision, ce quilz estoient prestz et deliberez de faire." Not finding any commissioners here, they sent letters on October 4 to Charles VII and to members of his Council at Bourges and Tours, as well as letters to the various councillors and officers of René and Charles of Anjou at Angers and Sablé, informing them of their arrival and their desire to confer on the problem of provisions. Therefore, Molyneux asserted, neither Henry VI nor his commissioners had caused any delay in the negotiations. It was only at the present time, he concluded, that he had learned that Charles VII had just recently appointed ambassadors for this purpose. However, in spite of the fact that Cousinot had not produced the originals of the letters requested by Henry VI authorizing René and Charles of Anjou to make an alliance and truce, Molyneux announced that he and his party were willing to proceed to "la dicte provision et recompense," as they had been commissioned to do. He expressed the wish that Cousinot and Havart would also act in a conciliatory spirit by

proceeding to carry out the wishes of the "deux princes souverains."[67]

Cousinot replied that it had been about two years since Henry VI had first promised to deliver the county of Maine, "tous excusations et empeschmens cessans." Since then he had made additional arrangements with Cousinot and Havart, as his uncle's ambassadors, and had supplied other letters promising the delivery of the county, "toutes excusacions et empeschmens quelconques cessans," and had made no mention of the letters authorizing the truces and alliances of René and Charles of Anjou with Henry VI. Therefore there should be no further question on this point. Cousinot also noted that the various letters mentioned that a "provision raisonnable" was to be made but did not specify the hour or day when this should be done. Thus, he asserted, it could be as easily handled after the delivery as before, whether "trois moys, demy an, ung an, dix ans, ou plus." However, he stressed, there was a day mentioned in the letters of Henry VI on which he promised to turn over to Charles VII Le Mans and the county of Maine, "cest assavoir dedans le premier jour de Novembre, lequel est adjourduy." He then stated his belief that if "la dicte provision ou recompense (laquele il nesquipolloit pas lun a lautre)" were made before or during the delivery, "ce seroit une maniere de vendicion," which, he held, Henry VI had never intended. Cousinot also defended Charles VII's delay in sending the

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[67] Ibid., pp. [661]-[672].

delegation to receive the county and make arrangements for provision, by asserting that the king did not wish to send them earlier because he had agreed to confer first with the ambassadors Henry VI had sent to Bourges. However, Cousinot said, the French delegation was ready to accept the delivery of the county and to agree on a day and place to arrange for "la dite provision." According to the writer of the English protocol, Cousinot and Havart then demanded the English commissioners

> baillier et mettre en leurs mains ou nom du dit oncle, les chastel, ville, et cite dessus dictes, et generalement toutes et chascunes les autres villes et forteresses estans ou dit conte du Maine en lobeissance du roy, nostre dit seigneur.[68]

Molyneux answered Cousinot that the later promises of the king ratified the earlier letters, and that the conditions mentioned in the later letters should be observed as completely as the original promise of delivery. He reiterated that Henry VI wished that his liegemen and subjects who would suffer losses by the delivery should have "provision raissonable, comme devant est dit, [qui] est entendu deue recompense." He stated that he and his colleagues had been appointed by Henry VI "pour le droit de ses subgiez," both churchmen and nobles, as well as other subjects, including some who had received from Henry V or Henry VI "terres, offices, prebendes, benefices, et aussi pour le fait des compositions des villes,

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[68] Ibid., pp. [672]-[676].

places, et forteresses." He asserted that if delivery were made before these matters were settled,

> les hommes subgietz, et liges du roy... demourroient despourveuz et sans seurte, provision, et recompense de ce quilz delaisseroient....

Molyneux stated that when the matter of provision arose at the time Cousinot and Havart conferred in England with Henry VI, the king had refused to conclude an agreement on the matter because he wished the matter to be resolved to the satisfaction of his officers in France who had more knowledge of the matter. It was for this purpose, Molyneux held, that he and his party were commissioned. Thus, wishing "acomplir la voulente du roy," they were prepared to make arrangements for "la dicte provision et recompense," as provided by their commission. Molyneux urged Cousinot and Havart to attend to this matter, after which, he stated, the English representatives would give "leur requeste et demande tele response au surplus quilz nauroient cause deulx douloir par raison." However, he concluded, if Cousinot and Havart insisted on the delivery first, he would be willing to send a message to Henry VI to obtain his wishes.[69]

Cousinot replied that the desires of Henry VI would not be fulfilled if the English commissioners did not respect the letters of the English king promising the delivery of Maine by November 1, "toutes excusacions et empeschemens cessans."

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[69] Ibid., pp. [676]-[681].

He also offered to show the letters of Charles VII, which had granted permission to René and Charles of Anjou to make alliances and treaties with Henry VI, to deputies of Molyneux who could journey to near-by Sablé for this purpose. He again rejected the English contention that the problem of provision should first be settled so that the subjects of Henry VI might not be denied their security and property. Cousinot asserted that the advantages of universal peace transcended this matter. The demands of the English commissioners questioned the good faith of the French and thus jeopardized the hope for such a peace. He also noted that to oppose the wishes of one's sovereign prince was a capital offense and that, at any rate, there was no need for security to be demanded. He also asserted that it could not be alleged that a king could or ought

> en traictie de paix donner les biens et heritaiges de ses subgietz oultre leur gre et voulente, et ainsi le vouloient tous drois canons et civilz.[70]

Cousinot then referred Molyneux to Buckingham, Suffolk, Moleyns, Scrope, Dudley, and Thomas Kent, who were present during the embassy of himself and Havart to England when the matter of "la dicte recompense" was discussed. Cousinot recalled that Edmund Beaufort had received "recompense par lordonnance" of Henry VI and he understood that Lord Scales was to come to Maine in order to make additional arrangements. He then

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[70] Ibid., p. [684]. According to a marginal note in the MS.: "Nota, de veoir les decretales pour savoir se le roy puet donner les biens de ses subgietz sans le consentement et advis des trois estaz de son royaume."

concluded by asserting that these matters ought not to prevent the delivery promised by Henry VI and then citing the English king's various statements in this regard.[71]

Molyneux expressed his surprise at the requests of Cousinot and Havart. He pointed out that the only documents supporting the transfer of Maine on that date were held by the French ambassadors, and that the English in charge of the various places in Maine had received no charge from Henry VI to turn the places over to them.

> Mais quant ilz vouldroient faire apparoir de lettres suffisans du roy, nostre dit seigneur, contenans descharge pour ceulx qui avoient la garde des places, ilz estoient prestz de obeir ad ce comme ses vrays et loyaux subgietz.[72]

However, Molyneux repeated, the English were ready to proceed to the matter of provision as they had been authorized by their king. A number of English subjects and their representatives then appeared before the ambassadors of the two kings and requested that, prior to the delivery of Maine, attention be given to the matter of "provision raisonnable." Otherwise, they indicated,

> en deffault de ce se pourroient ensuir pluseurs inconveniens et maulx, (que Dieu ne vueille!) qui a paine pourroient estre estains, appaisiez, ou repparez.

Molyneux then urged that "la dicte matiere de provision" be given attention.[73]

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[71] Ibid., pp. [684]-[685]. [72] Ibid., pp. [686]-[687].

[73] Ibid., pp. [687]-[689].

Cousinot and Havart said it was not for them to determine whether there were proper mandates from Henry VI to those charged with various properties and duties in Maine. They observed that, if the mandates of Henry VI to his representatives in France were not properly drawn up so that the English king might fulfill his promise, it was the duty of the king to see that proper measures were taken to see that the promise would be fulfilled. Cousinot then stated that since they were without a mediator ("juge"), they would probably absorb a great deal more time in this dispute if they remained. He also noted that they did not have the authority to extend the date, within which the delivery was to be made, beyond November 1. Molyneux replied that he was only ready to attend to those matters contained in his commission. The representatives of the two kings then parted.[74]

The English representatives at this conference were more sensitive to the apprehensions of the English subjects in Maine than to the wishes of their king. It is true, as they stated, that they had not been authorized by Henry VI to turn over the county to the representatives of Charles VII, but only to discuss the matter of "provision raisonnable." However, they did not tell Cousinot and Havart that Gough and Eyton had been authorized to receive the area from them and turn it over to the French. The fact that Mundeford, Molyneux, and their associates had not turned the area over to Gough and Eyton in

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[74] Ibid., pp. [689]-[690].

September had caused Henry VI, in late October, to order Beaufort, and those under him, to do so immediately. This had not been done by the end of October. Thus Gough and Eyton, the only ones authorized to turn the county over to the French, could not have done so even if they had been present at Le Mans. Molyneux and his colleagues do not appear to have been representing the wishes of Henry VI when they attempted to make a "provision raisonnable," a precondition to the delivery. They had been authorized only to confer on the matter of provision, not on the delivery, and there is no indication that Henry VI had desired the delivery to be executed only after the matter of provisions had been settled.

The fact that the arrangements for the delivery were unable to be completed by Gough and Eyton by November 1 indicates that Henry VI did not exert a strong control over his officers and subjects in France. This display of weak authority over his subjects may have damaged hopes for a permanent peace with the French more than the actual failure of the delivery to be carried out. The French probably realized then, if not before, that they were dealing with a ruler who could not control his own officers. If the promise of 1445 to deliver Maine, with nothing in return except a vague hope of peace, had not already made Henry VI appear weak in the eyes of Charles VII, his inability to carry out this promise certainly did. There is no indication that Henry VI was now unwilling to deliver Maine, although this might have been the case, but only that he did

not command enough authority over his subordinates to do so. Henry VI may also be criticized for failing to safeguard the interests of his subjects in Maine by not exacting from the French more concrete assurances that their losses would be provided for. The attempt of the residents of Maine to secure a settlement with the French for the losses they would suffer, prior to the delivery of the county, though not conforming to the wishes of Henry VI, is certainly understandable. On the other hand, the representatives of Charles VII were probably conforming to the wishes of their king by refusing to discuss the matter of "provision raisonnable" until after the delivery. To have agreed otherwise might have unnecessarily cost their king considerably more. It was probably not coincidental that they arrived in Le Mans on October 31, only one day before the delivery was to be made, and too late to discuss provisions prior to the time of delivery. The opportunity to take advantage of a weak monarch and his peoples could hardly have been ignored by the able Charles VII.

Mathieu Gough met with Dunois, Pierre de Brézé, Précigny, Havart, Guillaume Menypeny, and two others in late December to discuss

> la delivrance de la cite, ville, et chastel du Mans, Maine-la-Juhez [Mayenne-la-Juhais], et des autres villes, places, chasteaulx, et forteresses estans en lobeissance du roy Dangleterre ou conte du Maine.[75]

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[75] Ibid., pp. [710]-[711].

The location of their meeting is not known but was presumably in France, perhaps Le Mans, because of the greater number of Frenchmen present. On December 30, they agreed to a number of matters concerning the delivery of Maine. The French promised to turn over to Gough and Eyton the letters of Charles VII granting René and Charles of Anjou permission to make alliances and treaties with Henry VI. They also agreed to make provisions for those who would suffer losses due to the transfer, and, meanwhile, these people would be allowed to enjoy their gifts and privileges unless they individually made settlements with the French. Gough had requested that he be allowed fifteen days to arrange for the delivery. It was agreed that he and Eyton would have until January 15, 1448, to deliver the

> cite, ville, et chastel du Mans, Maienne-la-Juhez, et autres places dessusdictes, ou de celles quil pourra recouvrer, sans aucune faulte, difficulte, ou dellay.

It was agreed that Gough and Eyton would make a bond within four days guaranteeing delivery by the fifteenth. It was also agreed to continue the present truce, which was apparently dependent on the satisfactory delivery of Maine by November 1, through the fifteen-day period.[76] After the successful delivery of the city, town, and castle of Le Mans, and after the giving of security for the delivery of areas, the agreement

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[76]On February 27, 1447, the truce had been prorogued until January 1, and on July 27, 1447, it had been prorogued until May 1, 1448. However, the latter was apparently dependent on the transfer of Maine by November 1, 1447. See above, p. 185.

signed at Bourges on October 15, 1447, extending the Truce of Tours from May 1, 1448, to January 1, 1449, would then be proclaimed as though the delivery had been made before November 1. The truce prorogation would not apply only in those areas in which the inhabitants remained disobedient. A provision was also agreed on authorizing the subjects of Henry VI to remove their personal property from Maine without hindrance. The officers of Edmund Beaufort were authorized to collect taxes through January 15.[77]

Gough and Eyton apparently encountered difficulty in obtaining custody of the various places in Maine, for delivery was not made by January 15 and Charles VII reluctantly agreed to their request to extend the date of delivery from January 15 to January 20. The two Englishmen also sent a letter to Dunois, Précigny, and Brézé requesting that the delivery be delayed until they obtained an answer to questions they had just sent to Henry VI. The French envoys answered them on January 14. They replied that there was no need for such a delay for the promises and wishes of Henry VI were well known. They stated that the king had already granted an extension of five days in order tc bring about a more satisfactory result to the problem of delivery and to avoid causing hardship to the people of Maine. An additional delay could not be granted, they emphasized, without sufficient cause.[78]

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[77] Ibid., pp. [711]-[717]. On October agreement, see above, pp. 189-90.

[78] "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 175-78.

Thomas Hoo, the English chancellor of France, wrote to Brézé from Rouen on January 20 that he had just learned with great surprise that Charles VII "assemble de jour en jour grant armee de gens, en intencion de faire guerre es pays et subgetz du roy, notre dit seigneur," at Le Mans. He emphasized that, regardless of what may have been said by Eyton or any other person, he should not doubt that the promises of Henry VI concerning Maine would be fulfilled. He urged that nothing drastic be done that might endanger the cause of peace, and he promised that the delivery would be made speedily.[79]

Brézé and some of the other French commissioners went to Rouen in late January or early February to confer with Thomas Hoo on the problem of Maine. They concluded an agreement asserting that if Maine were not delivered by February 8, those holding the town would be considered disobedient and would not be protected by the existing truce. At the request of Hoo and his colleagues the date was extended to February 10. On February 13, Dunois, Brézé, and Précigny appeared before Le Mans with forces totaling perhaps six or seven thousand men. French talks with Gough and Eyton still proved unsatisfactory. The English asserted that they had just received instructions from Henry VI not to deliver the county of Maine until the arrival of additional envoys from England. On February 14 the French agreed to a delay of five days. Meanwhile the English

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[79]Stevenson, I, pp. 198-201.

prepared to defend the town.[80] Thomas Hoo, the English chancellor of France, wrote from Rouen to Brézé on February 18. The letter, received by Brézé at Le Mans on February 21, related the concern of Hoo about the reports he had been receiving that Charles VII planned to lay siege to the city. He noted that an embassy from England, consisting of Adam Moleyns and Robert Roos, had arrived at Harfleur on February 15 and was hastening to Charles VII in order to discuss and settle the various disagreements relating to Le Mans.[81] He urged Brézé to take no aggressive action until after he and the king had conferred with the English envoys.[82] A letter from Henry VI to Charles VII, dated February 1, announcing the new envoys, did not reach the French king at Lavardin until March 6.[83] On March 1, Brézé received a letter from Garter

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[80]The details concerning the events of February at Le Mans are contained in a lengthy letter from Dunois and the other French leaders to Henry VI, explaining the reasons why the French were required to take aggressive measures in the face of disobedient acts on the part of the English present ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 181-92), and also in a letter from the French representatives to the embassy from England that arrived at Lavardin in early March (Ibid., pp. 193-96, see below). The explanatory letter to Henry VI was accompanied by a letter from Charles VII to Henry VI testifying to the insubordination of the English representatives at Le Mans (Stevenson, II, pp. 361-68. Wrongly dated February, 1445.).

[81]This embassy also included Reginald, abbot of Gloucester. They had been commissioned on January 30 to treat for a general peace, a prorogation of the truce, and a postponement of the meeting of the two kings (Rymer, XI, pp. 196-97).

[82]Stevenson, I, pp. 202-206.

[83]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 179-80.

king-at-arms, written at Alençon on February 27, announcing the approach of the English envoys.[84]

The English ambassadors apparently arrived at Lavardin (near Vendôme) in early March, for, on March 11, a number of agreements were arrived at between them and representatives of Charles VII. The commission of Charles VII to Jacques Jouvenel des Ursins, archbishop and duke of Reims, Dunois, Pierre de Brézé, Précigny, and Jean de Mesnil-Simon, seigneur de Maupas and seneschal of Limousin, empowering them to treat with Moleyns and Roos, was signed at Lavardin on March 11.[85] He also granted them a commission to negotiate on the matter of compensation to Henry VI and his subjects for the loss of the county of Maine.[86] On this date the French representatives agreed to pay 24,000 pounds (Livres Tournois) as compensation for the loss of various properties in Maine, in four installments, and also to refrain from levying the usual contributions and taxes from English residents in Maine until April 1, 1451.[87] The Truce of Tours was prorogued to April 1, 1450,[88] and the French promised this would be ratified by Charles VII before the first of June.[89] It was later confirmed by him on April 30.[90]

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[84] Ibid., pp. 197-98.

[85] Rymer, XI, pp. 198-99.

[86] Ibid., p. 203.

[87] Ibid., pp. 203-204.

[88] Ibid., pp. 199-203. See also Stevenson, I, pp. 207-208. On October 15, 1447, it had been prorogated to January 1, 1449.

[89] PRO, Exch. T. R. (Dipl. Doc.) 30/511A.

[90] Rymer, XI, pp. 214-15.

It was also agreed on March 11 that French and English ambassadors would meet in September to treat for a general peace and a meeting of the kings.[91] Moleyns and Roos promised on March 15 that the castle and fortress of Mayenne-le-Juhais would be delivered to the French by March 27.[92]

According to the chroniclers,[93] these events at Lavardin were related to occurrences at Le Mans, though there is no extant correspondence between the English representatives at the two locations. On March 15, Gough and Eyton issued a notarized statement, also signed by Mundeford and many other Englishmen at Le Mans, asserting that Le Mans and the county of Maine were being reluctantly given up only "pro meliori, firmiori, & stabiliori Pace." The statement denied that the cession compromised, in any way, the sovereignty over it held by Henry VI. It also proclaimed that the English king maintained the right to assume full possession if any act contrary to the furtherance of peace should occur.[94] Several hundred English troops had reportedly come to Le Mans in recent weeks. However, only a semblance of resistance to the French blockade and siege of Le Mans continued rather halfheartedly until March 16 when the English capitulated to Dunois and delivered the protest they had signed the day before. According to the chroniclers, the

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[91] Ibid., pp. 210-11. This and the truce prorogation were both confirmed by Henry VI on March 29 (Ibid., pp. 206-10, 210-11).

[92] Stevenson, II, pp. [717]-[718]. [93] See below, p. 212.

[94] Rymer, XI, pp. 204-206.

surrender had been arranged by Moleyns and Roos. The English were allowed to carry out their possessions with them, and were given safe-conducts to Normandy. According to D'Escouchy, the leaders were also given some money by Charles VII.[95] Eyton and Gough certified on March 16 that they had handed various castles over to Brézé and others.[96]

It appears likely that Moleyns and Roos had arranged for the capitulation in return for the safe withdrawal of the English, an extension of the truce, and the other agreements made with Charles VII. Their presence at Lavardin may well have prevented the war from resuming. A concession of Henry VI to promote the chances of a permanent peace had very nearly resulted in a resumption of the war because of his inability to exert authority successfully. That Henry VI was aware of the fact that war might result from the procrastination of his government is indicated by the fact that on March 6 he had taken the precaution of increasing the military power of Edmund Beaufort.[97] The king's mandate noted

> that a grete powere and a mightye seege is laide before oure towne of Maunte, and sharpe werre

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[95]D'Escouchy, I, pp. 128-31. See also Basin, I, pp. 186-88; Le Bouvier (Godefroy ed.), p. 430; Monstrelet [as continued by others], III, pp. 397-98.

[96]PRO, Exch. T. R. (Dipl. Doc.) 30/1637. On June 12 Henry VI declared that Gough and Eyton had performed their duties in Maine satisfactorily and exonerated them of any wrongdoing (Rymer, XI, pp. 215-16).

[97]Stevenson, I, pp. 482-83. See also pp. 479-81.

> dayly made to our subgettes being therin, the whiche is no signe of peas, but a likelyhode to the werre.[98]

This had proven to be the most severe test of the Truce of Tours since its signing four years earlier.

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[98] Ibid., p. 482. Beaufort, earl of Somerset and marquis of Dorset, became the duke of Somerset on March 31, 1448 (Ramsay, II, p. 85).

CHAPTER VII

THE CAPTURE OF FOUGÈRES AND THE FINAL CONFERENCES (1448-49)

The surrender of Maine to the French may have briefly postponed the resumption of the Hundred Years War but it did not increase the chances for lasting peace. Edmund Beaufort, who was made a duke at the end of March, had arrived in Rouen from England in March or April of 1448 to assume his duties as governor and lieutenant-general of France. He had been given funds to compensate the subjects of Henry VI who had left their possessions in Maine. However, apparently little or none of this money reached the refugees.[1] Many of the English garrisons formerly at Le Mans were unable to obtain a place to settle in Normandy. Thus they situated themselves at two abandoned towns, whose fortifications had been destroyed

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[1] Stevenson, II, p. [722]. See also a petition to Henry VI made in 1452 by the former residents of Maine which asserted that they had been reduced to poverty because they had received no compensation for their losses in Maine, and also because by 1452 Normandy had fallen into French hands, causing them to lose what possessions they had carried there (Stevenson, II, pp. [598]-[603]). Later, probably between 1450 and 1453, the duke of Somerset was accused of keeping this money. In 1453 he was committed to the Tower because of his actions in France. He was acquited early in 1455. See Paston Letters, II, p. 290; Rymer, XI, p. 362; Ramsay, II, pp. 137, 168, 179-80.

during the war. St. James de Beuvron and Mortain, both near the Breton border, were taken and refortified before the first of June.[2]

In April Charles VII sent Cousinot and Pierre de Fontenil to Rouen, perhaps to confer on truce infractions or a meeting of the kings. A letter they had carried to Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset, was acknowledged on April 22. Somerset wrote to Charles VII that an embassy from England would arrive shortly.[3] Henry VI had commissioned Somerset, Moleyns, Roos, and Mundeford on April 6 to negotiate with the French on matters relating to a final peace, including a meeting of the kings.[4] However, only Moleyns and Roos journeyed to Tours on about the first of June to confer with the French. At about the same time Charles VII sent Cousinot and Raoul, seigneur de Gaucourt, to Somerset "pour le sommer et requerir quil voulsist faire reparer le dit exces [along the Breton frontier]."[5] Their commission was dated May 20[6] though they may have left slightly

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[2]D'Escouchy, I, pp. 132-34; "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 213 et passim; Le Bouvier (Godefroy ed.), p. 432; Stevenson, I, pp. 210-11, 245; Morice, II, cols. 1430ff. D'Escouchy and Morice also mention the town and castle of Pontorson as being taken. D'Escouchy makes no mention of Mortain. St. James de Beuvron was the location most emphasized in the various sources. The town is still known by its English spelling.

[3]Stevenson, I, pp. 241-42.

[4]Stevenson, II, p. 557n.; Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 378.

[5]Stevenson, I, p. 212.

[6]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 200.

later. Somerset told the two envoys that if they insisted on summoning him he would have to be shown he was at fault before leaving Rouen; otherwise his honor would require him to arrest them. The envoys apparently did not press the issue. Somerset offered to send Mundeford to the two English ambassadors already present at Tours and request them to deal with the matter since they were more familiar with the provisions of the Truce of Tours than he.[7] Meanwhile some minor infractions of the truce were resolved in a treaty concluded with the English by Cousinot and Gaucourt on June 12.[8]

On June 14 Somerset addressed a letter "A tres hault et puissant prince loncle en France du roy, mon souvrain seigneur," i.e., to Charles VII. Cousinot and Gaucourt refused to accept the letter because they considered the styling of the address an insult to their king.[9] Thus the letter was delivered to

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[7]Stevenson, I, pp. 213-14. See also pp. 245-46.

[8]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 201. A commission of Henry VI, dated at Rouen on June 5, had authorized Guillaume Chambellan, Jean Stanlawe, Osburn Mundeford, Jean l'Enfant, and Louis Galet to treat with the French (Ibid., pp. 200-201). The treaty was ratified by Charles VII on June 28 (Ibid., p. 203).

[9]Stevenson, I, pp. 214-16. The styling appears not to have varied greatly from the usual style of address to Charles VII used by other Englishmen. The letter Somerset wrote on April 22 was addressed "A tres hault et tres puissant prince, loncle de France du roy, mon souverain seigneur." The only variation in the letter of June 14 from the usual style was "loncle en France," instead of "loncle de France." Charles VII considered this an insult "par quoy lon ne savoit au vray a qui elles addressoient; attendu que messeigneurs Dorleans, de Bourgoigne et Du Mayne sont 'oncles en France' du dit prince nepveu" (Stevenson, I, pp. 216-17). The letter of June 14 is

the king at Tours by Mundeford. Charles VII refused to receive the letter personally[10] though it was recorded by officials of his government as received on June 27.[11] Somerset proposed in the letter that Charles VII discuss the issue of St. James de Beuvron with Moleyns and Roos who had already come to the Valois monarch's court and who were more familiar with the provisions of the truce. Charles VII expressed his resentment by stating that the matter was an obvious violation of the truce and that there was nothing to discuss. There was only, the French king asserted, a need for the English to undo their aggressive acts. The problem was complicated by the fact that the two envoys had since departed for Brittany, perhaps to discuss the matter with the duke of Brittany. Charles VII offered to discuss the seizure with Roos and Moleyns if Mundeford would venture into Brittany to recall the two. Mundeford refused to do so, however, stating that he had not been empowered to search for them.[12]

Before Roos and Moleyns had left Tours they had obtained a statement from Charles VII, dated June 17, agreeing to a suggestion of Henry VI concerning the conference planned in September. On March 11 it had been agreed that a conference should be held in September between the representatives of the

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in "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 201-202.

[10]Stevenson, I, pp. 214-15.

[11]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 202.

[12]Stevenson, I, pp. 215-16.

two kings. At the suggestion of Henry VI, it was agreed in June that the English representatives would reside at Pont de l'Arche, and the French at Louviers.[13] The actual conference was to be held at a site between the two places. Charles VII also wrote a letter to Henry VI, dated June 14, agreeing to the arrangements suggested by the English king. Henry VI acknowledged this letter on August 20, and expressed his affection for the duke of Brittany, Francis I, and his imprisoned brother Giles. He also asserted his desire for a permanent peace and the settlement of their existing differences.[14]

Relations between Francis I and Henry VI had begun deteriorating almost from the day Francis had become duke of Brittany in August of 1442, following the death of his father, Jean VI. At the same time, ties were being strengthened between Charles VII and the new duke. Previously the dukes of Brittany had followed a somewhat neutral and not always consistent policy regarding the two who claimed to be king of France. Jean V did homage to Charles VII in 1425 and to Henry VI in 1427. Jean VI sent an independent embassy to Arras in 1435. In 1440 he signed a treaty of friendship with Henry VI, promising to allow no Valois forces into his lands. The Breton feud with England stemmed at least partially from

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[13] Rymer, XI, pp. 216-17.

[14] Morice, II, cols. 1429-30. Letter received by Charles VII on September 24. Giles had been imprisoned by Francis in 1446; see below.

the unrecognized claim of Francis I to the earldom of Richmond in England.[15] The ravaging of parts of Brittany by the late duke of Somerset, John Beaufort, though denounced by Henry VI, also fomented differences. At Tours in 1444, probably as an expedient concession by Suffolk, he was recognized as a vassal of Charles VII.[16] In March of 1446 Francis I did homage to Charles VII and was granted an amnesty by the Valois ruler for the various agreements his father had made with Henry VI. Meanwhile Giles became more closely allied with English interests. Giles was arrested in Brittany for his Anglophile activities in 1446. By 1448 the English had on several occasions, including on August 20 in the letter noted above to Charles VII, attempted to gain his release. However the conflict was not over the imprisonment of Giles as much as it was over the vassalage of Brittany, and this depended at least partially on who was the king of France, Henry VI or Charles VII. Various border disputes between the inhabitants of Brittany and Normandy increased tensions even before the refortification of St. James de Beuvron. By the end of 1448 English ties with Brittany were virtually extinguished. The English resented the imprisonment of Giles and, like the Bretons, were preparing for an outbreak of hostilities. The policies of Francis

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[15] See PPC, VI, pp. 1-23 et passim.

[16] The duke of Brittany had been named with the other princes of the blood as a subject of Charles VII in the Truce of Tours. See É. Cosneau, Traités de la guerre de cent ans, p. 163.

may also have been influenced by the fact that he was married to a Scottish princess, Elizabeth, second daughter of James I of Scotland. Francis was less interested than Charles VII in maintaining peace with England. Whereas his father had worked for peace between the two kings in 1439, Francis abandoned any sort of neutrality and upset whatever balance of power had formerly existed between the rival kings. The failure of the English to follow a conciliatory policy towards Francis I, if it had actually been possible to do so, meant that, except possibly for the duke of Burgundy, who still followed a somewhat independent course, all of the princes of the blood had come closer than ever to supporting the Valois throne.[17]

On August 22 Charles VII sent the herald Valois to Henry VI with a letter and also detailed instructions concerning the recent difficulties with the duke of Somerset. Valois was instructed to relate to Henry VI that, since the arrival in France of Somerset, St. James de Beuvron had been taken and fortified, and that, when Charles VII sent envoys to complain of the occurrence, they were threatened with arrest. He was also to assert that Somerset had addressed Charles VII in a derogatory manner and to relate the refusal of Mundeford to follow the French king's suggestion to seek Moleyns and Roos.

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[17] A. Bourdeaut, "Gilles de Bretagne -- Entre la France et l'Angleterre -- Les causes et les auteurs du drame," Mémoires de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Bretagne, I (1920), pp. 53-145; Morice, II, cols. 1288 et passim; Lobineau, II, cols. 1043ff. For the homage of Francis I to Charles VII and the king's amnesty see Lobineau, II, cols. 1081-83.

He was to note that letters of marque had been issued under Henry's seal by Ogorot de St. Pierre against the subjects of the Valois monarch. Charles VII then instructed Valois to ask Henry VI for reparations. Valois was told to relate that the French king would do his utmost to suppress murder and violence along the frontiers and to live up to the provisions of the truce.[18] Valois probably did not arrive in England before the first of September and he could not have departed from England before October 9, for he was given a letter of that date from Henry VI to Charles VII.[19]

Meanwhile on August 18 Henry VI commissioned a delegation to meet with the representatives of Charles VII to prorogue the truce and arrange for a meeting of the kings.[20] The conference opened near Louviers on Saturday, August 24, although it had been planned for September.[21] Only a portion of the

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[18] Stevenson, I, pp. 209-20. See also p. 246. The letters of marque were not mentioned in Havart's instructions but they were noted in Henry's reply of October 9 and in a letter from Henry to Ogorot on October 3 ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 205-207, 209; see below, p. 224). Nothing is known of Ogorot other than that he was a squire and a subject of Henry VI.

[19] Ibid., p. 579n.; "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 207-10. See below, p. 224.

[20] Rymer, XI, pp. 223-24. Those commissioned were Raoul Roussel, archbishop of Rouen, Adam Moleyns, bishop of Chichester and keeper of the privy seal, John Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury, William Neville (Lord Fauconberg), Reginald, abbot of Gloucester, and Robert Roos.

[21] A Breton protocol of the conference by Michel de Partenay (Partheney), in Latin, is in Morice, II, cols. 1430-37.

English commissioned are known to have been at the conference. Those present were Moleyns and the abbot of Gloucester. The French subjects of Henry VI who participated were Guillaume Chambellan and Louis Galet. The French representatives were Charles, seigneur de Culant, Jean Beson, Cousinot, and Jean Herbert, the king's secretary. Michel de Partenay (Partheney) represented the duke of Brittany. Rather than discuss plans for a meeting of the two kings, they discussed recent violations of the Truce of Tours and, in particular, the matter of St. James de Beuvron.

Cousinot asserted that the duke of Brittany had protested to his lord, Charles VII, over the English fortification of St. James de Beuvron and certain other places. He demanded that the English make reparation for these violations of the truce and stated that the French could not proceed further in negotiating a permanent peace until this was done.[22]

Moleyns assured the French that Henry VI wished to observe the provisions of the truce and would rectify any infractions that had actually occurred. However, he asserted, St. James de Beuvron had always been an English possession and it was not even on the French frontier but, rather, on the Breton frontier. Therefore, he said, it was a matter to be resolved between Henry VI and his vassal, the duke of Brittany, and was of no concern to the French. He suggested that the French should dismantle various places they had fortified

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[22]Morice, II, cols. 1430-31.

near English-held territory. He then cited several places, generally near Normandy.[23]

Cousinot replied that the duke of Brittany was a subject of Charles VII, not of Henry VI, and he cited the fact that the Breton duke had been so identified in the Truce of Tours which the English king had affirmed. He also noted that the places cited by Moleyns had not been recently refortified but had been so since before the truce. However he offered to dismantle these places if the English would dismantle the newly constructed defenses at St. James de Beuvron and Mortain.[24]

Moleyns stated that he had no power to conclude such an agreement and would have to consult with the king and the duke of Somerset. He also noted the need for defenses because of recent aggressive acts by the Bretons on both land and sea. Michel de Partenay, the envoy of Francis I, interrupted the talks on at least two occasions to state that the Breton duke considered himself a vassal of Charles VII, rather than of Henry VI, and that the Valois ambassadors had been authorized to represent the interests of Brittany at the conference. He also accused the English of committing aggressive acts against Breton ships. At the close of the conference the French demanded to no avail that satisfaction be made by the English for the aggressive acts against Brittany on both land and sea.

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[23] Ibid., cols. 1431-32. These included newly fortified places at or near Granville, Ivry, Louviers, and Beauchamps (Bauchem).

[24] Ibid., cols. 1432-35.

Plans were probably made at this conference for a resumption of talks near the site in November.[25]

On October 9, Henry VI answered the messages from Charles VII which the herald, Valois, had brought to England in late August.[26] As was customary, he expressed the usual pleasure over the good health of his uncle and stated his desire for peace. Henry VI then expressed his displeasure over the refusal of Mundeford to follow the suggestion of the Valois king that he seek out Moleyns and Roos so that the matter of St. James de Beuvron could be resolved. He expressed his hope that the matter could be settled and stated that he had written the duke of Somerset, charging him to resolve the differences.[27] He also wrote that he had not authorized the letters of marque against the subjects of Charles VII to be issued under his seal by Ogorot de St. Pierre and wrote a separate

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[25] Ibid., cols. 1431-36. There is no indication in the protocol of the date the conference ended, though the length of the protocol indicates that it probably lasted only a few days. According to a letter from Somerset to Charles VII, dated February 28, 1449, it lasted into September. This letter also indicates some of the truce violations that Moleyns complained about (Stevenson, I, pp. 223-25). Subsequent events suggest that plans were made at this conference for a resumption of talks in November (see below).

[26] The herald, Valois, had left August 22 with a letter to Henry VI, and also with detailed instructions to protest the recent actions of Somerset and Mundeford relating to St. James de Beuvron (Stevenson, I, pp. 209-220; see above, pp. 220-21).

[27] "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 207-10. For the letter to Ogorot see pp. 205-207. Charles VII received the letter on October 30. Also see above, p. 221.

letter to Ogorot on October 3 ordering him to retract it. A copy of his letter to Somerset was enclosed.[28]

The letter to Somerset from Henry VI had been written on October 3. He related the messages brought by Valois. He stressed to Somerset his desire for "bonne paix avec nostre dit oncle, par tous bons, raisonnables et honorables moyens," his wish that the provisions of the Truce of Tours be observed, and his belief that if any action contrary to the truce is made or attempted by either side, reparations should be made. He recognized that it was difficult because of the distance for him and his Council to deal directly with the problems that had arisen. Thus, he said, he charged Somerset and those under him to resolve the disagreements that had arisen with "prudence et bonne diligence."[29]

Garter, king-at-arms, was sent by Somerset and the English ambassadors in France to Henry VI and his Council in the latter part of October to obtain further instructions on how the English should proceed in the talks that were to resume in November. On October 30, the king and his Council answered the following three questions which had been asked by Garter:

> [1] FURST forasmoche as it hath ben accustumed in other instructions the commissarys to use tharticles of thair instructions in such ordre as it seemed them moost expedient, that it like the King to declare what his ambassatours shal doe at this time.

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[28] See Stevenson, I, p. 246.

[29] "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 204-205.

> [2] ITEM how men shall demene thaim anenst the commissaries of Bretaigne sithen they wol not intend but in compaigny of the Kings uncle.
>
> [3] ITEM as to tharticle to keep the matiere from rupture, how and by what mean the said ambassatours shall mowe [should] soe do.

The king and his Council answered the first question by stating that, since the ambassadors may be familiar with matters not known in England, "thay kepe such ordre as shall be thought to thair discretions moost expedient." In answer to the more delicate second question, the ambassadors were instructed not to do anything that would prejudice the king's claim that the duke of Brittany was his vassal. They should attempt to confer with the Breton representatives separately and insist they be included "as partie with the King" in any treaty. However, "rather than the principall tretee shall be letted, use and make such protestation or protestations as shall be thought to thair discretions covenable and behovefull to eschew" any prejudice against the claims of Henry VI. The king and his Council stated that the ambassadors were probably more familiar than they themselves were with solutions to the third question. However, they stated, one of the means to prevent rupture

> might be to entend to prorogation of thaire assamble to as long a day and tyme as shal mowe [might] be accorded between thaim, under the which prorogacon theambassat^{rs} of either party shal mowe [should] resort agen to their princes and make report unto thaim of communications had betwix the said ambassato^{rs} and of the difficultees that they feel in the matiers, the which time hanging, either of the princes shall mowe [should or could] if it like them send to other for easing of the said difficultees or sum other good and godly wayes

be found by the which the matiere shall be kept in good hope and out of rupture.[30]

The conference first begun near Louviers on August 24 was resumed on November 2 at Léry and Vandreuil between Louviers and Pont de l'Arche.[31] Serious discussions did not begin until November 11 when Charles d'Artois, count of Eu, Guillaume Chartres, bishop of Paris, and Charles, seigneur de Culant, arrived. The other French ambassadors, all of whom arrived earlier, were Cousinot, Beson, and Herbert. The latter three had also attended the August 24th conference. Present for the English were Raoul Roussel, archbishop of Rouen, Moleyns, Fauconberg and Roos. Near the end of the conference, which lasted until November 29, they were joined by Reginald, abbot of Gloucester, Mundeford, Galet, and John Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury. The last three had not been present at the August 24th conference and were all closely identified with the militant activities of the English inhabitants of France. All of the English subjects present, except Mundeford and Galet, had been named ambassadors by Henry VI in his commission of August 18. Francis of Brittany was again represented by Michel de Partenay. Three ambassadors of the duke of Burgundy, Pierre de Goux, Oudart Chuperel (Chupel), and Jean d'Auby, were also present.[32]

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[30] PPC, VI, pp. 62-64.

[31] The sites included the church of Saint Ouen in Léry, the manor of Rouville (in Morice, col. 1439, as "valle Rodolii") in Léry, and the hôpital de Vandreuil ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 210-11).

[32] Morice, II, cols. 1439-41 (a Breton protocol of the

On November 15, according to the Breton protocol, Moleyns declared that he and his colleagues had only been authorized to treat with the ambassadors of Charles VII, not with those of the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany. He declared that both of these dukes were vassals of Henry VI. This was disputed by the ambassadors of Charles VII and also by those of the two dukes. They declared the two dukes to be the vassals and subjects of Charles VII and asserted that the representatives of the dukes were only present to assist the royal envoys.[33] As is well known, both of the dukes were independent of effective control by either of the kings. Philip was released from his oaths to Henry VI by the papal representatives at Arras in 1435. By the treaty signed there he had certain obligations to Charles VII but was not required to do homage, although his successors were. The role of the Burgundian diplomats at this conference is not clear. As the representatives of the duke of Brittany did, they also professed to be part of the Valois delegation.[34] Burgundian relations had remained proper, but not overly friendly, with Charles VII. The Burgundian policy at this conference was probably one of greater neutrality than was the Breton policy. Philip was fairly conciliatory to Charles VII at this time perhaps because of his ambitions in

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talks held on November 15); "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 210-11; Rymer, XI, pp. 223-25; Beaucourt, IV, p. 319.

[33]Morice, II, cols. 1439-41. [34]Ibid.

the Empire. He did not wish to anger the French king at the same time he was obtaining various lands at the expense of the German princes. Disagreements still existed between Charles VII and Philip over the failure of the French king to live up to all the provisions of the Treaty of Arras. Philip wished to create a new Lotharingia. In 1446, as duke of Brabant, he added to his title, "par la grace de Dieu." Though Charles VII resented this, he granted permission in January of 1449 for the duke to use it.[35] The title was common among the princes of the Empire, but not used among the French princes of the blood. Thus Philip's relationship to Charles in 1448 was one of independence, but not such as to threaten the prestige of the Valois king. Meanwhile his commercial relations with England were worsening because of the desire of his cloth-producing provinces to prohibit the importation of English cloth into the Low Countries and the Hanse cities.[36]

The conference lasted until November 29. The delegations recognized that they were unable to resolve the various disputes that had arisen. They signed a treaty on November 25 agreeing that Charles VII would send an embassy to England before May 15, 1449, to engage in negotiations for a final peace. This proposed meeting never took place; after this conference

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[35]Leonard, pp. 44-45. On Philip's ambition to create a new kingdom see also Calmette, p. 138 et passim.

[36]Plancher, "Preuves," IV, pp. clxxv et passim; Kerling, pp. 51, 77-80; Calmette, pp. 154ff; Beaucourt, IV, pp. 333ff. See below, pp. 276-77, concerning his commercial relations with England.

relations deteriorated further.[37] The conference in November was to be the last one during the truce which was led by blood princes and prominent clerics.

Several letters were exchanged by Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset, and Charles VII during February, March, and April of 1449. They both complained of treaty infractions on the part of the subjects of the other and demanded satisfaction for them. On February 24 the Valois king complained to Somerset about the fortification of St. James de Beuvron, summoning him to demolish the fortifications and to pay reparations.[38] Somerset replied on March 9 that he was sending Thomas de Louraille and Jean Cousin, both from the chamber of accounts at Rouen, to discuss more fully how he believed the matter should be resolved.[39] According to the French, Louraille and Cousin informed Charles VII of Somerset's regrets and asserted that the English duke would never threaten a Valois fortification, even if it were without sufficient protection. In the presence of Louraille and Cousin, Charles VII appointed

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[37]Rymer, XI, pp. 223-25. This treaty was ratified by Henry VI on February 1, 1449 (Ibid., p. 225). It made no mention of the representatives of the dukes of Brittany and Burgundy. At this conference, or shortly afterwards, Mundeford, now treasurer of Normandy, and Louis Galet met with Jean de Noucelles and Jean Beson to complain of various French infractions of the treaty, according to a letter of Somerset, dated February 28, 1449, to Charles VII (Stevenson, I, p. 226).

[38]Indicated in the letter of Somerset to Charles VII, dated March 9, 1449 (Stevenson, I, pp. 233-35).

[39]Stevenson, I, pp. 233-35. This letter was received at Tours on March 19.

Cousinot and Pierre de Fontenil to go to Somerset at Rouen and make arrangements for reparations for all of the acts of violence which had been committed.[40]

On February 28 Somerset had complained to Charles VII of numerous acts of violence against the subjects of Henry VI. The more serious charges were that a large amount of wine was stolen at Quévreville (Cuerarville) near Pont de l'Arche by Robin de Floques (Floquet), and that several Englishmen had been jailed and killed without cause at Dieppe. The first charge had been discussed, but not resolved, at the conferences in August and November. Somerset demanded Charles VII "faire et donner en la matere si bonne et briefue provision et reparacion."[41] This letter was answered by Charles VII on March 16. The French king said that he had sent investigators to Dieppe to gain information on the truth of the charges, and stated his desire to remain at peace.[42] Somerset replied on April 7. The English duke thanked him for the reception given Louraille and Cousin. He noted that since Cousinot and Fontenil, envoys of Charles VII, were on their way to Rouen, he would not write more until later.[43]

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[40] Ibid., pp. 247-48. This is noted in a long remonstrance made in April by the French which attacked English aggressions (pp. 243-64).

[41] Ibid., pp. 223-32. This letter was received by Charles VII on March 11.

[42] According to letter of Somerset to Charles VII, dated April 7, 1449 (Ibid., pp. 236-38).

[43] Ibid., pp. 236-38. Louraille and Cousin had probably

Cousinot and Fontenil were in Rouen by April 16.[44] They made arrangements with Somerset for Mundeford and Galet to wait at Avranches in order to confer with Jean Beson and Jean de Noucelles, envoys of Charles VII, who would be at Granville and Mont St. Michel, on the matter of reparations for all of the acts of violence recently committed. This conference was disrupted by an English act of aggression, described below, which occurred on March 24. When Galet and Mundeford were informed of this subsequent truce violation, they left the conference.[45]

Meanwhile, Charles VII, not satisfied with his correspondence with the duke of Somerset, also wrote to Henry VI three times during the months of February and March. In late February he sent a letter by the herald Valois to Henry VI complaining that Somerset refused to satisfy the French demand that the fortifications at St. James de Beuvron and Mortain be dismantled and reparations be made for these violations of the Truce of Tours.[46]

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informed Somerset of the approaching embassy upon their return. This letter was received by Charles VII on April 18.

[44]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 216-17.

[45]Stevenson, I, pp. 248-50. Cousinot and Fontenil were still at Rouen when word was received of the March 24th aggression (see below, pp. 235-36). Jean de Noucelles should not be confused with Thomas Scales, lord of Nucelles, a subject of Henry VI.

[46]Indicated in letter of Henry VI to Charles VII, dated March 18, 1449 ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 212-16).

Henry VI replied on March 18 that he desired peace with his uncle and that he would, if Charles VII preferred, send ambassadors to Pont de l'Arche before May 15, rather than require the French ambassadors to come to England. Since recent conferences had been held in France, Henry VI could expect, as had been agreed, that the next conference be held in England. However, this gesture was apparently made by him not only to indicate his sincere desire for peace but also to facilitate the settling of disputes which had arisen in the regions of France near Pont de l'Arche. This letter was received at the court of Charles VII on April 18.[47] However, as will be noted, intervening events prevented the May conference from being held. Charles VII also wrote letters to Henry VI on March 17 and 23. These letters, which were received by Henry VI on April 28, also complained of violations of the truce by Somerset.[48]

Somerset recognized that his policies toward the Valois and Breton governments might well lead to war. Indeed, it appears by his terse correspondence with Charles VII that he wished the war to resume. Perhaps he hoped for a resumption of hostilities so that Maine might be regained, and he and

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[47] "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 212-16. Henry VI had not yet received the approval of Charles VII to change the site of the May 15 conference to Pont de l'Arche. He granted letters of safe-conduct on March 22 to the archbishop of Reims, Culant, Précigny, Dunois, and Cousinot (Rymer, XI, pp. 227-28).

[48] These letters are mentioned in a letter from Henry VI to Charles VII, dated May 3, 1449 ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, pp. 218-25).

his lieutenants gain rewards. He recognized that English defenses needed strengthening but probably did not realize how superior the Valois forces really were. He sent the abbot of Gloucester to Parliament in February of 1449 for additional money and supplies to defend Normandy. The abbot related the great number of murders and other crimes being committed along the Norman frontier by the subjects of Charles VII, a number probably not exceeded by those committed by the English. He also noted some of the extensive military reforms and build-ups in Valois France and asserted that the people of Normandy were too impoverished to provide adequately for their defense against such strong forces. He also reminded the members of Parliament that the truce with Charles VII expired on April 1, 1450, and argued that war could be expected at that time, if not earlier. There is no record of Parliament appropriating any funds for the defense of Normandy.[49]

Charles VII strove to conciliate Henry VI by blaming the recent infractions, not on the king himself, but on Somerset and his other subjects in France. This approach allowed an amicable correspondence between the two kings to continue, at least temporarily. However, Charles VII held no illusions that peace was likely, or attainable, even if he really desired it. As was noted previously, he had, since the Truce of Tours, carried out very extensive reforms in the French military establishment. It is doubtful that a Valois king had ever been

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[49] Rot. Parl., V, pp. 147-48.

so well prepared to wage war. This was not merely a defensive force to be used only if Valois France should be attacked. Charles VII was ready to resume the war and gain all the English portions of France as soon as the English provided him with a colorable pretext. In September of 1448 he had announced to the bourgeoisie of Reims that he intended to recover Normandy.[50] The recent incursions of the English into Brittany and the demands of Somerset had probably indicated to him that such a justification for war would be provided shortly. However, it is difficult to understand, in view of the military strength of the French and the weakness of the English, why the English would provide the Valois monarch with such an excuse. Yet it was provided on March 24, 1449. On this day occurred the most serious act of aggression committed by either side since the signing of the Truce of Tours. Forces under the leadership of François de Surienne, often called "L'Arragonais," seized and sacked the town of Fougères, a rich woolen-cloth manufacturing town in Brittany near the Norman frontier.

Cousinot and Fontenil had arrived at Rouen on April 7 to negotiate for reparations because of the fortification of St. James de Beuvron and other acts previously denounced by the French. Except for four or five days at Easter they were there until April 22. According to a French account written

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[50]Vallet de Viriville, Histoire de Charles VII, III, p. 144.

in late July, they warned Somerset, after word was received about the seizure of Fougères, of the possible consequences, including the resumption of war, if immediate reparation for Fougères were not made.[51] The English denied at a conference in late June that these two envoys even brought up the matter of Fougères.[52]

This flagrant violation of the truce was not merely the act of one soldier of fortune. It had extensive support from the English garrisons in Normandy and from Somerset. Plans for the attack and seizure apparently went back to late in 1447 when François de Surienne became a knight of the Garter in London. According to a statement made to Henry VI in 1450 by François, he also discussed the matter extensively with Suffolk. According to François, Suffolk was angry at recent Breton policies, particularly the persecution of Giles. He recounted in detail the aid and encouragement he received from both Suffolk and Somerset, and also recalled a letter from Henry VI urging his diligence in the matter. He was critical of Somerset for not coming forth with the military support he had been promised, and lamented that he was required to surrender the place in

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[51] Stevenson, I, p. 250. See also Blondel, De Reductione Normanniae in Narratives of the Expulsion of the English from Normandy, M.CCCC.XLIX.--M.CCCC.L., ed. Joseph Stevenson ("Rolls Series," no. 32), pp. 9-14 (hereafter referred to as Blondel). Easter was on April 13.

[52] Conferences between the Ambassadors of France and England in Narratives of the Expulsion of the English, pp. 420-21. Hereafter referred to as Conferences.

November after a siege of several weeks by the duke of Brittany.[53] According to Kingsford, the testimony of François is "so circumstantial that it is difficult to acquit Suffolk of all complicity, though his original consent may have been given at a time when affairs were less critical."[54] Suffolk's support may have had some small justification in 1447, but in view of his other policies it is difficult to accept the belief that he still supported this action in 1449 when relations with Charles VII had deteriorated much further.[55]

Though Suffolk may not have supported the enterprise of François in 1449, Somerset most certainly did. He helped gain supplies for François and, after the seizure of Fougères according to the Spanish adventurer, Somerset was "plus joyeux de

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[53]Stevenson, I, pp. 278-98. This statement was sent to Henry VI along with the Garter. François also wrote to Charles VII early in 1450 that he was no longer in the employ of the English king and should be considered a subject of the king of Aragon (Stevenson, I, pp. 275-77).

François was angered by the lack of English support while beseiged in the autumn by large forces led by Francis I. He held the town from October 16 to November 5 when he received a payment of 10,000 écus and marched out (Cosneau, Richemont, p. 403). The lack of English aid is understandable since they were also losing Normandy at this time, Rouen having fallen on October 19.

[54]Kingsford, p. 166.

[55]Accounts of the seizure are contained in most of the chronicles: Basin, I, pp. 193-97; D'Escouchy, I, pp. 154-59; Hall, p. 211; Monstrelet (as continued by others), III, pp. 402-404; Wavrin, V, pp. 120-23; Chartier, II, pp. 60-65; Blondel, pp. 4-7; [Jacques le Bouvier], Le Recouvrement de Normandie, par Berry, herault du Roy, in Narratives of the Expulsion of the English, pp. 239-40 (hereafter referred to as [Le Bouvier]).

la dicte prise que qui lui eust donne cent mil escus dor."[56] Thus he compounded the belligerent activities at St. James de Beuvron and Mortain by an act considerably more aggressive. This act could have led to an immediate resumption of hostilities, but Charles VII followed a more conciliatory course, perhaps in order to gain time to prepare for war.[57] According to various French chroniclers, Somerset disclaimed any responsibility for the seizure of Fougères, but answered to the French ambassadors that he was glad it happened, would not wish it otherwise, and would not attempt to get it returned.[58] Also, according to some of the chroniclers, Francis of Brittany sent his herald-at-arms to Somerset and received a similarly unsatisfactory reply.[59] However, there is no documentation to support these assertions that Somerset expressed his pleasure at the seizure to the Valois and Breton ambassadors. It seems more likely that Somerset expressed his regrets but refrained from making any reparations.[60] It is difficult to understand why

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[56]Stevenson, I, p. 288. See also Conferences, p. 416 et passim.

[57]Somerset was apparently asked later to justify his actions concerning Fougères. He was accused of telling François not to surrender the city, even if later letters from him should say to do so (Stevenson, II, pp. [718]-[722]; see below, pp. 298-99).

[58][Le Bouvier], p. 241; Wavrin, V, p. 120; Blondel, pp. 9-14.

[59][Le Bouvier], pp. 241-42; Wavrin, V, p. 121. The Breton embassy to Somerset is also mentioned in Charles VII's instructions to an ambassador going to London in June ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 231).

[60]See below and D'Escouchy, I, pp. 156-58; Monstrelet,

Somerset, who was responsible for the defense of Normandy, appeared to give Charles VII an excuse for attacking Normandy, at least before the English were better prepared.

On April 23, perhaps before word was received at Rouen of the seizure of Fougères, Somerset sent Jean l'Enfant and Jean Hanneford[61] to negotiate on various treaty violations that had not yet been resolved in the talks with Cousinot and Fontenil. The latter two had returned to Charles on April 22, apparently not before, as has been noted, they had had an opportunity to protest the seizure of Fougères. They had been at Rouen since April 7, except for a few days at Easter.[62] L'Enfant and Hanneford arrived at the Valois court at Razillé on May 1. They were also apparently commissioned to protest a recent unsuccessful attempt, perhaps in retaliation for Fougères, by the French to seize Mantes and other places.[63] They were informed by members of the Valois court[64] of the

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III, pp. 402-403; Basin, I, pp. 198-99. The chroniclers are confusing and contradictory on the sequence of events. They appear less reliable than the documents on these matters; yet they do provide details on the Breton reaction to the seizure of Fougères not noted elsewhere (see below, p. 242).

[61] L'Enfant was a doctor of law and "president en la court du conseil de Normandie tenu à Rouen." Hanneford was a knight.

[62] "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 216-18; Stevenson, I, p. 250; Conferences, pp. 419-21. Easter was on April 13.

[63] Conferences, pp. 421-22. Razillé was a royal castle near Chinon. Their lettre de créance was received on May 2 ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 217-18).

[64] These details of their conversations at the Valois

events at Fougères and told to relate these events to Somerset upon their return to Rouen, "et incontinent le feist reparer ou autrement il en pourroit avenir inconvenient." Charles VII denied that the assault on Mantes had been with his permission. They were also asked to inform Somerset that "tantost apres" Charles VII would send representatives to Louviers "veoir et savoir se le dits attemptaz auroient este reparez." L'Enfant and Hanneford requested Charles VII to promise that the places belonging to Henry VI would be secure from attack and all acts of violence would cease. Somerset in return would make the same assurances concerning places belonging to Charles VII. The king or, more likely, his advisors answered that the duke of Brittany was a great prince and was related to various great lords. He also had many soldiers and others in his service. It might seem reasonable, the Valois asserted, that they would attempt "revanchier la grant injure et dommaige que len avoit faite a mon dit seigneur de Bretaigne a la dite prinse de Fougeres." While Charles VII refused to give any surety to the English possessions in France, members of his court observed that he would command nothing to be done by open force. However, the Valois courtiers suggested, the English guard well their strongholds and they would do likewise. L'Enfant

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court are taken mainly from a Valois speech made on or about July 31 to justify the later actions of Charles VII (Stevenson, I, pp. 252-53), and the instructions given by Charles VII to Havart in June before his departure on an embassy to Henry VI ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 225-39; see especially pp. 232-37).

and Hanneford were advised again that Charles VII was sending two ambassadors to Louviers, Culant and Cousinot, to see about reparations for Fougères "et des autres attemptas."[65]

On May 13, Charles VII wrote a letter to Somerset which may have been taken back to Rouen by l'Enfant and Hanneford. The king asserted that it had always been his wish to observe fully the Truce of Tours, and he noted that no infringement of the truce had occurred, as Somerset fully knew, on the part of his subjects. He also stated that aside from Fougères, an enormous and obvious violation of the truce, scant provision had been made for earlier English violations. The king observed that Henry VI had twice suggested that such matters be taken up with Somerset as his chief representative in France. Charles VII stated that Somerset well knew how matters now stood and of the dangers inherent in further delay. He observed:

> Vous scavez ce que la treve porte, et cognoissez ce qui est a faire par raison touchant ladite matiere.

The king related that Somerset's ambassadors had informed him of the duke's desire for peace and the preservation of the truce, and announced that he intended to send some members of his Council to Louviers or Évreux to see what had already been done to rectify the recent violations of the truce. He concluded by stating that he would so act that all would know of

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[65]Stevenson, I, pp. 252-53; "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 232-37; Conferences, pp. 421-25, 458-62.

his desire for the blessing of peace and the preservation of the truce.[66]

Culant and Cousinot were commissioned by Charles VII on May 27 to go to Louviers, Évreux, or elsewhere in either English-held or French-held lands to negotiate and agree to a settlement of all matters which had recently risen to jeopardize the truce. Although their instructions probably limited the extent to which they could go, their commission, as was more customary for the French than the English, obligated Charles VII to accept fully any agreement that they might make.[67]

According to various chroniclers, some time during April Francis of Brittany sent an embassy consisting of Robert de la Rivière (de Riparia), bishop of Rennes,[68] and the seigneur de Gaimine (Guemenay), the chancellor of Brittany, to Charles VII to ask for his aid, as his lord, in regaining Fougères and obtaining reparations for the damages done against his people. Charles VII replied, according to the various chroniclers, that he would support the claims of his vassal against the English. First, however, Charles preferred to request just reparation

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[66] Conferences, pp. 383-85.

[67] Conferences, pp. 379-83; Stevenson, I, p. 253. This difference between the English and French over the delegation of authority may indicate that the French king and his ambassadors had a better defined foreign policy than the English. The vagaries of English foreign policy kept Henry's ambassadors from being given too much power. In England the Council provided leadership; in France, the king.

[68] Fougères was in the diocese of Rennes.

from Somerset and Henry VI. If, following the return of his ambassadors to Rouen and London, this did not succeed, he would support the just claims of Francis by such more extreme means as was necessary.[69] The embassy to London to which the chroniclers referred was the embassy of Jean Havart which left for England on or about June 3.[70] Also on this date Charles VII commissioned Dunois, Précigny, and a secretary, Étienne Chevalier, to go to Rennes and conclude an alliance against the English with Francis I.[71] They concluded a treaty on June 17 in which the king agreed to aid the Bretons in their claims against the English and the Bretons pledged their support if the war resumed.[72] By late June Charles VII had also provided three hundred lancers to the Bretons under Valois command to insure against new aggressions.[73] The Bretons began to prepare for war. One of the two great French feudatories was finally entirely within the Valois camp. Among the French princes of the blood only the duke of Burgundy remained somewhat

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[69]Blondel, pp. 14-17; [Le Bouvier], p. 243; Wavrin, V, pp. 121-22; D'Escouchy, I, p. 158; Monstrelet, III, pp. 402-403.

[70]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 239.

[71]Ibid., p. 241.

[72]The treaty was confirmed by Francis I on July 17 and by Charles VII on June 26. It has been printed in: Leonard, I, pp. 45-46; Du Mont, III, pt. 1, col. 167; Morice, II, col. 1508; Lobineau, II, col. 1099. Those in Leonard and Du Mont appear abridged.

[73]Morice, II, col. 1452; Blondel, pp. 21ff. The lancers probably had retinues which increased the number of men beyond three hundred.

aloof. As will be shown, he too gave his support a few weeks later. The French king had long striven for national unity and especially for unqualified support from the princes of the blood. With unintended English help this dream was now becoming a reality.

Charles VII gave diplomatic instructions to Jean Havart on June 3 for the planned embassy to London. The French diplomat also carried letters addressed to Henry VI and to Margaret of Anjou, which did little more than express the Valois monarch's strong desire for peace and for a satisfactory solution to the difficulties which had arisen.[74] However, the instructions to Havart were very explicit in what he was to say to the English monarch concerning recent developments, and particularly concerning the circumstances surrounding the capture of Fougères. Havart was instructed to recount in detail the various difficulties the envoys of Charles VII had encountered in attempting to resolve the matters of St. James de Beuvron and Mortain during the winter of 1448-49 with Somerset and his representatives, and to remind Henry VI that he had earlier suggested that all matters relating to truce violations be referred to Somerset.[75] He then was to relate how

> messire François l'Arragonois, chevalier de l'ordre de la Jarretière, du grant conseil dudit prince

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[74]Beaucourt, "Pièces justificatives," Histoire de Charles VII, IV, pp. 456-67.

[75]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 225-29.

> neveu deçà la mer, son pensionnaire, son vassal aiant charge et gouvernement des places et de gens soubz lui, accompaigné de grant nombre de gens de guerre de l'obeissance dudit prince neveu, de guet apensé et par conspiracion de long temps pourgectée, est venu prandre le chastel et ville de Fougières, appartenant à monseigneur le duc de Bretaigne, subget et obeissant du Roy [Charles VII], et comprins nommément, lui, ses pais et subgets en sa treve; et en iceulx chastel et ville, tué gens, violé femmes, prins prisonniers, pillé, robé et fait maulx innumerables, et non pas seulement en chose que touchoit les gens seculiers, mais en reliquaires, joyaulx et autres biens appartenans à l'eglise.[76]

Havart was also instructed to relate that Somerset had erroneously claimed that the duke of Brittany was not a vassal of Charles VII, but rather of Henry VI. The Valois envoy was to note that the dukes of Brittany had long done homage to the kings of France and that Henry VI had recognized this practice in the Truce of Tours. He was to note in detail the various unsatisfactory diplomatic encounters with Somerset since the seizure of Fougères, and to warn of the possible consequences if Charles VII was forced to resort to war in defense of a vassal. He was to emphasize the Valois monarch's great desire that a reasonable and honorable solution be found so that friendly relations might be restored.[77]

Unfortunately, there is no indication of what response Havart received at the English court, nor, indeed, is there any indication that he ever reached the court.[78] If he did

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[76] Ibid., p. 229.

[77] Ibid., pp. 229-39.

[78] Unless the questions that were later suggested to be asked of Somerset were a result of his embassy (Stevenson, II, [718-22]).

reach the English court, Henry VI must have been indecisive for no attempt is known to have occurred in England to rectify the deteriorating relations with Charles VII.

Charles VII and Francis I were not required to rely solely upon diplomatic procedures to gain restitution for Fougères. On May 16 their bargaining position had been strengthened by the seizure of the town and castle of Pont de l'Arche, located on the Seine not far from Rouen, by Breton and other French soldiers, some of whom were from garrisons at Louviers and Évreux. After a small group gained entry to the town, a larger force of four or five hundred unfurled the Breton flag and overwhelmed the city crying "Saint Yves et Bretaigne." Among the hundred or so English subjects taken prisoner was William Neville, Lord Fauconberg. Breton forces or those friendly to the duke of Brittany shortly afterwards also took Conches, not far from Évreux, Gerberoy in the Beauvaisis, and Cognac and Saint Maigrin in Guienne. Somerset was not pleased with these events. According to Basin the news of the fall of Pont de l'Arche reached him in two hours and came as a great shock.[79] The people of Bordeaux protested futilely to the king at Chinon over the fall of Cognac and Saint Maigrin. Charles VII and Francis I were now ready to negotiate on more equal terms for the return of Fougères and the payment of reparations.[80]

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[79]Basin, I, pp. 201-202. See also Blondel, pp. 26-27.

[80]Considerable details on the seizure of Pont de l'Arche are provided by the chroniclers (Blondel, pp. 23-26;

Charles VII had given broad powers to Culant and Cousinot on May 27, as has been noted, to settle the problems arising from the seizure of Fougères and from other violations of truce. On Sunday, June 15, they wrote to Somerset that they were at Louviers, as their king Charles VII had announced they would be in his letter of May 13, and they desired to know his intentions concerning the recent violations by the English of the truce.[81] They did not mention the capture of Pont de l'Arche. Somerset noted in his reply, dated the next day, Monday, June 16, that Pont de l'Arche had been seized after l'Enfant and Hanneford had left the French court, and after Charles VII had written his letter of May 13 to Somerset that he was sending envoys to Louviers to discuss matters relating to the keeping of the truce. Somerset then reminded the Valois envoys that Charles VII and Henry VI had agreed in the previous year that the Valois envoys would reside at Louviers, the English at Pont de l'Arche, and a conference would be held at a site between these two places.[82] Somerset then stated that in spite of this interference he was sending l'Enfant and Hanneford

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[Le Bouvier], pp. 245-53; Monstrelet, III, pp. 407-408; D'Escouchy, I, pp. 159-67; Basin, I, pp. 199-201; Wavrin, V, pp. 123-25).

[81] Conferences, pp. 386-87. For their commission and Charles's letter of May 13 see pp. 379-85.

[82] He was referring to the suggestion of Henry VI made in March of 1448, and agreed to by Charles VII on June 17, 1448, that talks be held under this arrangement in September, 1448, to plan a meeting of the kings (see above, pp. 217-18, and Rymer, XI, p. 216).

to Elbeuf[83] to agree to a place to discuss the "matieres qui seront ouvertes, si nous vueilliez certifier de vostre voulente sur ce."[84] The Valois ambassadors answered him on the following day, Tuesday, June 17, that they did not recall any such agreement made on the part of their king. Furthermore, they were not at Louviers to discuss or debate the "cas de Fougieres," but only to determine what reparation should be made. There could be no dispute over the illegality of the seizure of Fougères since it was obviously a violation of the truce. Culant and Cousinot then suggested that Somerset's envoys come to the abbey of Bonport, "qui est lieu deglise, et bien convenable pour telles matieres," or to Port Saint Ouen, on Thursday, July 19, at 2:00 P.M. "et oirons [verrons] tres voluntiers ce quils nous vouldront dire." They requested a reply to their suggestion.[85] Jean l'Enfant wrote to the French ambassadors on Wednesday, June 18, in response to their letter to Somerset, that the English delegation, of which he believed he would be a part, would be at Port Saint Ouen on Friday, June 20, between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M.[86]

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[83]About fifteen miles northwest of Louviers on the Seine.

[84]Conferences, pp. 388-91.

[85]Ibid., pp. 391-95. These places are all near Louviers and Port de l'Arche.

[86]Ibid., pp. 396-97. The letter may have been written by l'Enfant rather than Somerset because neither Culant nor Cousinot were of equal rank to Somerset, and the latter was also somewhat piqued by recent developments.

Cousinot and Culant made a formal declaration on Wednesday, June 18, which was given to the English ambassadors upon their arrival at the conference, that they were not meeting with the English at Port Saint Ouen in order to engage in a dispute over the affair of Fougères or over any other matter already clearly decided by the truce. They were, rather, going to Port Saint Ouen on the next day only for the reasons noted in their letter of July 17 to Somerset, i.e., to determine what reparation should be made.[87]

The conference at Port Saint Ouen convened on Friday, July 20. L'Enfant, Cousin, and Thomas de Sainte-Barbe, bailiff of Mantes, represented Somerset. Each diplomatic party also included several others. L'Enfant spoke for Somerset and Cousinot for the Valois monarch.[88] L'Enfant reviewed recent diplomatic occurrences and protested that all of the recent violations of the truce be discussed and negotiated, rather

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[87] Ibid., pp. 397-98.

[88] An English protocol of the talks at Port Saint Ouen, which also includes various letters and other items written in May and June, was given to Culant and Cousinot by the English clerks at the conference. This protocol is in French archives and has been printed by the PRO (Conferences between the Ambassadors of France and England in Narratives of the Expulsion of the English from Normandy, M.CCCC.XLIX.--M.CCCC.L. ["Rolls Series," no. 32], pp. 379-514), and by Morice (Mémoires pour servir de preves à l'histoire de Bretagne, Paris, 1744, II, cols. 1454-1508). Also included are protocols of talks held later in June and July (see below). The protocols are in Latin, except for the inclusion of documents in French, and were written by Johannes Textoris and Robertus Fromondi, notaries and priests of the bishopric of Évreux (Conferences, pp. 412, 514).

than merely the question of reparation for Fougères. Cousinot answered that Charles VII had tried faithfully to observe the truce because of his reverence for God and his desire to halt the shedding of Christian blood. He cited various English violations of the truce which had occurred before the seizure of Fougères and noted particularly the refortification of Saint James de Beuvron and Mortain along the frontier. He noted that Somerset had been designated by Henry VI to represent the English crown in resolving problems relating to the violation of the truce, and that the English duke had refrained from doing so. Cousinot then dwelt at length on the seizure of Fougères and again reminded the English that François de Surienne was a knight of the Garter and a crown pensioner. He then asserted that Somerset had encouraged the seizure of Fougères and had refused to make restoration of the city and agree to reparations. He summarized the recent unsuccessful French attempts to resolve the matter in talks with the English. He stressed that Fougères and the rest of Brittany were subject to Charles VII and were thus protected by the Truce of Tours. Cousinot declared that there should be no questions to debate.[89]

L'Enfant protested that Somerset could not be implicated in the seizure of Fougères for he had strongly expressed his displeasure over the incident in a letter to François. After additional lengthy talks by l'Enfant and Cousinot over Fougères and Somerset's alleged role in it, l'Enfant brought up the

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[89] Conferences, pp. 400-404.

Valois-Breton seizure of Pont de l'Arche and the capture of Lord Fauconberg. He demanded that Pont de l'Arche be returned to the English and that Fauconberg be freed, noting in particular that the English envoys were to have been domiciled here while conferring with the French. Cousinot questioned whether it had been agreed that the English envoys were to be housed at Pont de l'Arche. He agreed to resolve the matter of Pont de l'Arche and the capture of Fauconberg but held that the matter of Fougères had arisen first and should be first resolved. Following a further exchange of views, the English ambassadors agreed to refer to Somerset, Cousinot's offer to give satisfaction for the seizure of Pont de l'Arche and the capture of Lord Fauconberg, after reparations had been made for Fougères. L'Enfant stated that he would send representatives to Les Andelys on the following Monday or Tuesday, June 23 or 24, to notify the French that the English ambassadors were ready to resume talks at Louviers.[90] However, on Wednesday, June 25, before the ambassadors met at Louviers, they held some secret talks at the church at Venables.[91] The writers of the protocol did not reveal what transpired at Venables. They recessed their talks and reconvened at Louviers on the next morning, Thursday, June 26. Perhaps at Venables the envoys were trying

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[90] Ibid., pp. 404-12. Les Andelys is about twenty miles southeast of Rouen on the Seine.

[91] Ibid., p. 413. The ambassadors ". . . inter se, seorsum et separatim, aliquas secretas collocationes habuerunt." Venables is in the diocese of Évreux.

to agree upon a procedure to allow discussions to continue in the hope of resolving their differences, since there had arisen a difference of opinion on what should and should not be discussed. However, this was not resolved at Venables for at Louviers the English wished to follow a broader agenda that would allow them to resolve their various grievances against the French before making any agreement concerning Fougères. After a considerable amount of discussion and negotiation on June 26 and 27, it was agreed that the English would state, in writing, their position on the various matters about which they were concerned, and then, after a careful study, the French would reply in writing. This device then would allow each side not to be limited in its presentation by what the other side believed should or should not be discussed, and would tend to decrease, it was asserted, the abundance of words being exchanged. Direct talks were probably also continued, but their content is not given in the protocol.[92]

Mundeford and l'Enfant presented their first written statement on Saturday, July 28, and the Valois ambassadors, Culant and Cousinot, answered them in writing on Sunday. The English communication consisted of twenty-one separate items, each of which was directly referred to and answered by the French. The French reply also included lengthy introductory remarks. The French asserted again that there was no question concerning the fact that the capture of Fougères was an obvious

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[92] Ibid., pp. 413-14.

violation of the truce. They also stated that any French proposal not accepted by the English at this meeting could not be accepted at a later date.[93] Apparently Lord Fauconberg had been listed in the English commission with Mundeford and l'Enfant as one of the English ambassadors. This attempt to give him diplomatic immunity failed; the French refused to accept this part of their commission. The French also summarized the alleged violations of the truce by the English.[94]

The English noted in their opening paragraphs that they had come "pour communiquer, besongner, et appoincter sur le bon entretenement des treves, leurs circumstances et deppendances," with the representatives of Charles VII. They then noted that the French had only come to ascertain the amount of reparations for Fougères.[95] The French replied in their statement of the following day that the purpose of the French mission had been clearly stated to Somerset and his envoys on previous occasions and that there should be no confusion concerning it.[96]

The English denied the earlier French charge that Somerset had conspired with and given aid to François de Surienne. The capture was made without Somerset's permission or aid;

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[93]It was a fairly common feature of diplomacy during this age to attempt to resurrect previous offers of an opponent.

[94]Ibid., pp. 435-48.

[95]Ibid., pp. 414-16 (Items I and II).

[96]Ibid., pp. 448-49 (Items I and II).

it was, rather, against his wishes. According to the English statement, Somerset wrote a sharp rebuke to François in which he stated that the Aragonese knight would be held responsible for whatever the consequences of the seizure might be. François replied to Somerset that he regretted an act which was unpleasant to the lord. He admitted that he had neither Somerset's approval nor support, but stated that, when Somerset knew the full circumstances, he would not criticize him for the seizure. François also wrote to Somerset, according to the English statement, that he had proclaimed, "sur peine de la hart [halter]," that his troops should not injure or damage any of the inhabitants or property of Fougères. The English ambassadors then wrote that, in view of the extensive acts of violence on both land and sea by Bretons against the subjects of Henry VI before the capture of Fougères, including even along the coast of England, Somerset reasonably decided to refer the questions relating to Fougères to Henry VI. If Somerset had not done so, it was alleged, he could have been rebuked by the king for acting against his uncle, Charles VII. They asserted that Somerset also ordered, "sur peine de la hart," that none of the king's forces should go to the aid of François or make incursions into Brittany.[97]

The French replied to these "excusacions pretendues par le dit hault et puissant prince, duc de Somerset," in their letter of the following day by saying "soubz correction et en

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[97] Ibid., pp. 416-19 (Items III-VI).

toute reverence, que les dites excusacions sont bien petitement fondees." They intimated that Somerset knew François was moving his troops towards the Breton border and asserted that if Somerset had really regretted the seizure he would have immediately taken action to rectify it. They also questioned the innocence of Somerset by noting that much of the goods seized at Fougères was seen being shipped to Normandy. The statement that François had assured Somerset he would recognize the rights of the people of Fougères did not warrant an answer, for François had already violated this promise and was continuing to do so on an even greater scale. The French also asserted that various English violations against the subjects of the duke of Brittany had preceded any alleged Breton violations. The French had taken these matters up with Moleyns and Dudley in December of 1446 at Tours and they had been discussed at the conference in London in July of 1447, according to the French statement. The French writing then noted that it had been agreed in London to hold a conference at a later time. However, it was asserted, Somerset gave no heed to later attempts made by the duke of Brittany to obtain reparations for violations prior to Fougères. The French then questioned why Somerset should delay making reparations for Fougères by asserting it was necessary to obtain the wishes of his king. Somerset had been appointed his king's representative in France to deal with such matters, Fougeres was an obvious violation of the truce, and, further, "le dit prince nepveu nest pas juge du dit roy

de France." The French particularly questioned the sincerity of Somerset's proclamation forbidding his subjects to aid François for,

> depuis la dite prinse de Fougieres, presque de toutes les garnisons de Normendie de lobeissance du dit prince neveu il est alle gens au dit lieu de Fougieres qui ont fait guerre au dit pays de Bretaigne, et semblablement ceux Davranches, Tombelaine, et dailleurs, ont couru ou dit pays de Bretaigne, ainsi que dessus est touche; par quoy nest homme qui bonnement sceust entendre a quoy profite ce dit cry, ne quelle excusation le dit haut et puissant duc de Somerset puet pretendre a ceste cause.[98]

The English envoys also recalled in their letter that Cousinot and Fontenil were with Somerset at Rouen from April 7, fifteen days after the seizure of Fougères, to April 22 ("sauf quatre ou cinq jours des festes de Pasques"), and that during all this time they made no mention of Fougères. If they had done so, the English envoys assured, they would most certainly have received an early and reasonable answer. They also repeated the charge that in April Jacques de Clermont and other men loyal to Charles VII tried unsuccessfully to seize Mantes and other places obedient to Henry VI. Hanneford and l'Enfant were sent to Charles VII on May 1, the English envoys recalled, to protest these recent acts of aggression and also to attempt to settle those matters previously discussed at Rouen. Charles VII said that the recent aggressions at Mantes and elsewhere were against his will, according to the English.[99]

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[98] Ibid., pp. 449-58.

[99] Ibid., pp. 419-22 (Items VII-IX). See above, pp. 238-39.

The French replied that, when Cousinot and Fontenil were in Rouen in April, the details of the seizure of Fougères had not yet been obtained and the duke of Brittany had not yet protested the action to Charles VII. However, they stressed that, as soon as Charles VII was informed of the details relating to the seizure, he sent a letter of protest to Somerset.[100] The French wrote that the assertion that Cousinot and Fontenil had not mentioned it in April could in no way excuse Somerset from fulfilling the requirements of the truce. The French repeated the assertion earlier made to l'Enfant and Hanneford by Charles VII that the attempted seizure of Mantes had been done without the knowledge or consent of the Valois monarch. They then observed that the duke of Brittany had many friends who resented Fougères and the various other attacks against his lands. Therefore, they noted, various acts of reprisal, such as that attempted against Mantes, could well occur without the knowledge of the French king.[101]

The English also wrote that, because of the seriousness of the matter of Fougères, Somerset preferred not to take any action without first consulting with Henry VI. The request was made that he be given time to do so. The English protested the recent seizure of Pont de l'Arche, Conches, and Gerberoy, and the capture of Fauconberg. These were obvious violations of the truce, they stated, and, furthermore, they were committed

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[100] This letter was dated May 13 (see above, p. 241).

[101] Ibid., pp. 458-61.

without justification. There was no reason for reprisal because of Fougères, they claimed, since Somerset had already done all that he could in that matter until he had consulted with Henry VI. The English also inquired whether the seizure of Pont de l'Arche, Conches, and Gerberoy were executed with the approval of Charles VII, or of the duke of Brittany, so they would know with whom to deal. They also noted that during the last three or four days, while Culant and Cousinot were at Louviers, Valois troops had attacked Harcourt and made additional threats against other English places.[102]

The French ambassadors asserted that the truce did not provide for referral to England. Henry VI had also twice written to Charles VII that Somerset was in charge of such matters. They denied that the seizure of Pont de l'Arche was made by order of Charles VII, but observed that in view of the recent outrages against the duke of Brittany it was no wonder that it had occurred. They further observed that, if the capture of Pont de l'Arche, Conches, and Gerberoy were in violation of the truce, as the English asserted, then the capture of Fougères and subsequent dilatory actions of Somerset were more so, for these brought on the later violations. They denied the English statement that Somerset had done all that he could regarding Fougères and reminded the English that Somerset had also refrained from doing all that he could to rectify the earlier

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[102] Ibid., pp. 422-30 (Items X-XIV, XVI, XVII, XIX).

violations of St. James de Beuvron and Mortain. The English had committed the first infractions of the truce, they claimed. If the French had committed any violations subsequently, the French wrote, they would be willing to make fitting provision, after the earlier matters were resolved.[103]

The English also demanded the release of Giles of Brittany, and asserted that the duke of Brittany was a vassal of the English king. The French observed that Charles VII had been working for better relations between Giles and the duke before Fougères, and hoped to reconcile their differences after Fougères was settled. The French asserted that there had been no question that the duke of Brittany was a vassal of the king of France since the time of Charles V.[104]

Mundeford and l'Enfant made two proposals to the French in their letter of June 29. If the French would return Fauconberg, who they alleged was on an embassy for Henry VI, and all other prisoners recently taken, and turn over to the English Pont de l'Arche, Conches, and Gerberoy, Somerset would then require François, by arms if necessary, to turn over Fougères to Somerset. Further arrangements could then be made between the two kings or their representatives relating to the possession of Fougères, and reparations which each side might owe the other. However, Fauconberg and the other prisoners should

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[103] Ibid., pp. 461-71.

[104] Ibid., pp. 427 (Item XV), 430 (Item XVIII), 437, 467-68, 470.

be made entirely free.[105] If this offer was not acceptable, Mundeford and l'Enfant wrote, they then proposed that Fauconberg and all of the prisoners of either side be set free. A day would then be set for the English crown to get control of Fougères from François, and the French crown to get control of Pont de l'Arche, Conches, and Gerberoy from those who held them. No assaults or attacks would be allowed during this period, nor would any fortifying of the places obtained be made. The kings would gain these places by force if necessary. A day would then be agreed upon "pour plus avant besongner ez dites matieres, ainsi que de raison sera, et selon la teneur des treves." If neither of these offers was acceptable the English would require the delivery of the prisoners and places recently taken and demand to know the "finale intencion et voulente touchant les dites matieres" so that they could report this to Somerset.[106]

The French rejected the two offers as neither "raisonnables ne recevables." They were not reasonable

> car raison veult que les premiers aggresseurs reparent les premiers, et toutesfois les dites offres contiennent le contraire.

They could not be received because "elles ne sont pas selon la teneur des treves." The French proposed that the English do as the truce required and they would then do as was

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[105] "a plaine delivrance," i.e., there should be no ransom involved.

[106] Ibid., pp. 430-35 (Items XX-XXII).

appropriate. More specifically, they proposed in the early part of their letter that Somerset return Fougères to the duke of Brittany, along with the goods taken or their value, estimated by the French at "deux millions dor et plus." The English should put up security to this value in the form of "ostaiges, gages, ou places." At a convenient time for meeting, prisoners would then be exchanged and the exact amount of damages ascertained. The security required then would be adjusted higher or lower as necessary. The English should also punish those responsible for the capture of Fougères, destroy the fortifications at St. James de Beuvron and Mortain, and also make restitution for other damages in Brittany and in other lands subject to Charles VII. The French intimated that they would then discuss the recent capture of Fauconberg and others, and the seizure of the three towns. In answer to the English demand that they state their final intention if they rejected the English offers, the French answered that when Somerset had done what was necessary according to the truce, the king of France would then do that which he should.[107]

The English ambassadors replied in writing on Monday, June 30, to the answer of the French, dated June 29. The French answer had been in reply to their letter of June 28. The French then replied on Wednesday, July 2, to the English letter of June 30. Each side attached its earlier letter to

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[107] Ibid., pp. 446-48, 471-73.

its second letter and wrote that it should be considered part of the second letter.[108] The letters of June 30 and July 2 did little more than attempt to answer allegations in the previous letters, and reaffirm the positions of the two embassies.

The English protested in their second writing that Somerset had done all that was possible to observe and keep the truce, although violence may have occurred on the part of the English since men by nature are inclined to do wrong. They held that there were many French wrongs committed, however, for each English wrong. The only specific French act cited by the English was the capture of Fauconberg, whom they again termed an ambassador. The French replied that, except for the mentioning of Fauconberg, this charge by the English was general and vague. They observed that "quand il vouldra particulariser, il y sera bien et deuement respondu." However, the taking of Fougères and the fortifying of St. James de Beuvron and Mortain "ne sont pas articles generaux, ainczois sont cleres infractions de treves." The French wrote that Fauconberg might be styled an ambassador or any other name the English wished but that there was no indication he was on an embassy to the Valois court. The English also wrote that they had always sent envoys to the French when necessary, who then did their best to observe the truce concerning St. James de Beuvron and Mortain. They held that these matters had already

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[108] Ibid., pp. 480-81 (Item X), p. 490.

been discussed in the presence of Charles VII and that reasonable offers had been made by the English. They also held that the first fortifications in violation of the truce had been made by the partisans of Charles VII. Concerning Fougères, which they noted was the sole reason for Culant and Cousinot coming to the conference, they referred the French to the articles in their previous writing. The French admitted that envoys had been sent to Charles VII concerning St. James de Beuvron and Mortain, but denied that any reasonable offers had ever been made. The French refused to answer the English charge that the first fortifications in violation of the truce had been carried out by the French until the English gave more particulars. The French agreed that their sole reason for coming to the conference was to determine the amount of reparation the English should pay for Fougères, and emphasized that as yet the English had done nothing to atone for their crimes committed at Fougères.[109]

The English also noted that Giles of Brittany had been captured by subjects of Charles VII before the seizure of Fougères, and demanded his release. The French referred to their previous statements and noted that Giles was a native of Brittany and therefore a subject of the duke of Brittany and the king of France. The English stated that they knew nothing about the duke of Brittany doing homage to Charles VII, and

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[109] Ibid., pp. 474-77 (Items I, III-V), pp. 483-88.

asserted that if this had occurred since the truce it should not prejudice the rights of Henry VI. The English also demanded to know whether the capture of Pont de l'Arche and other places recently taken had been done with the approval and consent of Charles VII, so that they would know with whom to deal. The French merely referred them to their previous writing.[110]

Mundeford and l'Enfant termed the offer made by Culant and Cousinot neither acceptable, reasonable, nor just. According to their second letter, they detailed their objections orally to Cousinot and Culant.[111] The French offer, they held was unequal; whereas their previous offers, which they chose to stand by, were equally fair to both sides. The French envoys disputed the English contentions and asserted that their offers "sont justes et raisonnables; car elles sont selon la teneur des treves." They stated that, if the English desired to keep the truce, they should accept them. They termed the English offers "injustes et desraisonnables."[112]

Both sides reaffirmed their previous offers. The English mentioned again the capture of Fauconberg and others, and the seizure of Pont de l'Arche, Conches, and Gerberoy. They demanded the return of the prisoners, restoration of the towns,

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[110] Ibid., pp. 476 (Item II), 479 (Item VI), 480 (Items VIII and IX), 485, 489, 490.

[111] There is no reference in the protocol to any conversations between the two embassies at this time, although they may well have occurred.

[112] Ibid., pp. 477-78 (Items V and VI), 487-88.

and damages. Perhaps in answer to the French request for more specific information on any French violations prior to Fougères, the English requested the delivery of Simon Morhier, a knight and a member of the King's Council, and others taken prisoner at Dieppe early in 1448. Mundeford and l'Enfant offered in their letter to take the letter of Culant and Cousinot to Somerset in order to obtain his thinking, and then to return on Friday, July 4, at the latest, to consult with the French ambassadors. They insisted that all acts of violence cease during this time. The French agreed to a delay of one day, until Thursday, so that the English might confer with Somerset, but refused to guarantee that violence would cease until an agreement concerning violations of the truce had been made. They charged that on the night of June 30 Richard Frogenhale, Somerset's chamberlain, and others close to Somerset, attempted unsuccessfully to take the castle of Neufbourg. They then set fire to the town and killed many inhabitants. This caused them to doubt that the English wished to have the violence cease or that they even had the power to guarantee a cessation of the violence. The English apparently departed for Rouen on June 30, and received the second writing of the French after they returned on July 2.[113]

On the morning of Thursday, July 3, Cousin and l'Enfant came to the abbey of Bonport, not far from the previous meeting

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[113] Ibid., pp. 477-82 (Items V-VII, IX-XI), 488-93.

place. Cousin had replaced Mundeford in the English delegation.[114] At about nine o'clock on the morning of July 4, Cousin, l'Enfant, and Thomas de Sainte-Barbe met with Culant and Cousinot and exchanged their final written statements. These contained the last offers of the two governments. The English statement included again a rejection of the previous French offer.[115] The English doubted that a "petite ville" such as Fougères could have goods valued at so great an amount. They also held that the Bretons had inflicted greater damages against the English than had been done at Fougères, and were continuing to do so. The ambassadors also stated that Somerset had only been empowered to resolve differences with Charles VII, not with the duke of Brittany; therefore, matters concerning the duke of Brittany would have to be considered separately and only after consultations with the English king. They also pointed out that "en la dite offre esqualite nest pas gardee," since the English would be required to submit "ostages, gages, ou places," with nothing in return. The English then asserted that although their previous offers were just and reasonable, they would make another offer to show the good will of Somerset.

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[114]Mundeford was hindered by other unspecified developments from attending. The French demanded to see the English commission, possibly to be technical, or perhaps to see whether Cousin had been authorized to replace Mundeford. It was decided after some discussion to meet again on July 4. Presumably an acceptable English commission was available at that time (Ibid., p. 495).

[115]"Semble, soubz correction, que la dite offre ne soit pas raisonnable ne acceptable (Ibid., p. 497)."

The English then offered that "la personne de monseigneur de Faucomberge, ambassadeur, etc.," be freed immediately, and a date be set for the exchange of all other prisoners. The exchange of Fougères for Pont de l'Arche, Conches, and Gerberoy was conditional on the release of Fauconberg.[116] Concerning the matter of reparations, the English suggested that, after the above items had been accomplished, commissioners

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[116] Ibid., pp. 496-99. The protocol is unclear on the transfer of the towns. The most generous interpretation, and the only one that can reasonably be made, is that the English were willing to have all the disputed towns transferred to the other side on the same day. Any less generous interpretation, e.g., that Somerset wished to have Fougères transferred from François to him, and the three French-held towns also transferred to him, would have been less generous than the earlier English offers and thus would have been rejected by the French in the strongest of terms. The French appear, in their writing made later in the day (Ibid., p. 503), to have interpreted the English as offering to turn the castle and town of Fougères over to the duke of Brittany, though they were mainly referring to the statement of the English (Ibid., p. 500) that, if they should do so, this would not prejudice the English claim that the duke of Brittany was a vassal of Henry VI.

The second offer contained in the first writing of the English at Louviers on June 28 would be similar, though not identical, to the offer apparently made here (see above, p. 260, and Ibid., pp. 432-34). The unclear portion of the protocol of July 4 reads as follows:

> neantmoins, pour soy mettre en toute devoir tant et si avant que bonnement luy est possible, honneur gardee, offre mon dit seigneur [Somerset] dabondant, soubz les protestacions ci-apres declarees, que certain jour convenable soit pris et accepte dedans lequel la dite place de Fougieres sera baillee et delivree ez mains de mon dit seigneur le Gouvernant [Somerset], ou ses commis et depputez, les places du Pont de l'Arche, Conches, et Gerberay, et toutes les personnes des prisonniers, tant dune part que dautre, en quelque lieu quils soient (Ibid., p. 499).

There is no significant variation between the protocol edited by Stevenson, quoted above, and by Morice (II, col. 1502), though, according to Stevenson (Narratives, p. xiv), they used different transcripts.

be appointed to settle the various claims made by each side upon the other. The English emphasized that nothing in their offer should be interpreted in such a way as to affect their claim that the duke of Brittany was the vassal of Henry VI. They also stated that any agreement that should be arrived at in England between Havart, the ambassador of Charles VII to Henry VI, and the English monarch would not be affected by any agreement arrived at in the conference at Bonport. They also held that if the above offer was not accepted by Henry VI, matters should remain as before. As was customary, they held that, if no final agreement was reached, the offers made in this and two previous writings were null and void.[117]

Later on the same day, after studying the offer of the English described above, the French ambassadors answered in writing that the "offre nest juste ne raisonnable, et par consequent non acceptable, pour trois causes." First, they answered, the English protested that any agreement should not prejudice their claim that the duke of Brittany was a vassal of Henry VI. There could be no question over this matter, the French wrote, for he had long been a subject of the king of France. The second reason given for refusing the offer of the English was that any agreement would be subject to the approval of Henry VI and would not take precedence over any agreement arrived at between Havart and the English in London.

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[117] Ibid., pp. 499-502.

The truce held, they asserted, that a matter such as that of Fougères should be settled according to "la teneur des dites treves," and could not be left to the pleasure of either of the kings. They also asserted that Havart had not been commissioned to make any agreement concerning Fougères. The third reason supplied by the French for rejecting the offer was that the English wanted the reparations they owed for Fougères to be applied to "la recompense quils demandent des pertes et dommages quils dient avoir este portes par les Bretons sur ceux de lobeissance Dangleterre." This was not according to "la teneur de la treve," for it clearly stated that in cases such as Fougères things taken should be restored as they were before the infraction. If they were not restored, the truce would not be observed. The French also asserted that since August of 1448, the Bretons had repeatedly claimed reparations totaling 732,000 écus against the English for proven inflictions upon Breton subjects other than those at Fougères. The English claims against the Bretons, however, remained unconfirmed. If the English claims were discussed, the Breton claims would also have to be considered. However, these matters were not as clearly decided by the truce as was Fougères and should not be confused with it. Fougères was an obvious violation of the truce, the French reiterated, which could not be put "en contens et debat."[118]

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[118] Ibid., pp. 502-508.

The French also noted the matters of St. James de Beuvron and Mortain and observed that

> soit cler, notoire, et manifeste que icelles treves nont pas este bien entretenues ne gardees de la dite part Dangleterre, aincois enfraintes en pluseurs et maintes manieres.

Therefore, they concluded, Charles VII "ne soit point tenu dicelles entretenir ne garder, se bonne luy semble." The English were the first aggressors, they stated, and could thus make no demands until they made reparations for their aggression. They then emphasized the desire of Charles VII to preserve the truce and stated the last offer of the Valois monarch. If, by July 25, the English would turn over Fougères to the duke of Brittany, along with the goods taken at the time of seizure, "selon le teneur des dites treves," Charles VII would, not more than twelve days later (August 6), set Fauconberg free and turn over Pont de l'Arche, Conches, Gerberoy, and the goods taken from these towns, "en la maniere que contiennent les dites treves." The French admitted that there might be some difficulty relating to the valuation of the goods taken at Fougères by the English, and also that the English might desire some security to assure the delivery of the three towns held by the French and the release of Fauconberg. The French again proposed that the English, after they return Fougères and its goods, give as security, until the full loss of goods at Fougères could be more accurately determined, "gaiges, hostaiges, ou places a la valeur ou extimacion diceulx biens, selon la commune renommee, qui est de deux millions dor." If

the goods lost amounted to a larger or smaller sum, the English would pay or be paid the difference. The French also offered, at or before the restitution of Fougères and its goods, to give "bon gages ou hostages," of an unspecified amount until the release of Fauconberg and the transfer of the three towns and their goods be carried out. The twelve day delay was necessary, the French wrote, because of the distance between Fougères and the other three towns. This offer, the French reminded the English, was reasonable since the English had been the first aggressors. Fifteen days after the delivery of the three towns to the English, i.e., on August 21, the places recently fortified by either side near the frontier would be dismantled,[119] and a time and place set to resolve the various complaints that had been made by those on each side concerning all other infractions of the truce. They also suggested that both sides provide sureties for the dismantling of recently fortified places comparable to those made for the exchange of towns.[120]

The final offers of each side contained too few concessions to make them acceptable to the other delegation. The French and English embassies recognized that they could not reach an agreement on their differences. The English stated that Somerset had no authority from Henry VI to proceed further in his offers. The French embassy held that this position was

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[119]Here the French were probably thinking primarily of St. James de Beuvron and Mortain.

[120]Ibid., pp. 508-12.

unreasonable since he had not been asked to make any concession that would violate the Truce of Tours or be against the contents of the letter of Henry VI.[121] The French envoys proclaimed that the proposals of Charles VII had indicated that he desired to do all that could be reasonably expected to preserve the truce, and that if the war should resume, he could not be blamed. Rather than break off relations completely, the envoys adopted the usual device of referring the offers and statements of their counterparts to their lords, i.e., to Somerset and Charles VII, so that they might consider them at their pleasure and perhaps arrive at a solution to their differences at a later time. For all practical purposes, any reasonable hope for fruitful diplomacy to stave off a resumption of the war ended at Bonport.[122]

During the conferences at Louviers and Bonport each side had resurrected the old charges of truce violations, along with a few additional ones. Though the two sides gradually broadened their offers, neither side appears to have made any offers that could have been acceptable to the other. The French had reason to be suspicious of the sincerity of Somerset

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[121] Stevenson, I, p. 259. The French were probably referring to Henry's letter of October 3 to Somerset, a copy of which had also been sent to Charles VII ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 204-205; Stevenson, I, p. 246; see above, pp. 224-25).

[122] Conferences, pp. 513-14; Blondel, p. 36; "Epistola Guillelmi Cousinet [sic] ad Gaston IX, comitem Fuxensem, de victoriis à Gallis reportatis adversus Anglos." Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, complectens regum ac principum aliorumque virorum illustrium epistolas et diplomata, ed. E. Martène and U. Durand, I (5 vols.; Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1717), cols. 1812-18.

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following the refortification of St. James de Beuvron and Mortain, and certainly following the seizure of Fougères. This is especially true since he made no effort to rectify these truce infractions. The seizure of Pont de l'Arche and the other two towns had obviously been done in reprisal for the English violations, and, particularly, the English failure to make amends for these violations. Somerset's final proposal that Fauconberg be freed, and then the towns be exchanged, did not allow for a recognition of the fact that the English had seized Fougères first; nor did it allow security for the payment of damages at Fougères. Yet the French demand of "deux millions dor," regardless of the denomination understood, made their otherwise somewhat reasonable final offer totally unrealistic. As the English observed on July 4:

> Premierement, car il nest pas vraiesemblable que en une si petite ville comme est Fougieres eust biens de tele valeur; car a un grant besoing a peine fineroit le royaume de France de si grande somme.[123]

Neither side was willing to make any significant concessions to the other, or even to trust the other. No solution appears to have been possible short of a large concession on the part of one side or the other. It is difficult to determine whether either of the sides was sincere in these negotiations, or whether the envoys merely wished to consume time in order to make preparations for war. The latter may well have been the case, especially in view of the low rank of the

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[123] Conferences, p. 497.

negotiators. These men were professional diplomats, however, and may have been chosen over nobility because of their abilities. They also were close to their masters and had easy access to them. If these talks were seriously engaged in, nevertheless, it appears that the embassies would have been headed by blood princes or leading clerics. Though the English crown may not have wanted the war to resume, Somerset's policies since his arrival in France left no doubt on his attitude towards the question of war or peace. During these weeks Charles VII was also making plans for the resumption of hostilities. His treaty of June 17 with the duke of Brittany against the English has already been mentioned. At about the same time that he concluded this treaty with one of his great feudal vassals, he sent an embassy to another great vassal to gain his support in the approaching conflict.

Charles VII sent Louis de Luxembourg, count of St. Pol, and several other members of his court to Philip of Burgundy at Bruges apparently in about the middle of June. The members of the embassy showed copies of the recent royal correspondence with Somerset and with the duke of Brittany concerning the various violations of the truce. The members of the embassy were charged with obtaining the "conseil et advis" of Philip on how the French monarch should proceed. Philip conferred with his Council and showed it the recent letters. He stated to the embassy that Charles VII had conducted himself wisely, particularly in regard to the outrages inflicted on the duke

of Brittany by the English. He urged that Charles VII give the duke of Brittany all the aid necessary for the protection of his duchy and people, and for the recovery of Fougères. He asserted that Charles was only doing what the truce required and that it was also the duty of the English to assist him. Charles VII had requested Philip's advice on the question of resuming the war in view of the English violations. Philip advised that Charles VII wait until after the conferences planned in and around Louviers,[124] and the return of Havart from England, so that he might know whether the English planned to make reparations for Fougères. He suggested that very soon afterward the king assemble

> les gens de son conseil et y mander les seigneurs de son sang et autres ses officers et subgiz, telz et en tel nombre que bon lui sembleroit, pour avoir leur advice et conseil sur le dit article de la guerre.

Then, Philip suggested, the king act in accordance with what would benefit his honor and that of his kingdom. The duke stated that he would send men to consult with Charles VII on these matters, and he also urged the king to secure his fortifications and to order his soldiers to approach the English frontiers. The members of the embassy reported back to Charles VII on July 24.[125]

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[124] I.e., those which ended at Bonport on July 4.

[125] Stevenson, I, pp. 264-73 (This is the report made to Charles VII by the Valois embassy after its return from Bruges. The embassy had related the questions of Charles VII to Philip.).

The Low Countries of Duke Philip, particularly the cloth-producing provinces of Flanders, Holland, and Brabant, were probably influential in causing a worsening of relations between Philip and Henry VI. English cloth had been prohibited in certain of the Low Countries at various times since 1428. In 1446 his duchess had signed a truce and a commercial treaty with the English. This was endangered by numerous infractions, and, in 1447, by an order requested by Brabant, Holland, and Flanders to forbid the importation of English cloth. At that time he also forbid the passage of English cloth through his lands to the Hanseatic cities in order to increase the markets for the cloth produced by his own subjects. It has also been suggested that the English Staple merchants at Calais were behind this prohibition of English cloth, so that the importation of English wool into the Low Countries might increase. Strong protests from the English led to talks being scheduled at Calais for November, 1448. However, they were postponed until May, 1449, and were largely unsuccessful. In May of that year, the English captured a fleet of Flemish, Holland, and Hanse ships. Those belonging to Philip's subjects were released, but the Hanse merchandise was retained for some time in England, increasing anti-English feeling in some of the Hanse cities. In July of 1449, the same month that he encouraged Charles VII to resist English aggressions, Philip sent an embassy to the Hanseatic Diet at Bremen to recommend that English cloth be prohibited in the Hanseatic lands. He was partially successful

with Lübeck, but not with all of the Hanseatic cities because of their disunity at this time.[126] Late in July, 1449, the English made plans for another attempt to improve their commercial relations with Philip. However, English relations with the Low Countries continued to deteriorate while those with the Hanse towns tended to improve. A truce and a commercial treaty was agreed to with the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights and some Hanse towns in June of 1451.[127] Thus the commercial relations of the Low Countries with England were not of a nature that would promote closer diplomatic relations between Philip and Henry VI. The worsening of Anglo-Burgundian relations probably helps to explain the increasing friendliness of Philip towards Charles VII. As noted earlier in this chapter, Philip may have also tended to be friendlier to Charles VII because he was engaged in conflicts in the Empire, and because Charles appeared to be increasing in military and administrative authority.

Shortly after the conference at Bonport ended on July 4, and while the French monarch was improving his ties with the

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[126] On the commercial relations of the Low Countries with England see: Rymer, XI, pp. 132, 140, 146, 169, 171, 218-22, 229-30; PRO, Exch. T. R. (Dipl. Doc.) 30/498, 515; A. W. Franks, "Notes on Edward Grimston, Esq. Ambassador to the Duchess of Burgundy," Archaeologia, XL (1865), pt. 2, pp. [455]-464; PPC, VI, pp. 69-76; Kerling, pp. 51, 77-80.

[127] For protocol of treaty see PRO, Chan. 30/10(7); for confirmation see Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 387. See also Rymer, XI, pp. 233, 272, 282; Cal. Fr. Rolls, p. 388; PPC, VI, pp. 76-85. The English had also made commercial treaties with some of the Hanse towns after the Congress of Arras, between 1436 and

dukes of Brittany and Burgundy, Charles VII also consulted with his Council[128] at his castle of Roches-Trancelion near Chinon on the question of war and peace. Culant and Cousinot related the recent events at Louviers, Évreux, and Bonport to the Council. They showed a notarized protocol (procès-verbal) of the recent talks.[129] It included the offers they had made in the name of Charles VII. They noted that the English envoys had stated that Somerset did not have the authority to make further concessions, an assertion which they had challenged. Charles VII stated that he had done all that he could to preserve peace, without success, and that, in view of the English failure to make amends for their truce violations, there was no alternative to declaring war. The councillors present agreed that the king could not be blamed if the war resumed, and criticized Somerset for not fulfilling his obligations under the truce. They noted that Henry VI had given him full powers to maintain the truce. The king and his

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1440 (see Rymer, X, pp. 401, 626, 666, 741, 745, 769, 770; XI, pp. 264, 304-307; PPC, V, p. 126; Cal. Fr. Rolls, pp. 331, 332.)

[128]Vallet de Viriville (Histoire de Charles VII, III, p. 152) suggests that he met with his Council on July 17, which appears reasonable. It was at least between July 4, when talks ended at Bonport, and July 20, when French troops attacked the town of Verneuil near Évreux ("Epistola Guillelmi Cousinet," col. 1814). It is not known who attended this Council, but, since it was apparently called on short notice, it probably consisted of those attached to the court. The duke of Brittany was not present. A larger Council meeting, which perhaps included a portion of the princes of the blood, was held later, on July 31, as will be noted.

[129]This is apparently the protocol cited above, p. 249.

Council agreed to secure the frontiers. Charles VII notified the duke of Brittany and the other princes not present, as well as his allies, Castile and Scotland, that he was resuming the war.[130]

On July 17, the count of Dunois was appointed lieutenant-general of the area from the Seine and Oise rivers to the sea, or as it was variously expressed in another document, the "Duchie & pays de Normandie." Other princes and officials were charged with raising armies and defending other frontiers. Breton forces had been active for several weeks and had recovered St. James de Beuvron on June 29. They also took Mortain soon afterwards. The duke of Burgundy was not required by the provisions of the Treaty of Arras to give military support to Charles VII, and, except for his aggressions against the English at Calais and elsewhere in 1436, there is no record that he had done so. However, he apparently authorized his feudatories to give military support because armies were raised in and near Picardy by the counts of Eu and St. Pol, and others. Thus Normandy was virtually surrounded by enemy forces. Pierre

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[130] Stevenson, I, pp. 259-61; "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 245-47; Chartier, II, pp. 76-78; Blondel, pp. 37-45; Vallet de Viriville, Histoire de Charles VII, III, pp. 152-53; D'Escouchy, I, pp. 184-86; Wavrin, V, pp. 125ff.; "Epistola Guillelmi Cousinet," col. 1814. Blondel quotes a lengthy speech by the chancellor, Jacques Jouvenel des Ursins, on the crimes of the English and the reasons why the French should resume the war. It is not clear whether he gave the speech at this time or on July 31. It is also mentioned by D'Escouchy (I, p. 185) and in the protocol of July 31 ("Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 248). However the protocol of July 31 might refer to another speech, e.g., that printed in Stevenson (I, pp. 243-64).

de Brézé seized the town of Verneuil on July 20, and soon after received aid from Dunois in storming the citadel. Hostilities were well underway before the king met again with his councillors on July 31.[131]

There is no indication that the English were making extensive plans for the resumption of hostilities. Though the curious diplomacy of Somerset in recent months should have indicated otherwise, there is no record of any reinforcements from England. Somerset had asked for aid from England and had warned of war in February of 1449 when he had sent the abbot of Gloucester to Parliament, but without any results. It is impossible to ascertain the reasons for the recent actions of Somerset. Perhaps he was merely trying to gain as many concessions as was possible from Charles VII without resuming the war, and he did not realize the state of Valois preparedness. He may have believed that the strength of his military forces were sufficient to withstand any direct challenge from Charles VII. Possibly he was not aware of the fact that the French, including the previously semi-independent princes of the

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[131] France, Sovereigns, etc., Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, recueillies par ordre chronologique, Volume XIV: Contenant les ordonnances depuis la vingt-cinquième année du règne de Charles VII, jusqu'a sa mort en 1461, ed. [Louis Georges Oudart Feudrix] de Bréquigny (A Paris: De l'imprimerie royale, 1790), pp. 59-60; Chartier, II, pp. 78-82 et passim; Blondel, pp. 45-55 et passim; D'Escouchy, I, pp. 186-90; Basin, I, pp. 205-208; Wavrin, V, pp. 127ff.; "Epistola Guillelmi Cousinet," cols. 1814-18; Ramsay, II, pp. 94-95; Beaucourt, IV, p. 331; V, passim; Vallet de Viriville, III, pp. 153-54. The English troops fortified in la tour grise at Verneuil did not surrender until August 23.

blood, were more fully supporting the Valois monarch than ever before. He appears not to have been greatly alarmed over the security of Normandy and the other lands held by the English in France for, after February, no request for aid to Henry VI or Parliament is known to have been made. Following the failure of the talks at Bonport on July 4, however, he may have had some second thoughts on his diplomacy with Charles VII, for on July 9 he wrote a letter to Charles VII asking for a resumption of negotiations relating to recent truce violations. The letter, carried by l'Enfant and Cousin, was received at the French court on July 24.[132] The two diplomats were apparently not instructed to make any significant concessions to Charles VII so that the truce could be preserved. However, it was probably too late for any concessions. As has been noted, hostilities had already resumed.[133]

On July 31 Charles VII convened his Council at Roches-Trancelion. The main reason for the meeting appears to have been to demonstrate to the two envoys of Somerset that Charles VII had been justified in resuming the war, and that he had the support of his advisers and vassals.[134] The king

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[132]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 243-44.

[133]The fact that the letter was not received until July 24 may indicate that the resumption of fighting had caused them to be delayed in their journey from Rouen.

[134]A protocol of this meeting is in "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 245-51. Among those present were Charles of Anjou, count of Maine and uncle of the queen

summarized the infractions of the truce by the English, the "juste et raisonnable" offers made in his name by Culant and Cousinot at the recent negotiations, and the opinions expressed by his Council at the meeting held some two weeks earlier. Each member of his Council present was then asked to state his individual views on the king's decision. They were "tous d'une mesme oppinion que le Roy estoit deuement, justement et honnorablement deslyé et acquité de ladicte treve." The Breton envoys emphasized their support of the king.[135] The chancellor then spoke at length on the history of Anglo-French diplomacy from the Truce of Tours to the present time, directing his remarks in particular to the English ambassadors. He tried to show that the representatives of Charles VII had at various times attempted to resolve the differences that had arisen over infractions of the truce and had worked for a permanent peace between the two kings. He noted the various violations of the subjects of Henry VI, stressing in particular the seizure of Fougères, and the failure of Somerset, as Henry VI's

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of England, Charles II, count of Clermont and eldest son of the duke of Bourbon, William de Harcourt, count of Tancarville, Gilbert Motier III, mareschal de la Fayette, Robert de Rouvres, bishop of Maguelone, Theobaldus de Luceyo, bishop of Maillezais (near La Rochelle), Jean d'Estampes, bishop of Carcassonne (Aude), and the king's chancellor, Jacques Jouvenel de Ursins, archbishop of Reims. A three-man delegation from Brittany, headed by Robert de la Rivière, bishop of Rennes, was also present. Others may have been present but many of the more important members of the Council, e.g., Dunois, were engaged in military activities at this time and were probably not present.

[135] "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 247-48.

representative in France, to rectify these infractions.[136]

The English ambassadors stated that the truce had been signed at Tours, and had been prorogued at various times, so that a permanent peace might be reached. They observed that representatives of both kings had resolved differences arising from truce infractions at numerous times. However, they stressed, the recent differences were due to the fact that the duke of Brittany wrongly claimed to be a vassal of Charles VII. This was indicated, the envoys of Somerset asserted, by the fact that the Breton duke had offered to release his brother Giles and pay 50,000 écus for the return of Fougères without first notifying Charles VII. The Breton envoys denied that any such offer had ever been made.[137] The English requested the release of Lord Fauconberg and called for negotiations on reparations for the seizure of Pont de l'Arche.[138] Unfortunately the protocol ends here, but there is no doubt on the outcome of this conference, for hostilities continued during August and the succeeding months until 1453, when the armies

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[136]Stevenson, I, pp. 253-64 (speech printed with the wrong date); "Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, p. 248. The speech recorded in Blondel (pp. 37-45) may have also been made at this conference or at the one held earlier in the month. The speech printed in Stevenson has been referred to at numerous times in this chapter, particularly as an aid to chronology. Since it contains the same Valois arguments already noted, it will not be summarized here.

[137]François also wrote to Henry VI in 1450 that he had been offered 50,000 écus, and other large offers by the duke of Brittany for the surrender of Fougères, but had refused them (Stevenson, I, p. 296).

[138]"Pièces justificatives," D'Escouchy, III, pp. 248-51.

loyal to Henry VI had lost all of the lands on the mainland of Europe except Calais, which was bordered only by the lands of the duke of Burgundy. At the most, the envoys of Somerset probably gained nothing more than a formal declaration of war.

Except for an embassy from Philip of Burgundy to Henry VI in August suggesting that Henry resolve his differences with Charles VII and oppose the Turks on a great crusade,[139] there was no further attempt on the part of either king or any of their vassals to bring about peace. War was, in the eyes of Charles VII and his councillors, the only solution to the repeated truce violations of the English. In view of the fact that both monarchs had claimed title to the crown, perhaps war was inevitable anyway. However, if Somerset had been more conciliatory to the French, it might not have begun at a time when the English were so ill-prepared, and the subjects of Charles VII so united. Charles VII could not have chosen a better time to resume the fighting, or Somerset a worse time. The English aided Charles VII in his quest for support from the princes of the blood, particularly the duke of Brittany, and then gave him the excuses he needed, or at least probably desired, to continue the war until the English were ousted from Normandy, Guienne, and all of their strongholds on the continent except Calais.

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[139]Stevenson, II, pp. 471-73. The embassy may have set out as early as July for England. Henry's answer was dated August 17.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The methods of diplomacy between England and France in the mid-fifteenth century do not vary significantly from those methods of medieval diplomacy described by Garrett Mattingly[1] and others,[2] although this dissertation may define more clearly some of the generalizations made by them. It is interesting to note that when two parties could not agree on the non-essential features of a treaty, e.g., the enumeration of allies in the Truce of Tours, then different versions of a treaty would be drawn up for each of the parties. There were also prescribed forms for the commissions of ambassadors and other documents. These have been described in the second chapter. The rank of the participants and the establishment of precedents were also a significant part of medieval diplomacy. What Mattingly referred to as "Renaissance diplomacy," as opposed to "medieval diplomacy," arose in Italy in the latter half of the fifteenth century, and varied somewhat from Anglo-French diplomacy at mid-century. The great innovation of Italian diplomacy in the late fifteenth century was the use

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[1] Renaissance Diplomacy, pt. 1. [2] See above, pp. 28-29.

of resident ambassadors instead of special envoys, although it was also more elaborate in other ways.[3] Nevertheless, the nature of medieval diplomacy, as it was conducted in the fifteenth century by England and France, is similar in many respects to modern diplomacy.

English diplomacy with France, during the years following the Congress of Arras and up to the English expulsion from the continent (except Calais) in 1453, was marked by vacillation, inconsistency, and weakness. Henry VI was guided in his diplomacy by the members of his Council, and when they were divided, as they often were, his policies became inconsistent and vague. On the other hand, the diplomacy of the government headed by the Valois monarch, Charles VII, remained generally strong and consistent. The allegedly weak dauphin, whom the Maid of Orleans had helped get crowned, proved to be one of the strongest and most important rulers in the history of France. The tendency of historians to call attention to his supposed weak traits prior to his coronation has caused him to be unjustly thought of as a weak monarch. Yet he was instrumental in causing Philip the Good of Burgundy to forsake his alliance

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[3]A permanent or resident embassy from Venice was at the Holy See as early as 1435, but the practice did not become widespread until the last part of the century. Pius II and Innocent VIII threatened to degrade to the rank of proctor those ambassadors who remained in Rome and were thus prolonging indefinitely their embassy of obedience, which was customary on the elevation of a new pope. Yet the threats were not carried out and the number of resident ambassadors continued to increase. They were soon considered useful by the papacy (Mattingly, pp. 79-80, 105-106).

with Henry VI of England. He also strengthened the administrative reins of his government, checking the dissident nobles, putting down their attempts to increase their power at his expense, and building a national army strong enough to remove the English monarchy from any effective voice in French affairs. After 1453 only Calais, surrounded by the lands of Philip, remained in English lands -- the smallest area of land held by an English monarch on the continent since William the Conqueror had ascended the throne of England.

The conflict between Henry VI and Charles VII was, in varying forms, an old one. Each claimed to be the rightful heir to the throne of France and each held that the other should do homage to him for lands in France. The cause of Henry VI had been damaged heavily when his powerful ally, the duke of Burgundy, had signed the Treaty of Arras with Charles VII in 1435. During the late 1430's and the early part of the next decade, the various princes of the blood, particularly the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany, worked for a peace between Henry VI and Charles VII. Philip apparently felt the pressures of economic interests in the Low Countries, and he and other princes may have also feared that a continuation of the war would have weakened their independence, especially if Charles VII should emerge as the only strong ruler in France. The war had been costly to the English and certain of Henry's advisers urged a peace treaty or truce, if satisfactory concessions could be obtained.

The Conference of Calais in 1439, the first large-scale peace conference since Arras, might have come close to resolving the issues, at least temporarily, if it had not been for the misunderstandings that existed between the English delegation, headed by the king's great-uncle, Cardinal Henry Beaufort, and the other members of the Council, who remained in England. Beaufort had apparently been empowered to compromise on Henry's claim to the crown of France by conceding that France could have more than one king, each sovereign in his own lands on the continent and thus not obligated to do homage to the other. However, these concessions were retracted in additional instructions to Beaufort, apparently because, in his absence from England, Humphrey of Gloucester, brother of the late Henry V, was able to dominate the Council. Even if the English delegation had been empowered to make such extensive concessions, however, it is doubtful that they would have been accepted by Charles VII, since the war was proceeding well for him at this time and he would not have countenanced a second "king of France" when control of the entire nation seemed possible. The conference had been called mainly through the efforts of the duke and duchess of Burgundy and had apparently not been actively sought for by Charles VII. Yet, if peace had been possible, it could not have been reached because of the dissension in the government of the weak Henry VI.

During the early part of the 1440's Charles VII was increasingly plagued with difficulties from the semi-independent

French princes of the blood, including his own son, the future Louis XI, as well as the dukes of Brittany, Burgundy, Alençon, Bourbon, Vendôme, and others. While a number of the nobles became involved in the unsuccessful conspiracy against Charles VII known as the Praguerie, Philip remained aloof and even led successful negotiations with the English to obtain the release of Charles, duke of Orléans, who had been a prisoner of the English since Agincourt. His ransoming, opposed in the strongest of terms by Gloucester, was ostensibly carried out with the understanding that he work for an end to the hostilities. Charles VII even suspected that Charles of Orléans might cooperate with the other princes in an alliance against him. Such a possibility appears to have also entered the minds of his captors, but it did not materialize. Orléans and the other princes cooperated closely with the English and worked for a peace conference between the two kings or their representatives. Such a conference was successfully held at Tours in the spring of 1444.

Before the Conference of Tours Charles VII had been only moderately successful in his warfare with the English. His only noteworthy accomplishment was the disruption of plans in 1442 between his vassal, the count of Armagnac, and Henry VI for a marriage of the young king and a daughter of the count. The count had apparently entered into discussions with the English at the suggestion of the princes of the blood. The subsequent actions of Charles VII indicate that he was willing

to enter into a peace agreement with Henry VI by the spring of 1444 primarily in order that he could strengthen the control of his government over the blood princes and carry out extensive military reforms.

Beaufort had long believed that the English should maintain their power on the battlefield and thus negotiate only through strength. He had supported proposals in the past that would have allowed Henry to retain most of his lands on the continent, but would have required him to cease claiming title to the French crown. He apparently feared that, if the war continued indefinitely, those lands long held on the continent might be lost. In 1444, when the cardinal was past seventy years of age, William de la Pole, earl (later duke) of Suffolk, took up his policies and enunciated them more clearly. Gloucester, the leader of the "war party," had been weakened in 1441, when his wife was found guilty of sorcery. He had failed in 1440 to halt the release of the duke of Orléans and in 1444 he failed to stop the signing of the Truce of Tours and the marriage of Henry VI to Margaret of Anjou, a niece of Charles VII. Suffolk was an old friend of Orléans and had long been known for his conciliatory attitude to Charles VII. At Tours the English, led by Suffolk, stated that Henry VI would be willing to give up his claim to the French crown in return for undisputed sovereignty over the lands he held in France. This, it may be stressed, is essentially what the cardinal had wished to offer in 1439. These lands, the English asserted, had been

held prior to any English claim to the crown of France. Charles VII refused to compromise his claim to all of France. No peace, therefore, but a truce for two years, which was later extended at numerous times, was agreed upon. The royal marriage, which, it was believed, might tend to improve relations between Charles and Henry, was also approved.

Thus Charles VII obtained what he apparently wished -- a truce which eventually lasted for about five years and which gave him sufficient time to strengthen his power. The English also gained time, but nothing else. The time was not utilized to increase English military might on the continent or to improve relations with the French princes; instead, in the long run, it served to remove the English from the continent. Henry VI had hoped to resolve permanently his conflicting claims against Charles VII for his French lands, but Charles VII had been unwilling to make any general peace that would be at all satisfactory to Henry VI. The English representatives also made one significant concession at the conference. They had allowed the name of the duke of Brittany to be entered in both the English and French versions of the truce as an ally of Charles VII, thus refuting, in effect, the English claim that the duke was a vassal of Henry VI.

Various talks, which were held in 1445 and succeeding years to bring about a permanent peace, floundered mainly over the question of whether the English king should be required to do homage to Charles VII for his lands in France

or whether he should hold them outright. Disagreements over which lands the English should be allowed to possess could probably have been resolved, but there could be no English compromise with the claim of Charles VII that all those possessing lands in France, including even Henry VI, were required to do homage to him. Thus the Truce of Tours was extended again and again as negotiations broke down and a meeting of the two monarchs to resolve their conflicting claims was postponed. Neither government appeared to have strongly supported a meeting of the kings, although the ambassadors of both monarchs had come to realize that this was the only possible means of obtaining a permanent solution. Charles VII was probably not eager for such a meeting for he had no wish to compromise his claim to the crown of France. The councillors of Henry VI were perhaps hesitant to work vigorously for such a confrontation because of the personal weaknesses of Henry VI, which might have brought about an expensive settlement. The costs of such a meeting were also prohibitive to the English crown. Henry VI appears to have been unsuccessful in his attempts to raise the necessary revenue.

Charles VII, while awaiting the proper moment for war, did not hesitate to gain what advantages and concessions he could during the truce. As has been noted, many facts relating to the cession of Maine lie shrouded in mystery. The matter was probably discussed informally at the Conference of London in the summer of 1445, if not before, perhaps between

Suffolk and the Valois ambassadors. Margaret of Anjou appears to have also been instrumental in persuading her weak-willed husband that it was a necessary concession, if the truce was to remain effective, and a general peace was to be successfully concluded. The concession was made not later than December, 1445. It may have been a condition for an extension of the truce and a meeting of the kings, but it was apparently in exchange for nothing else, except a vague hope of peace. An earlier concession, the release of the duke of Orléans in 1440, had been designed to allow the duke to encourage peace between the rival kings of France, though also, perhaps, to foment dissension between Charles VII and his great vassals, but there appears to have been no rationale for the cession of Maine. This unilateral concession, which probably weakened the military defense of Normandy, if quickly executed, could perhaps have improved relations between the two monarchs. However, it served, instead, only to weaken seriously whatever amicable feelings may have existed between the Valois and Lancastrian courts. If this unilateral cession of Maine had not indicated to Charles VII that he was dealing with a weak monarch, subsequent developments relating to Maine did indicate this to him. Henry VI proved unable to require his subordinates in France to effect the cession. Part of the reason for the refusal of the English in Maine to surrender the county may have been the absence of clear orders from the king to do so, but this does not totally explain the delay

in Maine. Neither does it explain the reasons for the delays at the English court in executing proper orders and insisting that they be observed. The views of the English in Maine who resisted the cession were probably expressed by Humphrey of Gloucester in the meetings of the Council. He was arrested, however, and died a prisoner shortly before the transfer was executed. His fall and death may well have been related to the transfer. The city of Le Mans and other strongholds in Maine were not turned over to the agents of Charles VII until a display of Valois military power brought about the compliance, under protest, of the English representatives at Maine in 1447.

Meanwhile, the bitterness that had arisen between Charles VII and the representatives in France of Henry VI over Maine continued unabated. Henry's governor in France by this time was Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset, who appears not to have been concerned at all about Henry's professed desire for a general peace treaty or about the possibility of the war resuming. Somerset allowed refugees from Maine to refortify and settle at St. James de Beuvron and other places along the Breton border. This would not have been a violation of the Truce of Tours if the duke of Brittany had been a vassal of Henry VI, but, according to the truce, he was a vassal of Charles VII. Therefore this was in violation of the truce with Charles VII signed at Tours in 1444. According to feudal law, Charles VII was obligated to defend his vassal against

this alleged injustice. Also, according to the Truce of Tours, he was authorized to take up the cause of his vassal and ally. After Tours, the English ambassadors began to claim at various conferences that both the duke of Brittany and the duke of Burgundy were vassals of Henry VI. The representatives of both of these dukes denied this and acknowledged Charles VII as their vassal, as provided in the truce. The relations of the duke of Brittany with Henry VI were worsened by the failure of the English to recognize his claims to certain lands in England, and probably also because he was wedded to a Scottish princess. The duke of Burgundy, as has also been noted, was involved, on the part of some of the Low Countries, with various commercial conflicts with the English, and also was engaged in conflicts within the Empire. Also, probably because Charles VII continued to increase his control over his vassals and build a strong national army, and, in addition, because previous attempts to weaken his power had failed, the French princes of the blood had come to realize that they had a chance to maintain their semi-independent status only if they supported Charles VII. As they came to realize the lack of administrative power Henry VI had over his subordinates in France, as well as his lack of military force, they withdrew from the policy they had had up to the meeting at Tours, namely, of maintaining close relations with the king of England. It was reasonable for them to support Henry VI while they still had designs of increasing their own power at the expense of Charles VII, but it was

quite another thing to be on what would almost obviously be the losing side if the war resumed.

It is doubtful that the truce could have lasted much longer than it did even if Somerset had followed a conciliatory policy towards Charles VII, for Charles had indicated that he would be satisfied with nothing less than a united nation. Yet it is impossible to comprehend the reasons why Somerset countenanced the sacking and seizure of the Breton town of Fougères in 1449. The English were ill-prepared militarily for a resumption of the war. Charles VII was ready to fight and the English furnished him the excuse. Charles VII still allowed a state of peace to exist by differentiating between the policies of Henry VI and Somerset, and not holding the former accountable for the policies of the latter. Nevertheless, Henry VI and his councillors did not take any significant action against Somerset. The actual seizure of Fougères was committed by François de Surienne, called the Aragonese, but Somerset was probably implicated. François later asserted that Suffolk and Henry VI were also involved. If this is so, it may have been at a much earlier date and under different circumstances for there is no other evidence to substantiate this allegation. However, if Somerset was not implicated, he was not opposed to the occurrence because, subsequently, though he officially expressed regret, he refused to restore the city to the Bretons. He asserted that, since the duke of Brittany was a vassal of Henry VI, this was a matter to be

resolved between the English king and the Breton duke. The French seized the Norman town of Pont de l'Arche in retaliation. Negotiations in the summer of 1449 between the representatives of Charles VII and Somerset did not resolve the differences which had arisen over these various truce infractions. The French held that the truce violations relating to St. James de Beuvron, Mortain, and Fougères would all have to be resolved before Pont de l'Arche would be discussed. The delegates of Somerset wished to discuss these matters and also the status of the duke of Brittany all at the same time. The failure of the delegates of Somerset to offer any significant compensation for Fougères or the earlier violations gave Charles VII no alternative. Even if he had not wanted war, his honor, as the duke of Burgundy noted, required him to see that justice was achieved for his vassal, the duke of Brittany. Charles VII was supported by his vassals; he had increased his military power. The English had made no notable reforms or increases in their military forces on the continent. It is not difficult to believe that the Valois monarch preferred a resumption of the war anyway. However, it is difficult to understand why the weaker of the two powers would force the war to resume -- yet this was done by the duke of Somerset, in the name of the king of England. The English empire on the continent was lost within about four years, except for Calais, surrounded, as noted before, by the lands of the duke of Burgundy, nominally a vassal of Charles VII, but virtually independent.

Suffolk can be blamed for these developments only in the sense that he and other members of the Council appear to have done nothing to halt the aggressive policies of Somerset, or to strengthen English power on the continent. Yet he was the one who was assigned primary responsibility for the loss of France.[4] Charges were later made against Somerset also and he was imprisoned in the Tower for several months in 1453, but these charges were soon withdrawn.[5] It is impossible to

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[4]After the war resumed in the summer of 1449, and Rouen fell in October, Suffolk was blamed for the various concessions made to the French, particularly the release of the duke of Orléans and the cession of Maine. He was also charged with failing to reinforce the English forces in France and betraying English affairs to the Valois court. In January of 1450, Adam Moleyns, who had already been forced by Parliament to resign as keeper of the privy seal, was murdered for reasons apparently not related to these matters. Before he died he made statements on the cession of Maine which were hurtful to Suffolk. Numerous other charges were also made against Suffolk in February and March of 1450, including that he had collaborated to secure the throne for his son John, whom he wished to marry his ward, Margaret, the infant daughter of John Beaufort. She was also a niece of Somerset. Suffolk denied all these charges and the king and queen were able to arrange that he be allowed to remain free on the condition that he remain out of England for five years. He was murdered at sea on May 2, 1450, by sailors who considered him a traitor. (For the charges made against him in Parliament see Rot. Parl., V, pp. 176-83; on the circumstances surrounding his fall see Kingsford, "The Policy and Fall of Suffolk," and also Kingsford's article in the DNB, XVI, pp. 54-57. Also see the various chronicles and collections of documents cited in these articles.)

[5]Somerset lost favor with Parliament with each succeeding loss of land on the continent. His niece, Margaret Beaufort, was, along with Richard of York, one of the possible heirs to the crown until the birth of a son to Henry VI in 1453. When Henry became insane in 1453, allegedly because of the loss of France, Parliament appointed York his protector and sent Somerset to the Tower. He was freed in 1455 after the king regained his sanity. Henry VI then appointed him captain of Calais. Somerset lost his life in the battle of

determine what the course of events would have been if the personality or ability of the English king had been different, and if there had been a more consistent and well thought out policy regarding the lands claimed or held by Henry VI in France, as well as the title to the crown of France. However, it is safe to assume that events might have developed much differently. Most of the diplomatic and military results of the years since Arras were due ultimately to the differing personalities and abilities of Charles VII and Henry VI, or at least to the fact that there was no consistent and well planned policy adhered to by the Council of this weak Lancastrian monarch who claimed to be king of France, as well as of England. The only thing that can be said in favor of Henry VI's reign during these years is that they were not the most disastrous years of his reign -- the Wars of the Roses were

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St. Albans in 1455 against the forces of York. Although closely associated with Suffolk, it appears that he was primarily instrumental in creating the conditions that brought about the resumption of the war and was also mainly responsible for the inadequate defense of English lands in Normandy. There is an undated document in Worcester's Collection (Stevenson, II, pp. [718]-[722], possibly from the year 1453 (though perhaps earlier, since it includes nothing on the loss of France), which asks that Somerset be required to explain his role in the capture of Fougères. It alleges that he told François de Surienne he should not surrender the city, even if subsequent letters from him should order him to do so. It also charges that he did not pay his soldiers, though he had the funds, thus requiring them to plunder the country, and that he did not pay the money which had been given to him for the relief of the refugees from Maine. There is also in the Paston Letters (II, pp. 290-92) a petition by the duke of Norfolk requesting that Somerset be investigated because of "the loss of ij so noble duchees as Normandie and Guyen." See also DNB, II, p. 39.

just beginning. France, on the other hand, made further strides toward national unity as the more independent of the French vassals were subjugated by the subsequent Valois monarchs.

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the nineteenth century under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, contains numerous sources from private English collections and continental archives. Stevenson's work consists of a considerable number of documents from private collections in England, and from the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Archives Nationales in Paris. A portion of the works published in the nineteenth century by the Société de l'histoire de France have been valuable because of the chronicles and documents in these works relevant to fifteenth-century France. One collection of French documents, published by the society, of considerable value for the years 1444-49 is that edited by Beaucourt and appended to his edition of the Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy. Various protocols have provided an unusual amount of details on the Conference of Calais in 1439, the embassy to the count of Armagnac in 1442, and the Conference of London in 1445. The first two were written by Beckington, or an assistant. The protocol of the 1439 conference has been published by the Record Commissioners in the Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council. The Armagnac fiasco has been recounted in the "Rolls Series," published by the PRO, as well as in other editions; and the protocols of the London Conference, written by Valois participants, appear in Stevenson. There is, in addition, a detailed protocol of the final conferences in 1449, before the outbreak of war, in another work edited by Stevenson in the "Rolls Series": Narratives of the Expulsion of the English from Normandy. Other

documents of value, although in less quantity, were also obtained from the other works listed below.

The chroniclers of the age are often confusing on chronology, but occasionally provide illuminating details which explain various problems more fully. The chroniclers whose writings are of the greatest value are Monstrelet, who died in 1444, d'Escouchy, who continued his work to 1449, Wavrin, on whom Monstrelet apparently based a portion of his work, Jean Chartier, who is also occasionally similar to Monstrelet and Wavrin, and Thomas Basin. The Brut and Hall's chronicle are also occasionally of value. The writings of the other chroniclers noted below are only rarely of value.

The general surveys of the period by Ramsay and Beaucourt remain the two most detailed and valuable general histories, although both are more than half a century old and sometimes in error. Mattingly's Renaissance Diplomacy and Dickinson's work on the Congress of Arras are valuable for an understanding of the general nature of medieval diplomacy.

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